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INTRODUCTION
"The incarcerated are basically abandoned."'
"We're dealing with people deprived of liberty; it's one of the
last problems in terms ofprioritiesfor the government.
There isn't attention to it... "!
"Pretrial detention is not always wrong; it can be necessaiy to
prevent the flight of a criminal suspect and/or illegal
tampering with evidence or the process itselj Pretrial
detention is legal if it meets carefidly defined conditions in
human rights law, particularly the right to liberty and
security of the person, and the principle of presumption of
innocence.'
The excessive and arbitrary use of pretrial detention in
Bolivia and worldwide is a grave human rights violation with
serious and lasting consequences not only for detained
individuals, but for their families, communities, and the State.4
I . Interview with Ramiro Ilanos, Director General, Bolivian Prison System
[Reginen Penitenciario], in La Paz, Bolivia (May 23, 2012). Interviews were conducted
in English by the Fordham delcgation, assisted by interprctcrs flucnt in both Spanish
and English, where needed. In many cases, interviews with detainees were conducted in
the presence of individuals associated with nongoverinmental organizations, primarily
the Pastoral Pcnitcnciaria, that have established ties with dctainces. The delegation
ensured that all interviewees were informed of the interview's purpose, its voluntary
naturc, and how thc inforination provided would be used. All named individuals
consented verbally or, subsequently, in writing, to be interviewed and quotcd. Because
of the sensitive nature of the issues examined, the full names of certain interviewees
who contributcd to this Report have been withhcld.
2. Intervicw with Ramiro Leonardo Iquise Pally, National Progriam Manager of
People Deprived of Liberty and the Program of Disabilities, Office of the Ombudsman,
in La Paz, Bolivia (May 24, 2012).
3. OPEN SOC'Y FOUNDS., PRETRIAL DLTENTION AND TORTURE: WHY PRLTRALL
DETAINEES FACE THE GREATEST RISK 18 (2011).
4. See Martin Schontcich, The Scale and Consequences of Pretrial Detention Around the
World. in JLSTICE INITIATIVES: PRLTRLAL DETENTION 13-17 (2008), available at
http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org,/sites,/default/iles/JusticeInitiati.pdf, ROY
WALMSLLY, INT'L CLNTRL FOR PRISON STUDILS, WORLD PRL-TRIAL/RLMAND
IMPRISONMENT LIST (2008), http://ww'W.prisonstudies.org/info/(Iownloads/WPTRIL.p
df (discussing the dilerent delinitions for and ways to measure pretrial detention). For
purposes of this Report, "[p]risoners in pre-trial detcntion, or on remand, are those
who have been detained without a sentence and are awaiting legal proceedings. They
are also known as untried or unconvicted prisoners." Pre-trial Detention, PENAL REFORM
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On any given day, approximately three million people
worldwide are in prison awaiting trial, and during the course of
an average year, ten million people are admitted into pretrial
detention, Out of the worldwide incarcerated population, one
out of every three people in detention is awaiting trial and has
not been found guilty of a crime.6
In Bolivia, of the 11,516 persons deprived of liberty
throughout the country as of December 2011,7 9,626, or 8 4 %
percent of these prisoners, have not been sentenced.," This
number has increased in recent years, almost tripling between
2001 and 2011 from 3,747 to 9,626.9 At the same time, the
number of sentenced prisoners has remained relatively constant
at approximately 2,000 persons per year.10 In Bolivia, as in other
countries, many of these individuals spend months and even
years imprisoned, without being tried or convicted, much less
sentenced.
Despite national and international human rights legal
protections that ensure fair trial rights, pretrial detention is
ordered excessively and arbitrarily both in Bolivia and
worldwide. The Director of the United Nations Latin American
Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of
Offenders (ILAN UD) has classified the practice as "prison
genocide." 11 The Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights, at the conclusion of the 147th Period of Sessions in
March 2013, made the powerful statement that "the excessive
INT'1, http://vwv.penalreform.org/thenes/pre-trial-detention (last visited Akpr. 26,
2013).
5. Schonteich, supra note 4. at 11.
6. Id. at 13.
7. FUNDACTON CONSTRUIR, REFORMA PROCESAL PENAL Y DETENCION PRFVENTIVA
EN BOLIVIA [CRIMINAL PROCEDURE REFORM AND PRETRIAL DETENTION IN BOLIVIA] 65
(2012) [hereinafter FUNDACTON CONSTRUTR REPORT], available at
http://www.fndacionconstiruir.org/index.php/(ocutenictio/descargar/archivo/Refor
maProcesalB_62.pdf.
8. Id. at 67.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. See GUT LERMO ZEPEDA LECU ONA, OPEN SOC'YJUSTICE INITIATIVE, MYTHS OF
PRETRIAL DETENTION IN MEXICO 7 (1st ed. 2005). available at
http://www.opensocietyfounldationis.org/sites/dcfault/files/ iLlms-pretrial-detention-
mexico-20100825-en_0.pdf (reporting the statement of Elfas Carranza).
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use of pretrial detention is contrary to the very essence of
democratic rule of law."12
International human rights law contains extensive
protections for individuals who are brought into the criminal
justice system, including the right to the following: due process,
the presumption of innocence, liberty, protection against
arbitrary or unlawful detention, presumption of release pending
trial, the assistance of competent and effective legal counsel, and
trial within a reasonable time or release pending trial.
Similarly, Bolivian law, through both its Constitution and its
Criminal Procedure Code (the "CPC"), contains human rights
protections that relate to pretrial detention. Both the
Constitution and the CPC guarantee the right to freedom and
articulate the narrow circumstances under which personal
liberty can be restricted, as well as the purpose that such
restrictions should serve. This right of liberty is protected
through a presumption of innocence. Until it is proven that an
individual has violated the rule of law through due process, that
individual must be treated as innocent and must therefore be
accorded all the rights granted to an innocent person.
As this Report describes, these rights are routinely violated
in the Bolivian criminal justice system: Individuals are detained
in contravention of the law and not only are they detained
illegally, they are then held in pretrial detention beyond the
legal time limits. Judges forgo their independence by allowing
citizen security concerns to influence their decisions to impose
pretrial detention. Given the gross insufficiency of human
resources, particularly the dearth of public defense attorneys,
most accused individuals never see a lawyer and lack even basic
information about their rights. They are thus effectively denied
a meaningful defense. Widespread corruption, including
bribery, also impacts pretrial detention decisions. The problem
disproportionately affects the poor, both in terms of the
likelihood that they will be placed in pretrial detention and the
consequences they face upon release, as they sink even more
deeply into poverty.
12. Annex to Press Release Issued at the Conclusion of the 147th Period of
Sessions (Apr. 5, 2013) hLp://www.0as.org/cs/cidh/prensa/comunicad(los/
2013/023A.asp
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This Report represents the culmination of a yearlong
interdisciplinary project undertaken by the Leitner Center for
International Law and Justice at Fordham Law School. A
delegation from Fordham visited Bolivia in May 2012 to conduct
research and interviews. The Fordham delegation was led by the
2011-12 Crowley Fellow in International Human Rights, Aya
Fujimura-Fanselow. The delegation included Fordham Law
School Professor James Kainen, Leitner Center Executive
Director Elisabeth Wickeri, Fellow Daniel McLaughlin, and
eight second-year law students: Zohra Ahmed, Jennifer Chiang,
Gerald Dickinson, Stephanie DiFazio, Zachary Hudson, Leila
Mokhtarzadeh,Jonathan Park, andJeffrey Severson. Members of
the Fordham delegation also returned to Bolivia inJanuary 2013
to carry out follow-up research and interviews as well as to
conduct advocacy and present findings.
Prior to conducting field work in Bolivia, the delegation
participated in an intense program of study throughout the
academic year, including a seminar led by Ms. Fujimura-
Fanselow and Ms. Wickeri focusing on the intersection of
pretrial detention and human rights in Bolivia. During the visit
to Bolivia, the delegation conducted individual and group
interviews with individuals in pretrial detention,
nongovernmental organizations, lawyers, members of the
judiciary, academics, donor agencies, members of the
government, and the United Nations. Members of the Crowley
delegation traveled to nine cities in the departments (or
administrative regions) of Beni, Chuquisaca, Cochabamba, La
Paz, Potost and Santa Cruz.
This Report presents the findings of this research effort.
Part I sets out the legal framework governing pretrial detention
in Bolivia, including an analysis of the transition that Bolivia
underwent from an inquisitorial to an adversarial system of law,
and considering the legal reforms that resulted in the current
law which governs the practice of pretrial detention. Part II then
explores the immense gap between law and practice with respect
to pretrial detention and the numerous violations that result
from this gap. Part III examines the impact of citizen security
concerns on judicial decisions to order pretrial detention. Part
IV discusses the human resource limitations that affect pretrial
detention, as well as the disproportionate impact of pretrial
PRETRIAL DETENTIONIN BOLITA 8
decisions and the particularly severe effect of pretrial detention
on the poor as well as the role of corruption. The Report then
concludes with a series of recommendations aimed at ensuring
that pretrial detention is applied in a way that conforms with
both Bolivian and international human rights protections.
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I. BACKGROUND: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND BOLIVIA'S
TRAASITION FROM THE INQUISITORL4L SYSTEM TO THE
ADVERSARIAL SYSTEM
Bolivian law includes numerous protections for individuals
who are arrested, detained, or charged with a crime.3 Many of
these protections were codified when Bolivia undertook the
fundamental transition from the inquisitorial to adversarial
13. See infta Part I.B.
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system of law.14 This section will provide an overview of that
transition and demonstrate that failure on the part of the
government to adequately institute key elements of the
adversarial system, as well as the fact that judges, prosecutors,
and defense attorneys continue to retain vestiges of the
inquisitorial system in their practices, has meant that the
transition remains incomplete. Additionally, as this
transformation took place, public dissatisfaction with what was
perceived to be a system that was overly sympathetic to the
defendant resulted in subsequent backsliding and led to
additional changes in the law. The result, which will be discussed
in Part II, contributes to the overuse and increased time lengths
of pretrial detention.
A. Legal Background and Transition:
Inquisitorial to Adversarial System
1. Criminal Proceedings Under the Inquisitorial System
Bolivia's legal protections in the area of criminal justice
have only a thirty-year history. Alter Bolivia's institutionalization
of democracy in 1982, the State still faced challenges in the
administration of criminal justice.1 While other democratic
institutions were rebuilt,16 the judiciary continued to operate
under the authoritarian "Banzer Codes,"' 7 a holdover from the
military period that prioritized public order during previous
military regimes."
The criminal justice system in place at the time was based
on the inquisitorial model19 and was characterized by excessive
formalism, the concentration of power in the judge, and lengthy
proceedings.
14. Plcase note that at tinles, the erims "adversarial" and "accusatorial" are used
interchangeably throughout this Report; the different use of terms is based partly on
the different translations and interpretations that were used during interviews.
15. FUNDACION CONSTRUIRREPORT, supra note 7, at 12.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. The Criminal Procedural Code in place at the timie was Decree Law No. 10426
of kugust 23, 1972. FUNDACTON CONSTRUJR REPORT, supra note 7, at 12; Interview with
Jorge Richter Amallo, Attorney and Previous Member of Criminal Procedure Code
Reforin Team, in La Paz. Bolivia (May 22, 2012).
19. FUNDACION CONSTRUTR REPORT, supra note 7, at 13.
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In Bolivia, these qualities resulted in both major procedural
delays and violations of defendants' rights. Judges were
responsible for most procedural aspects of the process,
including investigation, the gathering of evidence, and
sentencing. Excessive caseloads resulted in numerous delays,
including the postponement of hearings and delays in issuing
final decisions. Delays were compounded by the general absence
of time limits and deadlines in criminal proceedings.
Criminal prosecutions were based largely on confessions
made by the accused and written records prepared by the
parties.2o It was not uncommon for confessions to be extracted
through the use of torture.2 1 Defendants were left vulnerable
because defense lawyers had such a limited role to play in the
case and there was minimal, if any, contact between defense
attorneys and defendants2 The defense attorney could only
issue a written response to alleged facts and defendants
frequently had no opportunity to view the record. Thus,
defendants remained unaware of the record against them.2 If a
conviction resulted, the only avenue for appeal was to request
revision of a particular precautionary measure (such as pretrial
detention) through habeas corpus. 4
Also under the inquisitorial system, people accused of
criminal offenses were put into pretrial detention as a rule so
that pretrial detention served, in effect, as an anticipated
sentence. 25 Individuals with scarce economic resources and
those who lacked political power were particularly vulnerable2
20. Id. at 13-14.
21. Id. at 13.
22. Id. at 14.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 13.
25. Mandatory sentencing systems were in place whereby individuals charged with
medium or highly scrious crines were, in general, held in pretrial detention, and even
in the case of less serious crimes the system favored broad use of pretrial detention. See
MAURICTO DU-CE J., CLAUDIO FUENTES M. & CRISTTAN RIEGO R., THE IMPACT OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURL RLORM ON THE USE OF PRLTRIAL DETENTION IN LATIN AMERICA.
3 n.9 (Mauricio Duce j. & Cristian Riego R. eds., 2009) [hereinafter CEjA INTRO
REPORT], available at http://www.ccjamericas.org/index.php/areas-de-tLrabajo/prision-
preventiva-seccion/prision -preventiva-y-inedidas-cautelares/proidutctos/infories-
situacion-de-prision-preventiva-en-america-latina/inform es-comparativos (noting that
under Bolivia's 1973 criminal procedure system there were "indefinite mandatory
sentences for recidivists, habitual offenders, and professional criminals").
26. FUNDACTON CONSTRUTR REPORT, supra note 7, at 14.
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Often, detainees were held for longer periods than their
sentences would have been had they been convicted and
sentenced.2
As efforts to combat the manufacture, transport, and sale of
drugs increased, so too did the number of individuals brought
into the criminal justice system, and by extension, the number
of people in pretrial detention. 28 In particular, the
implementation of "Law 1008" (the Law on the Regime
Applicable to Coca and Controlled Substances) contributed to
an increased number of people in pretrial detention, given that
pretrial detention was effectively mandatory for anyone arrested
on this basis.29
2. Transitioning to the Adversarial System: Law 1970
A 1992 study by the United Nations Latin American
Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of
Offenders (ILANUD), provided an important impetus to the
beginnings of reform.so The report revealed several key flaws of
Bolivia's criminal justice system including delays in the justice
system; violation of the principle of prompt and timely justice;
lack of compliance with constitutional guarantees; corruption;
discrimination against disadvantaged sectors of society,
27. Id. at 13.
28. Id. at 14.
29. Id. While a full discussion of Law 1008 is beyond the scope of this Report, in
the case of crimes under Law 1008, pretrial detention was, in effect, mandatory. This
Law, Bolivia's first national legislation on drugs, was implemented on July 19, 1988. The
United States played a strong role in the drafting of this Code. See Diego Giacoman,
Drug Policy and the Prison Situation in Bolivia, in SYSTEMS OVERILOAD-DRUG TlAWS AND
PRISONS IN LATIN AMERICA 21, 21-22 (2011), aIlable at
http://wwwdiruglawreform.info/images/stories/documents/Sy stems _Overload /TNI-
Systenm s_Overload-def.pdf (analyzing drug policy and prisons in Bolivia, the study made
the following analysis of Law 1008: "its ambiguities and vagueness in several aspects
have opened the way to excessive penalization ... In the criminal proceedings
pursuant to Law 1008, the presumption of innocence is eviscerated by pre-trial
detention, the issuance of arrest warrants for defendants who are in absentia, and the
provisional registration of the assets of the persons involved. Law 1008 includes
elements which in themselves violate constitutional and civil rights, and which, given
the manner in which they are carried out, presuppose the systematic violation of
human rights in the most vulnerable sectors of the population"). At the end of 2011,
forty-five percent of pretrial detainees wvere detained for crimes related to Law 1008,
making it one of the most common bases for pretrial detention. See FUNDACION
CONSTRUIR RLPORT, supra note 7. at 137.
3o. FUNDACION CONSTRUIR REPORT, supra note 7, at 14.
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including financial barriers that prevented access to justice for
those Without resources; weaknesses among judicial operators;
and political interference that violated the principle of judicial
independence.3'
It was in the context of these findings that efforts towards a
criminal reform process started. This process was also driven by
the fact that by 1995, eighty percent of the incarcerated
population of Bolivia was made up pretrial detainees, a figure
that generated intense criticism.3 2 On March 25, 1999, Bolivia
enacted Law No. 1970 ("Law 1970").3 Soon after, the Law of
"Jubilee 2000," a criminal pardons law, was enacted. 34 In
31. Id.
32. Id. at 15.
33. Codigo de Procedimiento Penal No. 1970, Ley del 25 de Marzo de 1999
[Criminal Procedure Code No. 1970, Law of Mar. 25, 1999] [hereinafter CPC 1970]
(Susana Medina Day, trans.) (on file with author). The reforim of Bolivia's criminal
procedural code was part of a trend of reform throughout Latin America. The reforms
were influenced by, and to some extent modeled after criminal procedural codes from
both neighboring countries including Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica. El Salvador.
Guatemala, and Paraguay as well as countries lurther afield including Germany and
Italy. The reforms incorporated international human rights principles. Bolivian lawyers,
several of whom the Crowley delegation met with, participated in the drafting process.
There was also participation and influence from neighboring countries in Latin
America, as well as international donor agencies, including the United States Agency
for International Development ("USAID") and the German Technical Cooperation
Agency ("GTZ"). See LETICIA LORENZO, THE IMPACT OF REFORM PROCESSES IN
PREVENTIVE PRTSON IN BOLIVIA 11 (Mauricio Duce j. & Cristian Riego R. eds., Adrian
Althoff trans., 2012) (2009) [hereinafter CEJABOLIVIAREPORT]. There has been some
debate about the extent to which the reforms were a response to international pressure
as opposed to originating fron and being motivated by a domestic impetus. Roger
Valverde Perez, a Bolivian lawyer, argues " [The] code was imported and didn't respond
to the reality of Bolivia. Now wve are adjusting the code to the reality in Bolivia."
Interview with Dr. Roger Valverde Perez, Attorney, in La Paz, Bolivia (May 21, 2012).
When discussing what motivated the reform, another lawyer said: "And this reforim was
part of a regional trend. Also, international organizations demanded a change of this
nature." Interview with Jorge Richter Amallo, supra note 18. For further discussion and
analysis of judicial reforms throughout Latin America, ste LINN HAMMERGRLN.
ENVISTONING REFORM: IMPROVING JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE IN LATIN AMERICA 27-54
(2007); Maximo Langer, Revolution in Latin Amr ican Oriminal Procedure: Difusion oj
Legal Ideas from the Periphery, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 617 (2007): Leonard L. Cavise. The
Transition from the Infquisitorial to the Accusatoral System oJ Tral Procedure: Why Some Latin
American Lawyers Hesitate, 53 WAYNE L. REV. 785 (2007); Jonathan L. Hafetz, Pretrial
Detention, Human Rights, and Judiial Refr m in Latin America, 26 FORD-HAM INT'L LJ.
1754 (2002); Richard J. Wilson, Supporg or Thwarrtg the Revolution? The Inter-
American Human Rights System and Crniinal Procedure Refor in Latin America, 14 Sw.J.L.
& TtADL AM. 287.
34. FUNDACION CONSTRUIR REPORT, supra note 7, at 19.
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combination, by 2001, these laws reduced the percentage of
pretrial detainees within the incarcerated population to sixty-
seven percent..,
Law 1970 created an adversarial system of justice,
characterized by orality, the guarantee of rights and the
principles of openness, immediacy, and the speedy and
economic processing of cases, as well as the application of
pretrial detention as an exceptional measure.A Together with
new constitutional guarantees ensuring due process, the new
system was designed to treat accused persons as subjects with
rights." Among the many new elements of the system were time
limits at different stages of the criminal justice process;
expanded public participation through citizen judges;
delegation of criminal justice duties among different
institutions; 40 greater participation of victims in the criminal
justice process; 41 greater respect for cultural diversityI4 as well as
a separate system to process cases involving indigenous
persons; 4'* and simplification of the process including
alternatives to trial.44
35. Id.
36. CEJA INTRO REPORT, supra note 25, at 13-14 ("The normative and procedural
structure of adversarial systems is constructed on a specific mechanisn of the
exceptional use of protective measures. The procedure necessary for its lkgitimacy, the
requirement of information that allows one to reach the conclusion that the prosecutor
has a good case at this early stage, and the deliberation of the judge are based on the
idea of protccting the process.").
37. These rights include the prohibition of a conviction without a final judgment
in a public oral trial; the lkgitimacy of courts to be used to try individuals; the
impartiality and independence of the judiciary; the rights guaranteed to the defendant:
the presumption of innocence; the application of precautionary measures as an
exceptional nanner; the right to defense; the right to an interpreter; and equality.
Fu.NDACI6(N CONSTRLIRREPORT, supra note 7. at 20-25.
38. CPC 1970, supra note 33, arts. 113, 239.
39. Id. art. 52.
40. Crimes were to be investigated by the Public Ministry, an organ distinct fron
the Judiciary, and investigation wvas to be conducted wvith objectivity and in accordance
with the law. Id. arts. 73, 279. The Public Prosecutor was to direct the investigative
police. Id. arts. 74, 297.
41. Id. arts. 11, 81, 382.
42. See id. art. 10. The right to translation and interpretation services for non-
Spanish speaking defendants.
43. A discussion of the indigenous justice system is beyond the scope of this
Report, but has been studied by legal scholars. See, e.g., INTLR-AM. COMM'N ON HUMIAN
RSACS TOJLSTICL AND SOCIAL INCLUSION: THE ROAD TOWARDS STRLNGTHLNING
DEMOCRACYIN BOLIVA, OEA/Ser.L/V/II, doc. 34 (June 28, 2007); john L. Hammond,
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Most significantly, reforms affecting pretrial detention were
a core component of the new system: pretrial detention was to
be an exceptional measure to be applied proportionately. In
cases of doubt, the measure most favorable to the accused was to
be adopted.4 6 Significantly, pretrial detention was to be imposed
only when tied to one of two procedural purposes, namely
ensuring the discovery of the truth and preventing the accused
from fleeing or from obstructing the investigation.4 Finally,
limits were placed on the total duration of pretrial detention.48
When Law 1970 was first implemented, the reforms seemed
at least partially successful with respect to their intended
outcome:
[P]retrial detention became the exception. This
helped take a load off the penitentiary system. There
was great expectation on the part of society that there
would be no justice delays, there would be access and
fast due process, and that there would be equality
within the system. In a sense, they were advocates of
the accusatorial system.49
This positive response and optimism, however, was short-
lived and soon thereafter, "society liked it on paper only." o One
result of the oral and public hearings, a central element of the
adversarial system, was that society became more aware of the
workings of the judiciary1 and, in turn, more critical of a
perceived "benefit to the accused more than the victims."52 The
popular perception was that "crime rates increased after the
reform of the criminal procedure code," and people began to
Indigenous Community Justice in th Boivian ConstitUtion of 2009, 33 HUM. Ris. Q. 649
(2011).
44. FU NDACION CONSTRUTR REPORT, supra note 7, at 24.
45. CPC 1970, supra note 33, arts. 7, 232.
46. Id.
47. Id. art. 221.
48. Id. art. 239(3).
49. Interview with Dr. Edwin Cocarico, Professor of Criminal Procedural Law and
Criminal Forensic practice, Catholic University of Bolivia "San Pablo," in La Paz,
Bolivia (May 25, 2012).
50. Id.
5 1. ciJA BOLIVIA REPORT, supra note 33, at 30, 45.
52. Interview with Dr. Edwin Cocarico, supra note 49. Due to the procedural rights
that CPC 1970 protected, "the public felt they were privileging the defense more than
the victim." Interview wvith jorge Richter Amallo, supra note 18.
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ask why judges and prosecutors were not fighting crime.5 The
opinion spread that there was a causal relationship between the
rights afforded in the new CPC and the increase in crime rates,
despite the fact that empirical data did not support this.)4
Prosecutors and judges complained that the new
regulations included too many requirements for imposing
pretrial detention,55 and the time limits were viewed as being too
generous to defendants,56 thus privileging them over victims.
Although the new Code also set up "important victim defense
programs," prosecutors did not promote them5 8 resulting in the
general view that the system did not do enough for victims.59
These early critiques of the system contributed to later efforts to
be "very tough on defendants."o
3. Responding to Popular Demands: Law 2494 and Law 007
The widespread belief that there was a causal relationship
between increased rights for defendants and a criminal reform
process that was too "complacent" towards the accused and the
growth of crime contributed to citizen insecurity and led the
53. Interview with Dr. Edwin Cocarico, supra note 49.
54. FU NDACION CONSTRUTR REPORT, supra note 7, at 26.
55. Prosecutors argued they were not given "enough time to produce evidence
and thus, at the initial hearing the judge will give the defendant fieedom." Interview
with Dr. Edwin Cocarico, supra note 49.Judges, though, said that their hands were tied,
and they could not "go above and beyond the laws." Id.
56. An analysis of criminal procedural codes in Latin America revealed the
following:
Paradoxically, when adversarial systems increase the speed and visibility of
their decisions, they generate confusion because it seens that people are
freed very quickly. This is due to the fact that the supervisory judge is
mandated to hear preliminary arguments and render a decision regarding
protective measures soon after arrest. This swift release of some defendants
has generated the impression that those who are "captured" are immediately
'reed,' which undermines confidence in the system. The sane occurs when
defendants who are charged with minor offenses that do not carry a prison
sentence are convicted very quickly or when alternative outcomes such as
provisional suspension of the process are adopted. In many countries, this has
led to the idea that the system works like a "revolving door."
CEJA INTRO REPORT, supra note 25, at 35.
57. Interview with Jorge Richter Amallo, supra note 18.
58. Id.
59. Interview with Anonymous Oficial, in La Paz, Bolivia (May 22, 2012)
(acknowledging that "[t]hey were partially right because resources weren't used
adequately for the victims").
60. Id.
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pendulum to swing strongly in the opposite direction.61 Other
more deeply structural factors that contributed to crime were
ignored in the public debate. Instead, these citizen security
concerns were one factor that led to the passage of the National
System of Citizen Security Law No. 2494 of August 4, 200362
which introduced significant changes with respect to the
application of precautionary measures, including pretrial
detention.b
Under this law, judges were given broader discretionary
powers to determine flight risk and obstruction of process,
which consequently widened discretion in imposing pretrial
detention.64
Particularly problematic for due process protections was the
incorporation of recidivism as grounds for the application of
pretrial detention. Unlike the two limited purposes established
in Law 1970 of 1999, recidivism is not related to process and is
thus inconsistent with the purpose that pretrial detention is
intended to serve.65
61. See FUNDACION CONSTRUTR REPORT, Supra note 7, at 26. See also infra Part III
(discussing citizen security).
62. Law 2494 of August 4, 2003, Concerning the National System of Public
Security.
63. "In 2002, two years after the New Criminal Procedure Code's ("N(CPP") lull
implementation, "public insecurity" began to be associated directly with the
precautionary measures regime, with the insinuation that the application of this regime
was excessively lax and was the principal reason for insecurity and increasing crime.
This would be reflected later in the Explanatory Introduction to Law 2494 Concerning
the National System of Public Security..." CEJA BoiuAIA REPORT, supra note 33, at 45.
64. FUNDACION CONSTRLIR REPORT, supra note 7, at 27.
65. In a study analyzing legislation forn several countries in Latin America that
include "recidivism as a justification for pretrial detention or as a criterion for the
judge to consider when evaluating the defendant's situation," the authors state that
"[r]ecidivism is also linked to the notion of citizen security and is unrelated to the
successful development of the criminal procedure." CEJA INTRO REPORT, supra note
25, at 12. They go on to express concern that:
"These reasons dcearly go beyond the protective logic and are a product of
the effort that had to be made to combine the regulations on pretrial
detention with various criminal-policy values in the system. Social alarm
and recidivism are unrelated to ensuring the success of the criminal
procedure from the perspective of making certain that the trial and
investigation go forward and that the system provides a high-quality
response. When social alarm is used to justify pretrial detention, there is
really no danger to the development of the investigation or trial by the
judicial agency. The issue at stake is instead the legitimacy of the system in
the eyes of the people and is directly related to the phenomenon of citizen
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Additional changes were made with the Law of
Modifications to the Normative Criminal Legal System, No. 007
("Law 007") of May 18, 2010.66 The enactment of Law 007 was
partially the result of dissatisfaction with the criminal justice
system, as "[c]rime rates didn't decrease and so society asked
the legislature to give more reforms."67 Law 007 makes it easier
to impose pretrial detention, and harder to be released, 8 and
reduces defendants' rights.G
Law 007 incorporates the addition of recidivism, as
established in Law 2494, as an independent ground upon which
pretrial detention can be ordered.70 Also based on Law 2494,
security, which has led countries throughout the continent to respond to
calls for more security and harsher responses to criminal activity but in no
way guarantees the development of an oral trial." Id.
While Bolivia was not included in this aspect of the study, the same issues apply.
66. Ley de Modificaciones al Sistema Normativo Penal, Ley 007 (18 Mayo 2010)
[Law of Amendments to the Criminal Normative System, Law 007 (May 18, 2010)]
[hereinafter CPC 007] (Susana Medina Day, trans.) (on file with author); See
FUNDACION CONSTRUTR REPORT. supra note 7, at 30.
67. Interview with Dr. Edwin Cocarico, supra note 49.
68. According to a 2011 Report by the United Nations Human Rights Council,
"[M]ore than 70 percent of the prison population is in prcventivc
detention. This percentage may reveal a long-standing practice of using
preventive detention as a rule and not as an exception, which, combined
with the weaknesses of the administration of criminal justice, is likely to
cause frequent violations of the right to personal liberty. This trend,
already seen in previous years, was aggravated in 2010 with the adoption of
legislation that, on the one hand, increased the grounds for detention and
its duration, and resuictcd the criteria required for its cessation, and on
the other, prevented the possibility of applying alternative precautionary
measures, as is available for crimes such as smuggling."
Rep. of the UN High Comn'r for Human Rights, Addendum on the activities of her
office in the Plurinational State of Bolivia, It 68-69, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/ 16/20/Add.2
(Feb. 2, 2011) [hereinafter UNHCHR Addendum].
69. See Interview with Dr. Teresa Ledezna, Professor of Crinminal Law 111, Catholic
University of Bolivia "San Pablo," in La Paz, Bolivia (May 25, 2012) ("There is also the
issue of citizen insecurity. This has led to harsher methods and measures of fighting
crime and has affected the guarantees of defendant's rights."). One judge explained
that " [j]ust to satisfy society, we've been adding more risks to the Code. This makes us
have to keep arresting and detaining people . . . ." Interview with Margot Pdrez
Montafno, Examining Judge, in La Paz, Bolivia (May 24, 2012).
70. CPC 007 incorporates Law 2494's addition of the risk of recidivism as a basis
for the application of precautionary measures. including pretrial detention. See Law
2494 supra note 62, art. 235(second). Precautionary measures, including pretrial
detention, may also be applied when the defendant has been convicted through a final
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Law 007 includes additional circumstances, including catch-all
provisions, for determination of both flight risk and risk of
obstruction, greatly expanding the possibility to impose pretrial
detention. 71
judgment in Bolivia or abroad, if five years have not elapsed since the completion of
the sentence. Id. Increasing social demand helped motivate this addition to the CPC:
Although the risk of recidivism is not a trial-rclatcd concern but rather a
prevention-related one, it was considered important to include a new article
on this subject (Alt. 235-bis. Recidivism Risk) in order to respond to a
growing demand from society, nearly dree years after the precautionary
regime had become effective. The regulation establishes that the examining
judge in each specific case shall evaluate the necessity of imposing a
precautionary measure base on the defendant's recidivism (at the request of
the prosecution). CEjA IV0IA REPORT, supra note 33, at 47; see Part II.A.2b.
71. These catch-all provisions cover "any other duly qualified circumstance that
allows for the reasonable assumption that the defendant is at risk of flight" and "shall
directly or indirectly obstruct the discovery of the truth." CPC 007, supra note 66, arts.
234--35. According to the CEA Bolivia Report:
The text of Art. 234, which established the possible factors to be
considered in substantiating flight risk, had been interpreted by practitioners
as a closed list of possibilities. It was also understood that all four extremes
established in that article had to be present at the same time. [In the original
Art. 234, the ]actors for determinig flight risk were: 1)f the dcefendant has no
domicile or reguiar residence, or has no ties to fail, business or work in the countn;
2)If the defendant has the resources to leave the countr or go into hiding; 3)If there is
vidence that the dedant is making preparations to fle; 4)1 he cfeniant's
behavior dating the curent or a pevious triai is sch as to indicate his unwillingness
to submit to it.] Art. 234 was modificd in three wa)ys:
(1) The factual conditions indicative of flight risk were increased.
(2) It established the factual conditions as a simple listing and not a
definitive one, leaving open the possibility of considering other factual
circumstances that might indicate risk.
(3) It was established that each of the factual circumstances is
independent in the assessment of risk.
Concerning the risk of trial obstruction, IThefiactorsfr this risk originally
set forth in Art. 235 were 1) He [the defendant] would destroy, modif, conceal,
suppress or falsi evidence and 2) He would negativel influence the participants,
itnesses or expets in order to benefit himsel the modification was similar to that
for flight risk. In order to cover more fully the factors for obstruction risk,
modifications to Alt. 235 were introduced as follows:
(1) Increase the number of factual circumstances indicative of
obstruction risk;
(2) Allow any other circumstances indicative of obstruction risk to be
evaluated;
(3) Allow thc judgc also to qualify as an obstruction risk any prejudicial
action on the part of the defendant carried out through the use of third
parties;
(4) CIcarly establish that each of the factual circumstances is
independent in the assessment of risk.
CgA iouiA REPORT, supra note 33, at 47, nn.35-36.
PRETRIAL DETENTIONIN BOLITA 8
Several other key changes shift the weight of the decision-
making process in favor of increased use of pretrial detention.
For example, the role of the victim is expanded in criminal
proceedings,2 with a specific right to request the imposition of
pretrial detention even where the victim is not a complainant.73
Further, judges are empowered to impose pretrial detention,
even if it isn't requested.74 Pretrial detention is easier to order
through a procedure designed specifically for cases committed
in flagrante delicto, but the language of the Code lacks clarity as
to when this procedure should be applied. 75 Finally, very
significantly, the limits on the length of time for which pretrial
detention can be ordered have increased significantlyv.t
4. Assessment of the Reforms
The fundamental legal shift from an inquisitorial to
adversarial system was intended to impact the entire criminal
justice system and radically transform the roles of actors in the
system. However, the transition was incomplete in many ways.
For example, while the laws changed, the mentality of actors
within the system did not change accordingly. 7 Even as
72. CPC 007, supra note 66. art. 11 (stating that "[t]he victim, alone or through legal
counsel, whether the latter be private or state-provided, may take part in criminal proceedings
even ifhe or she is not established as the complainant") (emphasis added). The emphasized
portion was added and part of the original provision was deleted in 2010.
73. Id. art. 233. Article 240 was also added allowing victims to make oral
declarations regarding pretrial measures. See id. art. 240.
74. See id., art. 235(third) ("The judge, upon consideration of the allegations and
assessment of the evidence furnished by the parties, shall render a well-founded
judgment and stipulate: (1) The inadmissibility of the application; (2) The application
of the requested measure or measures: (3) The application of a measure or measures
less severe than those requested; (4) The application of a measure or measures more severe
than those requested, and even pretrial detention.") (emphasis added).
75. See CONSTITUTION OF THL PLURINATIONAL STATL OF BOLIVIA [CONSTITUTION]
art. 23(4) (Bol.); see also CPC 007, supra note 66, tit. V.
76. CPC 007, supra note 66, art. 239. The cessation of pretrial detention occurs
when eighteen months have passed without an indictment or thirty-six months without
a sentence. Previously, under CPC 1970, the time limit was eighteen months without a
sentence and twenty-four months without acquiring res judicata. See CPC 1970, supra
note 33, art. 239. Furthermore, according to CPC 007, exceptions to cessation are
made when the delay is attributable to the defendant's dilatory acts. See CPC 007, supra
note 66. art. 239; see also infra Part II.A.5.
77. Interview with Dr. Roger Valverde Perez, supra note 33 ("There are many
authorities who still have an inquisitorial mentality."); Interview with Enrique
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foundational a principle as the presumption of innocence was
not fully adopted, as reflected in the fact that "many authorities
. . . still have an inquisitorial mentality. "7 This "inquisitorial
mentality" affects individuals' behavior and, as a result, impacts
those who move through the criminal justice system.79
Similarly, society has not fully understood or accepted the
adversarial system. Part of the reason for this stems from the
perception that the adversarial system is overly protective of the
rights of the accused and of defendants and, as a consequence,
that it fails to sufficiently protect society." The view that the
system will either protect the rights of the accused or society
persists. One judge summarized the challenge by noting that
"adapting to the new system is difficult because it is hard to sell
to the people. People think criminals are being let out of prison
easily. People also think there is no security in the cities and that
there are a lot more criminals living among them.",I
This popular sentiment, played out in the media and public
discourse, has had a direct effect on pretrial detention rates. 8 2
Although reducing pretrial detention rates and, relatedly,
minimizing delays in the justice system and thus reducing crime
MacClean Soruco, Attorney and Former Professor and Litigation Instructor, La Paz,
Bolivia (May 21, 2012) ("There is a lot of resistance to this new systen").
78. Interview with Dr. Roger Valverde Perez, supra note 33.
79. Interview with Reynaldo inana, Attorney and Former Director of the
Implementation Team of the Criminal Reform Process in Bolivia, in La Paz. Bolivia
(May 22, 2012) (explaining with respect to the trainings about oral hearings that were
conducted with judges, that "they seemed to understand it while the training took
place, but when they went back to their posts, they continued their inquisitorial
practices," and further noting that "it is very diffcult to reverse the inquisitorial
inindset . . . These practices fron the old system have lingered"); Interview with Dr.
Teresa Lcdczyia, supra note 69 ("One concern is that it's easier for judges and
prosecutors to carry over their old practices of the inquisitorial system and to continue
practicing the inquisitorial model."). With respect to litigation courses that were
offered following the transition, "[i]t is about teaching the values, not just technical
skills. A whole change in the mindset is needed." Interview with Enrique MacClean
Soruco, supra note 77.
80. Interview with Dr. Edwin Cocarico, supra note 49 (" [W] e need social support
to make a real change from the inquisitorial to accusatorial system. The issue society
takes with the accusatorial system is that they see it as advantageous to the accused and
not to the victim,. They view the accusatorial system as advocating on behalf of
prisoners.").
81. Interview with Nelma Teresa Tito Aiaujo, President of the Second Criminal
Court, Department of Justice, in Potosi. Bolivia (May 16, 2012). See infra Part 111.
82. See infra Part III.
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through the timely resolution of cases were motivating factors
behind the reforms, the system in fact "readily allows people to
be placed in pretrial detention."." As a result, the number of
detainees has increased and led to further congestion and
delays., 4
On the one hand, the fact that pretrial detention has not
decreased is at least partially attributable to the failure to fully
implement elements of the adversarial system. For example,
delays during various stages of the criminal justice process result
in longer periods of pretrial detention, beyond the legal limit of
three years.8 In addition, challenges in the relationship between
the prosecutor's office and the police accompanied the shift and
impede their work.86 And finally, continued prominence is given
to written materials despite the fact that orality is a primary
component of the new system.87
However, there are other factors to which high pretrial
detention rates and, relatedly, problems in the criminal justice
system, can be attributed. As one lawyer put it, "The problem is
83. Interview wvith Ninoska Ayala Flores, Attorney and National Head, Training
Program in Human Rights and the Culture of Peace, Training and Citizen Rights
("CDC"), in La Paz, Bolivia (May 23, 2012).
84. Interview with Dr. Ramiro E. L6pez Guzinda, Appellate Judge, Criminal
Division, in La Paz, Bolivia (May 24, 2012) ("Instead of bringing down the number of
detainees, the number of detainees has risen .... If we look at statistics, from the
passage of the criminal code of 1999 to today, the rates of pretrial detention have gone
up.").
85. Id. (asserting that "[t]he investigative period should last six months but many
pretrial detaineces are there for much more than six months. The process establishes a
minimum and a maximum period of pretlrial detention, from eighteen months to three
years. Obviously, you can see and if you have the opportunity wvith the examining
judges they have pretrial detainees longer than three years.").
86. Interview with Enrique MacClean Soruco, supra note 77 (explaining how the
prosecutor has control over the investigation and its functional direction, which
includes the authority to direct the police and seek disciplinary measures for non-
compliance, however prosecutors face a lot of resistance fron police officers in the
compliance of their instructions); Interview wvith Margot P6rez Montano, supra note 69
("It's so common that prosecutors have problems with police, and vice-versa, and
judges have problems with both of thcm."); Interview with Reynaldo imana, supra note
79 (" [T]hey have not been able to manage that police and prosecutors wvork together.
This is still a weak point. The Public Ministry still has not developed strategy to ensure
that these two actors work together. This has been the weakest point.").
87. Interview with Reynaldo Imana, supra note 79 ("Where we have least success
... is the investigative stage. The written aspect still dominatcs."); see also infra Part
II(A) (4) (discussing the requirement that tihe accused disprove the request for pretrial
detention through the submission of written documents).
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much larger than the shift from inquisitorial to accusatorial."
Other factors, including the role of the media, lack of societal
trust in the system, and lack of judicial independence, must not
be overlooked. * Moreover, the structural and institutional
changes that should have accompanied the transition were not
enacted.0o Similarly, trainings for actors in the criminal justice
system were neither comprehensive nor sustained over a long
enough period of time?11
B. Current Legal Framework: Bolivia's Domestic and International
Obligations
Despite the reality of Bolivia's arbitrary and excessive use of
pretrial detention highlighted in later sections, 92 on paper,
Bolivia's laws contain numerous protections for accused
individuals. In addition, Bolivia is a party to all of the core
international human rights treaties, 3 as well as the binding
American Convention on Human Rights. 4
88. Interview wvith Enrique MacClean Soruco, supra note 77.
89. Id. ("Peoplc only understand the justice systemn as the media presents. The
media does not point out the structural reasons. It does not point out that trials are not
public or are bureaucratic. That is why the Judiciary has a very bad reputation in the
country, people don't trust judges, that it has legitimate authority. Even though we had
elections for judges, people did not see this as an improvement, they see it as another
political influence on the judiciary. People don't trust the DAs and the prosecutors.").
90. Interview with Margot Perez Montafno, supra note 69 ("Recently, we've been
moving backwards ... we've changed our system but not the infrastructure even
though it's supposed to be completely different. Instead of improving, wve're actually
stuck. We haven't been able to progress the same way our collcagues in other countries
have."); Interview with Jorge Richter Amallo, supra note 18 ("The problem is not the
code, but the implementation. The institutions wvere not prepared to adopt such a big
change.").
91. Interview with Marcelo Barrios Aiancibia, Sentencing Judge, in Sucre. Bolivia
(May 15, 2012) (discussing that while previously, trainings were held to change this
mentality, "for the past three to four years, they [the State] are stepping back");
Interview with Silvia Salame Farjat, President of the Illustrious Bar Association of
Chuquisaca, in Sucre, Bolivia (May 15, 2012) ("There wvas the switch to the accusatorial
system, but they did not change the minds of the judges. Neither did they train the
attorneys for this new system.").
92. See infra Part II (discussing how the practice differs from law, and the actual
experience of pretrial detainces in Bolivia, in more detail).
93. See, e.g, Ilnternational Convention for the Protection of All Persons from
Enforced Disappearance, Dec. 20, 2006, A/RES/61/177 (ratified Dec. 17, 2008);
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Dec. 13, 2006. 2515 U.N.T.S. 3
(ratified Nov. 16, 2009); International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of
All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, Dec. 18, 1990, 2220 U.N.T.S. 3
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Moreover, Bolivia's Constitution must be interpreted in
light of international obligations,95 and criminal legislation also
makes reference to international standards.96 As a consequence,
international protections-at the stages of arrest, detention,
trial, and after trial-form a core component of the rights
afforded to criminal defendants. This section will provide an
overview of Bolivia's international obligations and review
existing domestic protections with respect to pretrial detention.
1. Overview: Fundamental Protections for Criminally Accused
Persons
The Bolivian Criminal Procedure Code ("the CPC") and
the Constitution are the primary domestic laws addressing
pretrial detention and related rights. The CPC and the
(acceded Oct. 16, 2000); Convention on the Rights of the Child. Nov. 20, 1989. 1577
U.N.T.S. 3 (ratified June 26, 1990); Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10. 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85
(ratified Apr. 12 1999) [hereinafter Convention against Torture]; Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249
U.N.T.S. 13 (ratified June 8, 1990); International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination, Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (ratified Sept. 22.
1970); International Covenant on Civil and political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171 (acceded Aug. 12. 1982) [hereinafter 1((PR]: International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16. 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (acceded Aug. 12,
1982) [hereinafter ICESCR].
94. Bolivia became party to the American Convention on Human Rights on June
20, 1979. which subseq u ently placed them under the auspice of both the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights. See Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights,
Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36. 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter American
Convention]. The Inter-American Commission promotes human rights among
members of the Organization of Anerican States by investigating countries, preparing
country reports, mediating disputes about human rights problems, and handling
individual complaints submitted to the Commission Id. arts. 41, 46, 48, 5 1. Meanwhile,
the Inter-Anerican Court has the advisory power to interpret the American Convention
as well as other treatics concerning the protection of human rights within the
American states and the adjudicatory power to rule on cases of human rights violations
referred to the Court. Id. arts. 61. 62. 64
95. See CONSTITUTION. spra note 75, art. 13(IV).
96. See, e.g., CPC 1970, supra note 33, art. I (declaring that "[n]o individual shall
be convicted unlcss a final judgment has been issued after having been heard in a
public oral trial held pursuant to the Constitution, any international conventions and
treaties in force, and this Code."); id. art. 5.
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Constitution establish the basic principles of the legal process."1
Both documents also establish fundamental legal protections for
criminal defendants including the right to an impartial and
independent judge, 9 the right to due process, " and in
particular, the presumption of innocence which entails that the
burden of proof lies with the accuser. "" The Constitution
further states that when there is any doubt in the application of
a norm, the interpretation that favors the accused must govern
any decision. 101
The key international provisions establishing these
fundamental protections are Article 10 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR") and Article 14(1) of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
("ICCPR"). 102 ICCPR Article 14(1) provides a standard for a
"fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and
impartial tribunal established by law . . . ," I' as well as
minimum guarantees' and the presumption of innocence.)0
These standards, binding on the Bolivian State and Bolivian
97. See CONSTITUTION, supra note 75, art. 180(I) (highlighting key principles,
including transparency, orality, promptness, imminediacy and equalities of the partics);
CPC 1970, supra note 33, art. 1.
98. See CONSTITUTION, supra note 75, art. 120(1) (the right to be heard by a
competent, independent and impartial jurisdictional authority"); id. art. 178(1)
(establishing the principles of independence and impartiality); see also CPC 1970, supra
note 33, art. 3.
99. See CONSTITUTION, supra note 75, art. 117(I) ("No person can be convicted
without having been previously heard and judged in accordance to due process. No
one shall be subjected to criminal sanction that has not been imposed by a competent
judicial authority as an executed judgnint."); CPC 1970, supra note 33. art. 1.
100. See CPC 1970, supra note 33, art. 6; see also CONSTITUTION, supra note 75. art.
I 16().
101. See id. ("During the process, in case of doubt regarding the application of a
norm, the most favorable to the accused or processed shall govern.").
102. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 10, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(111) (Dec. 10, 1948); 1((PR, supra note 93, art. 14(1).
103. I((PR, supra note 93, art. 14(1). Additional protections are found in several
regional documents; Organization of American States, American Declaration of the
Rights and Dutics of Man art. 26, O.A.S. Res. XXX, OEA/Ser.L/V/11.23 (May 12,
1948): Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
art. 6(1), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222; African Charter on Human and People's'
Rights arts. 7(1), 26.June 27, 1981. OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58.
104. See lCCPR, supra note 93. art. 14(3).
105. See id. art. 14(2).
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judges, are supplemented by numerous international principles
and declarations.106
The notion ofjudicial independence is especially important
in Bolivia because of the dramatic change that Bolivia
underwent during its transition from the inquisitorial to the
adversarial system. Indeed, one non-binding set of principles on
judicial independence, the Bangalore Principles of Judicial
Conduct ("Bangalore Principles"), had been an inspiration for
the drafting of Bolivia's own CPC. 07 Notwithstanding public
opinion about the role of judges to provide security against
perceived criminal threats, judges in the new system are called
upon to be impartial arbiters. 10s The commentary to the
Bangalore Principles highlights this potential tension, noting
that:
A case may excite public controversy with extensive
media publicity, and the judge may find himself or
herself in what may be described as the eye of the
storm. Sometimes the weight of the publicity may tend
considerably towards one desired result. However, in
the exercise of the judicial function, the judge must be
immune from the effects of such publicity. A judge
must have no regard for whether the laws to be
applied, or the litigants before the court, are popular
or unpopular with the public, the media, government
officials, or the judge's own friends or family. A judge
must not be swayed by partisan interests, public
clamour, or fear of criticism. Judicial independence
encompasses independence from all forms of outside
influence. I9
106. See, e.g., Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.121/22/Rev.l (1985) ("The judiciary shall decide matters before them
impartially, on the basis of facts and in accordance with the law, without any
restrictions, improper influences. inducements, pressures, threats or interferences.
direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.").
107. See Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct of 2002, reproduced in Report of
the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, Annex, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/2003/65 (Jan. 10, 2003), available at http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/
corruption/judicial-group/Bangalore-principles.pdf: see also Giuseppe Di Federico,
Judiil Accountablity and Conduct: An Overview, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN
TRANSI ION 87,96 n.20 (Anja Seibert-Fohr ed., 2012).
108. See infra Part III.
109. JUDICIAL INTEGRITY GRP., COMMENTARY ON THE BANGALORE PRINCIPLES OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT 1 28 (2007) [hereinafter BANGALORE COMMENTARY], available at
2013] 37
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A report issued by the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights ("IACHR") on Citizen Security and Human
Rights highlights the fragility of weighing this tension in favor of
impartiality and notes how the scale often tips the other way in
Latin America.o'
2. Liberty and Detention
At the core of international human rights law is the right to
liberty and security of person and protection against arbitrary
arrest and detention. 111 Consequently, detentions can only be
carried out by competent officials''1 and in accordance with the
law." The role of the judge is again paramount in assessing the
lawfulness of detention.1 4 Although international law provides
for a range of situations under which a person can be detained
before trial, the imposition of pretrial detention as a general
rule is prohibited, and is incompatible with the right to liberty
and the right to be presumed innocent." Pretrial detention
must be an exceptional measure and used as a "means of last
resort.''lb
Bolivian law explicitly incorporates these standards. The
Constitution protects against detention without legal
http://wwwT.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/ccje/
textes/BangalorePriinciples( oninicnts.pdf (construing the Bangalore Principles.
110. See INTLR-AM. COMM'N H.R., RLPORT ON CITIZEN SECURITY AND HLM\AN
RIGHTS', OEA/Ser.L/V,/II, doc. 57 [ 159 (Dec. 31, 2009), available at
http://scm.0as.org/pdfs/2010/(P25032E.pdf [hereinafterCitizen Security Report].
111. See ICCPR, supra note 93. art. 9(1) (codifying this fundamental right).
112. See Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons Under Any Form of
Detention or Imprisonment, Principle 2, G.A. Res. 43/173. U.N. Doc. A/RES/43/173
(Dec. 9, 1988) [hereinafter Body of Principles].
113. ICCPR, supra note 93, art. 9(1).
114. See Bangalore Commentary, supra note 109, 1[ 47 (" [A] judge should not
deprive a person of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such
procedures as are established by law. Accordingly, a judicial order depriving a person of
his liberty should not be made without an objective asessmnt uf its necesity and
reasonableness. Similarly, detention ordered in bad faith, or through neglect to apply
the relevant law correctly, is arbitrary, as is committal for trial without an objective
assessient of the relevant evidence.").
115. See ICCPR, supra note 93, arts. 9(1), 9(3), 14(2); see also Body of Principles,
Supra note 112, at Principle 39.
116. See United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for Non-Custodial Measures
(The Tokyo Rules), Principle 6, G.A. Res. 45/110. U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/110 (Dec. 14,
1990) [hereinafter Tokyo Rules].
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foundation, 17 and the CPC requires that pretrial detention be
applied as an exceptional measure, stating that "if there is any
doubt as to the application of a precautionary measure or other
provisions to restrict the defendant's rights or powers, that
which is most favorable to the defendant shall be honored.""
Both the Constitution and the CPC protect the right to
liberty and clearly articulate the narrow circumstances under
which this right can be restricted. These circumstances relate to
serving process related purposes and ensuring that the case
progress through the system. '9 Pretrial detention can be
imposed "when it is essential to ensure the discovery of the
truth, the development of the process and the application of the
law." 12o Furthermore, restrictions on personal liberty can only be
imposed "for as long as they need to be applied," 121 and pretrial
detainees must be "treated as innocent individuals" and held in
spaces physically separated from convicted prisoners 12 in a
manner that minimizes the harm to the detained person.' 2 The
reason for this separation originates in the justification for
pretrial detention, which is to serve procedural, as opposed to
punitive purposes; given that pretrial detainees have, by
definition, not yet been tried, any type of puitive treatment
117. See CONSTITUTION, supra note 75, art. 23(111) ("No one can be detained,
apprehended, or deprived from freedom, unless in the cases and in accordance to the
ways established by law. The execution of the order will require that it be issued by a
competent authority and that it be in writing.").
118 . CPC 1970, supra note 33, art. 7 (concerning the application of
"Precautionary and Restrictive Measures").
119. CONSTITUTION, supra note 75, art. 23(I) (stating the right to freedom and
personal security); see also CPC 1970, supra note 33, art. 221.
120. See CONSTITUTION, supra note 75, art. 23(I); see also CPC 1970, supra note 33,
art. 221. The CPC identifies circiumstances under which pretrial detention cannot apply
(private offenses. offenses not punishable by imprisonment, and offenses punishable by
imprisonment with a legal maximum sentence of less than three years). See id. art. 232.
In those cases only the measures provided for in Artidce 240 can be applied. See id.
Moreover, pregnant women and nursing mothers of children under one year of age
cannot be put in pretrial detention unless "no alternative measure is possible." Id.
121. CPC 1970, supra note 33, art. 221 ("Such measures shall be authorized
through a well-founded court order, as regulated herein, and shall last only for as long
as they need to be applied.").
122. See id. art. 237.
123. See CPC 007, supra note 66, art. 222 (Stating that precautions must be [aken,
including minimizing the harm to a person's reputation).
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would violate their due process rights. 124 The Bolivian
government is responsible for the conditions under which
detainees are held and for regularly monitoring and enforcing
baseline standards.' 1
More specifically, pretrial restrictions on liberty are
permissible under international law in limited circumstances.126
Similarly, CPC Article 233 delineates the circumstances under
which a judge may order pretrial detention: when there are
"elements of sufficient conviction" with respect to the
commission of the offense by the defendant in combination with
"elements of sufficient conviction" that the defendant will "not
submit to the procedure or shall obstruct the discovery of the
truth. "127
The law establishes the range of factors that a judge can
evaluate to determine flight risk, including the following catch-
all provision: "Any other duly qualified circumstance that allows
for the reasonable assumption that the defendant is at risk of
124. See CPC 1970, supra note 33, art. 237 (stating that pretrial detainces are
considered innocent and are imprisoned solely for procedural criminal justice
purposes).
125. An examination of the conditions of detention for dctainces in Bolivia is
beyond the scope of this Report; however, prison conditions must meet certain
minimum standards prescribed under international law. See generally Convention
Against Torture, supra note 93; I((PR, supra note 93; Tokyo Rules, supra note 116;
Body of Principles, supra note 112, Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of
Prisoners. U.N. Doc. A/CONF/611, annex I, E.S.C. res. 663C, 24 U.N. ESCOR Supp.
(No. 1) at 11, U.N. Doc. E/3048 (1957), amended E.S.C. res. 2076, 62 U.N. ESCOR
Supp. (No. 1) at 35, U.N. Doc. E/5988 (1977) (Aug. 30, 1955).
126. See, e.g., 1((PR, supra note 93, art. 9(3) (discussing pretrial detention); Body
of Principles, supra note 112, at Principle 39 (explaining that except in special cases,
generally those charged with crimes are entitled to be released); Tokyo Rules, supra
note 116, at Principle 6 (explaining that pretrial detcntion should be a last resort); see
also Amcrican Convention, supra note 94, art. 7(5) (explaining that arrestecs must be
brought before ajudge within a reasonable amount of time after their arrest).
127. CPC 007, supra note 66, art. 233 ("Once the formal charge has taken place,
thc judge may order that thc defendant submit to pretrial detcntion at thc well-
founded request of the prosecutor or the victim, even if he has not been established as
the complainant, when thc following requirements are met: 1. The existence of
clements of sufficient conviction to sustain that thc accused is, with probability, the
author or participated in the offense; 2. The existence of elements of suflicient
conviction that the accused shall not submit to the procedure or shall obstruct thc
discovery of the truth."). But see infra Part 11 (discussing the disparity between the
Bolivian law as written and how the criminal justice system works in practice).
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flight."12 s The factors that a judge can evaluate to determine the
risk of obstruction contain a similar provision: "Any other duly
qualified circumstance that allows for the reasonable assumption
that the defendant shall directly or indirectly obstruct the
discovery of the truth."19Judges are also permitted to impose
pretrial detention in cases of recidivism, I and the law provides
the judge with flexibility to apply measures "more severe than
128. Id. art. 234 (defining flight risk as "any circumstance that allows for the
reasonable assumption that the defendant shall not submit to the procedure, seeking
to escape prosecution. To decide on the existence of flight risk, a comprehensive
assessment of existing circumstances shall be carried out, with special consideration
givcn to the following: 1. Whether the defendant has a regular domicile or residence,
or family, business or work established in the country; 2. Whether the defendant has
the means to flee the country or remain hidden; 3. Whether there is evidence that the
defendant is preparing to flee: 4. Whether the defendant's behavior during the process
or a previous process indicates that he is not willing to submit to it; 5. The defendant's
voluntary attitude towards the importance of recoverable damage; 6. Whether the
defendant has been charged with the commission of another intentional offense or has
received a sentence of imprisonment by a court in the first instance; 7. Whether an
alternative outcome was applied to the defendant for an intentional offense; 8.
Repeated or previous criminal activity: 9. Whether the defendant belongs to criminal
associations or criminal organizations:10. Actual danger to society or to the victim or
the complainant; and 11. Any other duly qualfied circuntance that allowsfor the reasonable
assumption that the defendant is at rsk of flight (emphasis addcd)).
129. CPC 007, supra note 66. art. 235 with the Author's added emphasis, defines
"risk of obstruction" as:
[a]ny circumstance that allows for the reasonable assumption that the
defendant's behavior shall hinder the discovery of truth. To decide on its
existence, a comprehensive assessment of existing circumstances shall be
carried out, with special consideration given to the following:
1. That the defendant might destroy, alter, conceal. remove, and/or
falsify evidence;
2. That the defendant might negatively influence parties, witnesses or
experts, so they provide false information or behave in a reluctant manner;
3. That the defendant might illegally or unlawlily influence Supreme
Court justices, Plurinational Constitutional Court justices, and members,
technical judges, citizen judges, prosecutors and/or officers and employees of
the judiciary system.
4. That the defendant might induce others to perform the actions set
out in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 above.
5. Any other duly qualified circumstance that allows fio the reasonable
assumption that the defendant shall directly or indirectly obstruct the discovery of the
truth (emphasis added).
130. See Law 2494, supra note 62, art. 235(second) ("Precautionary measures,
including pretrial detention, may also be applied when thc defendant has been
convicted through a final judgncit in Bolivia or abroad, if five years have not clapsed
since the completion of the sentence. ").
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those requested," by the prosecutor, including pretrial
detention.'",
In amendments made to the CPC in 2010, a new procedure
is established for crimes that were committed in flagrante
delicto.' If the case is accepted as one of flagrante delicto, the
prosecutor can request pretrial detention even if only one of the
two conditions set forth as preconditions for requesting pretrial
detention are met: either "elements of sufficient coniction to
hold that the defendant is, with probability, the author of, or a
participant in an offense" or "elements of sufficient conviction
to hold that the defendant shall not submit to the procedure or
shall obstruct the discovery of the truth."3 3 Furthermore, in
131. CPC 007, supra note 66, art. 235(third) notes that "t]he judge, upon
consideration of the allegations and assessment of the evidence furnished by the
parties, shall render a well-founded judgment and stipulate:
1) The inadmissibility of the application; 2) The application of the requested
measure or measures; 3) The application of a measure or measures less
severe than those requested; 4) The application of a measure or measures
more severe than those requested, and even pretrial detention.
132. See CPC 1970, supra note 33, art. 230 (defining flagrante delicto as "when the
perpetrator is caught in the act of committing or trying to commit a crime, or
immediately after committing a crime while being pursued by law enforcement officers,
the victim or witnesses to the crime").
133. See CPC 007, supra note 66, art. 233. To request pretrial detention inflagrante
delicto cases, the procedure, with the Authors' added emphasis, is as follows:
At an oral hearing, the examining judge shall hear the prosecutor. the
defendant and the defendant's counsel and the victim or complainant, vcrif
compliance with the conditions of application provided for in the Article
above and decide on applying the procedure.
If the judge accepts the application of the immediate procedure for
flagrante delicto, at the hearing the prosecutor may:
1. Request the application of an alternative outcome, including the
abbreviated procedure when the conditions set forth in this Code are met.
2. If complementary acts of investigation or evidence recovery be
required. he shall request that thc judge grant a term. as deemed necessary,
not to exceed forty-five (45) days. The judge shall decide on the request of
the prosecutor after the intervention of the victim and the defense;
3. If he decms that there be sufficient elements of probative evidence, he
shall submit the charge and furnish the evidence at the hearing. The
complainant may join the prosecutor's indictment or he himself may accuse
the defendant at the hearing by furnishing his own evidence. The defendant
shall be notified of the public indictment and the private indictment, if
applicable, at the hearing and he shall have a maximum of rive (5) days to
submit any exculpatory evidence. Immediately after this term, the examining
judge shall set the date and time of the pretrial hearing, which shall be held
within three (3) days. However, upon a well-founded request of the defense,
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such cases, the examining judge must grant this request, as long
as the case is not one for which pretrial detention is categorically
inapplicable. 13 4
3. Right to Reasonable Duration of the Process
Bolivian law provides for clear timeframes with respect to
the duration of the criminal justice process. These timeframes
are rooted in international law, which provrides that "[a] nyone
arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be brought
promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to
exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a
reasonable time or to release."' 1
Arrestees are also entitled "[t]o be "tried without undue
delay," although there is no precise time frame in these
international standards.1 6 Further, the necessity of ensuring
timely access to process is heightened when individuals are held
in pretrial detention. Domestic laws must therefore include
strict time limits for the criminal process to ensure that justice
delayed does not result injustice denied2 7
the judge may extend the deadline for submission of exculpatory evidence by
up to forty-five (45) days.
4. Request the pretrial detention of the defendant when any of the
conditions set forth in Article 233 of this Code are met, to ensure that the
defendant appears at the trial. The request cannot be denied by the examining
judge, except in the event of inadmissibility of pretrial detention.
Any decision the judge may render with respect to paragraphs 2 and 3 in
accordance with the provisions set out in this Article shall not be subject to
any appeal.
Id. art. 393(third).
134. See CPC 1970, supra note 33, art. 232 (listing exceptions to the application of
pretrial detention). The role of the Examining Judges is related to the investigation
and aspects of the preparatory stage, including the determination of the application of
precautionary measures including pretrial detention in contrast to Trial Judges who
have jurisdiction over the trials. See CPC 007, supra note 66. arts. 53-54.
135. ICCPR, supra note 93, art. 9(3) (listing minimal guarantees for criminal
defendants).
136. ICCPR, supra note 93, art. 14(3) (c) (explaining the standards for criminal
arrest); see also American Convention, supra note 94, art. 7(5) (referring to a reasonable
time for proceedings).
137. See AMNESTY INT'L, FIAiR TRIALS MANLAL 61-64 (1998) [hereinafter FAIR
TRIALS MANUAL ] (discussing the right to trial within a reasonable time).
2013] 43
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The Bolivian Constitution decrees the principle of timely
and prompt justice."3 8 Similarly, the CPC establishes set time
limits restricting the total duration of the criminal justice
process. Of particular relevance to pretrial detainees, the CPC
establishes that the criminal justice process will have a maximum
duration of three years, 139 and that pretrial detention "shall
cease" if eighteen months pass with no indictment, or thirty-six
months pass with no sentence. 14(* Exceptions to these
enumerated limits include those cases where delays are
"attributable to the defendant's dilatory acts."'41 However, the
cessation of pretrial detention does not mean an end to the
criminal justice process, as alternative measures (such as house
arrest) can be ordered at this stage. 4
The CPC also establishes time limits for the individual
stages of the criminal justice process, from the preliminary
investigation, which involves both police and prosecutors 43 to
the preparatory stage, when there is a maximum of six months
from when the defendant is notified of the charge against
him. 144 However, extensions are granted under certain
circumstances for both of these stages: in the case of the
preliminary imvestigation, there is an exception to the ninety-day
limit in the case of "complex investigations," 145 while the
138. CONSTITUTION, supra note 75, art. 115(I) (guaranteeing justice that is plural,
prompt, appropriate, gratuitous, transparent and without delay).
139. See C(PC 1970, supra note 33, art. 133 (stating that the maximum time for the
trial process is "three years from the first act of the proceedings").
140. CPC 007, supra note 66, art. 239 (stating limits on pretrial detention).
141. Id. (discussing exceptions to the limits on pretrial detention).
142 . See id. arts. 239, 240 (declaring that when "pretrial detention is
inappropriate" a judge may order the defendant be put under house arrest, or impose
other alternative measures).
143. See id. art. 300 (detailing that the police must complete the preliminary stage
of the investigation within twcnty days of the start of prevention, and subsequently
deliver information and evidence to the prosecutor).
144. See CPC 1970 supra note 33, art. 134 ("the preparatory stage shall be
completed within a maximum of six months from the start of the process . . . ."); CPC
007, supra note 66, art. 301 ("The term set out in Article 134 of this Code shall begin as
of the last notification of the charge provided to the defendants.").
145. See CPC 007, supra note 66, art. 301 ("Upon receipt of police proceedings,
the prosecutor shall analyze their content to: Order that the police proceedings be
supplemented, setting a reasonable term not to exceed ninety (90) days, except for
complkx investigations, in which case the examining judge shall be notified of the
extension.").
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preparatory stage can be extended up to eighteen months.146 In
this same provision, the CPC also contains a requirement of
periodic reporting by the prosecutor to the judge every three
months as well as measures that the judge must take when the
prosecutor does not present an accusation or other final request
within the legal time limits.147
Bolivian law further contains provisions that impose
repercussions for officials who are responsible for delays of
justice. Officials are liable on disciplinary and criminal grounds
if they are "negligent" in ensuring that deadlines are met,'4  and
can be punished if found guilty of "malicious delay." 149 In
accordance with international law, Bolivian officials should
regularly monitor and enforce these time limits. 15o
4. Right to Defense
Equality between the prosecution and defense is also
guaranteed by the CPC and the Constitution.' Related to this
concept, defendants have the right to a defense attorney
provided by the State if they cannot afford one.15  This is
146. See CPC 1970, supra note 33, art. 134 (articulating that "when the
investigation is complex due to the events being linked to crimes committed by
criminal organizations, the prosecutor may request that the investigating judge extend
the preparatory stage up to a maximui term of eighteen months; this shall not entail
an extension of the maximum term of the process").
147. See id. art. 134 ("The prosecutor shall inform the judge of the invcstigation's
progress every three months.").
148. See id. art. 135 ("Failure to meet the deadlines established in this Code shall
result in the negligent official's being subject to disciplinary and criminal liability.").
149. See CPC 007, supra note 66, art. 177(2) as amended by Law No. 1768 of 10
March 1997 ("The judicial or administrative oflicial guilty of malicious delay shall be
punished with the penalty established for the crime of refusal or delay of justice.
Malicious delay is understood to be delay caused to accomplish any unlawful
purpose.").
150. See, e.g., United Nations. Econ. & Soc. Council. Comin. On Crime Prevention
and Crininal Justice, Expert Group on Strengthening Access to Legal Aid in Criminal
justice Systems, Note by the Secretariat, U.N. Doc. E/CN.15/2012/17 (2012),
Guideline 4) [hereinafter UN Legal Aid Principles] (describing the steps that States
should take in order to "ensure that detained persons have prompt access to lkgal aid
in conformity with the law").
151 . CONSTITUTION, supra note 75, art. 119(1) (providing for the equal
opportunity of parties); id. art. 180(I) (asserting that jurisdiction is based on "equality
of the parties"). See CPC 1970, supra note 33, art. 12 ("The parties shall have equal
opportunity to exercise their powers and rights throughout the process.")
152. See CPC 1970, supra note 33, art. 8 ("The defendant ... shall be entitled to
defend himself . . ."); CONSTITUTION, supra note 75, art. 119 (articulating the right to
2013]
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particularly important given that without access to legal
representation, individuals are more likely to "be detained for
longer periods of time and, if facing trial, will be convicted."153
The United Nations Principles and Guidelines on Access to
Legal Aid in Criminal Justice Systems provide a baseline on what
legal aid should comprise. 154 Fundamentally, it must be
"accessible, effective, sustainable and credible" 155 and based on
the rule of law.156 The Principles provide a specific guideline on
"legal aid at the pretrial stage," an indication of the importance
of the availability of legal aid at this stage of the process.'17
5. Protections for Vulnerable Groups
Legal protections for the accused are especially vital for
vulnerable criminal defendants who are poor, come from rural
areas, or belong to indigenous groups, which is the case for the
majority of the accused in Bolivia's criminal justice system.'as
This is because socioeconomic factors and linguistic barriers
defense); CPC 1970, supra note 33, art. 9 (requiring that defense counsel be appointed
by the court if necessary).
153. See U.N. Secretary-General, Extreme Poverty and Human Rights: Rep. by the
Secretany-General, 1[ 13. U.N. Doc. A/66/265 (Aug. 4 2011) [hereinafter Extreme Poverty
Report] ("When persons living in poverty 0do not have access to legal representation
... [t]here is a higher likelihood that they wvill ... be detained for longer periods of
time, and if facing trial, will be convicted.").
154. See UN Legal Aid Principles, supra note 150, para. 5 ("The United Nations
Principles and Guidelines on Access to Legal Aid in Criminal justice ... [aims] to
strengthen access to lcgal aid in criminal justice systems.").
155. See id. para. 15 (asserting that States should enact "specific lgislation and
regulations and ensure that a comprehensive legal aid system is in place"). Additional
guidelines provided by the UN Principles include the following: "States should ensure
that effective lcgal aid is provided promptly at all stages of the criminal justice process";
"Effective legal aid includes, but is not limited to, unhindered access to legal aid
providers for detained persons, confidentiality of communications, access to case files
and adequate time and facilities to prepare their defence." See id. Principle 7
(describing these as ways to ensure that legal aid is "prompt and effective").
156. See id. Principle 1 ("[Llegal aid is a fundamental human right and an
essential element of a functioning crininal justice system that is based on the rule of
law . . .").
157. Id. Guideline 4 (detailing guidelines that govern legal aid activities at the
pretrial stage).
158. See infia Part IV.
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limit the ability to obtain legal assistance, even where such
assistance is available.159
The relationship between poverty, exclusion, and detention
has been identified at the international level as a key priority for
States to address in their criminal justice systems. l o
International law demands that laws are applied in a non-
discriminatory manner,11b and the Bolivian Constitution mirrors
that standard, even including "economic or social condition" as
a prohibited ground of discrimination.'62 The UN Principles
underscore the responsibility of States to ensure that all persons,
particularly those living in rural or remote areas, are provided
with legal aid,163 calling on States to "allocate the necessary
human and financial resources to the legal aid system." l"
Moreover, States are required to ensure that financial resources
reach target populations, and not fall into the hands of corrupt
officials.'6 A 2011 UN report highlights the disempowerment of
poor and excluded groups who come into contact with the State:
In every country, developed or developing, historical
social divisions and power structures ensure that the
poorest and most excluded are at a constant
disadvantage in their relations with State authorities.
Asymmetries of power mean that persons living in
poverty are unable to claim rights or protest their
violation. They may face obstacles in communicating
with authorities owing to illiteracy, lack of information
or language barriers, a situation which is particularly
159. See Extrene Poverty Report supra note 153, 1 13 ("Even when legal assistance is
available, discrimination and linguistic barriers are powerful obstacles in the way of
those seeking access to justice and redress.").
160. See id. 1[ 81(noting that detention has "extensive and long-lasting negative
effects on person's living in poverty"); see generally Citizen Security Report, supra note
110 (explaining how poverty could lead to frequent detention).
161. I((PR, supra note 93, art. 2(1).
162. CONSTITunIoN, supra note 75, art. 14(11).
163. See UN Legal Aid Principles, supra note 150, Principle 10 ("States should also
ensure that legal aid is providcd to persons living in rural, remote and economically
and socially disadvantaged areas and to persons who are members of economically and
socially disadvantaged groups.").
164. See id. paragraph 15. Moreover. "States should ensure that professionals
working for the national legal aid system possess the qualiications and training
appropriate for the services they provide." Id. para. 64.
165. See, e.g., United Nations Convention Against Corruption art. 11, Oct. 31,
2003, 2349 U.N.T.S. 41 [hereinalter UN Convention Against Corruption].
2013] 47
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acute for migrants, indigenous peoples, ethnic
minorities and persons with disabilities. As a result,
they are less likely to know and understand their rights
and entitlements or to report infringements and
abuses.16
11. GAPS BETWEENLAW AND PRACTICE
As discussed above, the Bolivian legal system establishes
legal protections that restrict the use of pretrial detention. The
Bolivian Constitution and the CPC guarantee the right to
freedom and articulate the narrow circumstances under which
personal liberty can be restricted. This right of liberty is
protected through a presumption of innocence and, in criminal
proceedings, precautionary measures should be applied as the
exception. Until it is proven through due process of law that an
individual has violated the law, every individual must be treated
as innocent and be guaranteed all the rights accorded an
innocent person.
Despite these strong protections, individuals' rights are
routinely violated in the Bolivian criminal justice system. As a
result, pretrial detention is ordered when the legal requirements
are not satisfied. There are multiple points throughout the
criminal justice process when the interpretations that govern the
process contradict the law, resulting in decisions that violate
human rights guarantees. While the ways in which routine
misapplication of the law lead to rights violations will be
demonstrated below, the statistics on pretrial detention alone-
eighty-four percent of those incarcerated are pretrial
detainees 167 -demonstrate that it is not applied as an
exception. 168
166. Extreme Poverty Report, supra note 153, 10.
167. Fu.NDACI)N CONSTRUIR REPORT, supra note 7, at 67.
168. Interview with Dr. Angel Arias Moralcs Fono, Judge and Member of the
Commission of Pardons, in La Paz, Bolivia (May 24, 2012) ("The law on criminal
procedure establishes that character of exceptionality. And there is a contradiction with
what happens today in the prison ... prisons are filled with pretrial detention detainces
... yes there is contradiction in the application of the law.").
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A. Violations in Decision to Order Pretrial Detention
1. Misapplication of the Law Stemming from Misinterpretation
Actors in the criminal justice system misinterpret the law
that forms the very basis for the decision as to whether to order
pretrial detention. The CPC provision that lays out the
circumstances under which pretrial detention can be applied
does not include an "and" or an "or" between the two
enumerated provisions169 By not being explicit, the CPC lends
itself to misinterpretation and resulting misapplication with
respect to the most crucial element of the law. A reading of the
CPC begs the question: can the judge order pretrial detention
on the basis of the first provision alone-that is, evidence that
the accused is the author of the offense-or is the judge
required to also consider whether the evidence suggests the
defendant's risk of flight or the likelihood that the defendant
will obstruct justice? An interpretation aligned with the purposes
that pretrial detention is intended to serve as well as legal
protections as guaranteed in both Bolivian and international law
suggest that both elements must be met. Even more definitively,
the Bolivian Constitutional Court has recently established that
the judge must consider both elements.170 However, criminal
justice actors routinely operate as if only the first provision must
be considered. For example, according to the interpretation of
one prosecutor: "The Code in 233 clearly states, that to request
pretrial detention, it is sufficient that the Public Ministry
demonstrate that there are indicators of commission [of the
crime]-simply this requirement." 171 As a result of this
misinterpretation and misapplication, the protections and
guarantees of the CPC and the Constitution are breached.
Judges ignore the requirement that prosecutors must prove
flight risk or obstruction of justice, and moreover, in deciding
whether to order pretrial detention, they also consider the
169. CPC 007, supra note 66, art. 233.
170. See Constitutional Sentence, 0339/2012. Santa Cruz, 18 June 2012, Record
00679-2012-02-AL. A further complicating factor is that the decision making process is
different when the case is one of flagrante delicto. In these cases, only one element must
be satisfied. See (PC 1970, supra note 33. art. 230: CPC 007, supra note 66, art.
393(third).
171. Interview with Prosecutor, in Beni, Bolivia (May 17, 2012).
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severity of the crime, a factor that is not even enumerated in the
law. As one NGO noted, "cases where judges only consider the
severity of the crime and not flight risk and obstruction of
justice" are "common" despite the fact that it is against the law
to do so. 7 2 A lawyer who has practiced both as a victims' lawyer
and a defense attorney stated: "The rules say that a defendant
should not be held, no matter how much evidence there is
against them, and no matter the severity of the crimes, if they
are not a flight risk. But this does not happen."1
2. Violations of Procedural Goals of Pretrial Detention
a. Pretrial Hearing Used to Determine Guilt
"The mentality of actors in the judicial system is so outdated. They
believe that an accused person has to suffer in jail and that he has
to be punished. "'7
"There is no observance oj the presumption of innocence principle
... basically judges give preemptive judgments, they decide to
convict people before the people are actually tried or sentenced...
judges treat them as animals without holding investigations. "
"In my opinion, pretrial detention has turned into the anticipated
sentence.""
172. Vladimir Nilo Medina Choque, Offcer, Training and Citizen Rights (CDC)
[Capacitacion y Derechos Ciudadanos], in La Paz, Bolivia (May 23, 2012); Interview
with Reynaldo Irnafna, supra note 79 ("I think we need to keep on working on the
investigation phase, it has to be much more rigorous ... There has to be more rigor in
the conclusion that there is flight risk or obstruction of justice presented by the
defendant. Now, there is more attention paid to the severity of the crime, rather than
the danger of flight risk or obstruction of justice. Evidence is needed to justify flight
and obstruction of justice. Gravity of crime is over-considered in assigning pretrial
detention."); Interview with Joe Loney, Volunteer, Pastoral Penitenciaria, in
Cochabamba, Bolivia (May 14, 2012) ("In reality [thcy] look at the seriousness of the
offense."); Interview with Raniro Orias Arredondo, Attorney & Executive Director,
Fundaci6n Construir, in La Paz, Bolivia (May 21, 2012) ("It shouldn't be that the
gravity of the crime is considered in pretrial detention. It should only be determined by
flight risk and obstruction of justice.").
173. Interview with jerjes justiniano Atald, Private Attorney, in Santa Cruz, Bolivia
(May 16, 2012).
174. Interview with Anonymous Detainee in El Abra Prison, in Cochabana,
Bolivia (May 14, 2012).
175. Interview with Wilfredo Vasquez, Detainee and Delegate, Riberalta Carceleta,
in Riberalta, Bolivia (May 16, 2012).
176. Interview with jerjes justiniano Atal, supra note 173.
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When judges order pretrial detention solely on the basis of
evidence that the defendant committed the crime, they turn the
pretrial hearing into the main trial. The distinct and sole
purpose of the pretrial hearing is to determine whether pretrial
detention should be ordered on the basis that the defendant is
likely to flee or to obstruct justice, both of which would interfere
with the criminal justice process.177 On the other hand, the main
trial is the platform to determine guilt or innocence.178 And yet,
"in pretrial detention hearings, lawyers try to bring up issues of
family, employment, but evidence of guilt is the primary factor.
It outweighs the other issues."17 One Supreme Court justice said
that the evidence standard in pretrial hearings is "subjective"
and that "a judge looks at indicators of guilt, such as statements
of the defendant, evidence presented by the prosecutor,
whether there are witnesses placing the defendant at the scene,
177. In an analysis of the criminal procedure reforms that countries throughout
Latin America undertook starting in the 1990s, the Justice Studies (enter of the
Americas (El Centro de Estudios de justicia de las Americas (CEjA)), in explaining two
justifications for pretrial detention-flight risk and danger to the investigation or risk
of obstruction-explains, with regard to flight risk that "thc objective to be protected
was the system's expectation of judging the defendant. If he or she were to flee, the
criminal procedure could only continue up to the oral trial and even in countries in
which one can be judged in ausencia. the sentence could not be executed." The analysis
went on to say that "this raises issues related to the right to defense and has a high
impact on the system's image and its lgitimacy." Similarly, with regard to the second
justification. in the case of "defendants who are thought to pose a threat to the
investigation or who may obstruct and alter that process," this obstruction "could limit
the system's effectiveness and thus the expectations of holding him or her responsible."
CEJA INTRO RLPORT, supra note 25. at 9. The reason that the codes provide different
criteria upon which a judge can base his decision is so that the judge can make a
ruling based on the circunstances of the specific case and how well-ttablished the
defendant is in the country." Id. at 11.
178. Interview with Fernando Medina, Advisor, Embassy of Denmark, in La Paz,
Bolivia (May 24, 2012) (remarking that: "In 2011 it seems w'tre still in 2001, and the
causal factors for pretrial detention are outside the justLice system, and it occurs when
lawyers turn preliminary trials into the main trials. Instead of the new criminal
procedure code protecting human rights the idea of presumption of innocence doesn't
work. There is a seventy to eighty percent rate of pretrial detention. Pretrial detention
has become the rule").
179. Interview with Anonymous Member of the Judiciary, in Santa Cruz, Bolivia
(May 15, 2012). Indeed, "public opinion is ... influenced by the press to think the
hearing is the trial and sentence." Interview with Iris justiniano, Examining judge, in
Santa Cruz, Bolivia (May 16, 2012). Often, "[t]hest initial hearings are treated like a
trial-these should be dynamic and quick but they turn into hearings about guilt and
innocence." Interview with Dr. Teresa Ledezma, supra note 69.
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whether they were caught in the act or at the scene, etc."180 As
one official explained, the judges "let the hearing become a pre-
trial, starting to talk about the guilt or innocence of the accused
when the purpose of the hearing is only to determine flight risk
or obstruction ofjustice."''
As a result, pretrial detention serves as a sentence and
accused individuals are punished before they have been
convicted, much less sentenced.828 Given that the purpose of
pretrial detention is to ensure the defendant's presence at trial
and that a determination as to the individual's guilt has not
been made at this initial stage of the process, using pretrial
detention as a punitive measure contradicts both the spirit and
letter of the law.18 , While sentencing and imprisonment are
obviously appropriate after a conviction, there is a tendency to
conflate the concept of punishment for those who have been
found guilty, through the criminal justice procedure, and those
who are merely accused. As one official stated: "Pretrial
detention is also being used for a pre-sentence."184 One lawyer,
recognizing the human rights violation inherent in such a
practice, cautioned that pretrial detention "cannot be the
anticipated punishment" and that "pretrial detention is a
serious problem because it means violating constitutional rights
because it's an innocent person."' 8 5
180. Interview with Anonymous Member of the judiciary, supra note 179.
181. Interlview with Anonymous Official, in La Paz (May 25, 2012).
182. INTER AM. COM1T 'N ON HUM AN RTS., REPORT ON TERRORISM AN) HUMAN
RIGHTS, OEA/Ser./V/11.116, doc. 5 rev. I corr. [ 223 (Oct. 20, 2002) ("The
Commission has long emphasized the axiomatic naturc of the presumption of
innocence to criminal proceedings, and has called upon states to ensure that it is
expressly provided for in their domestic laws. It is notable that this presumption can be
considered violated where a person is held in connection with criminal charges for a
prolonged period of time in preventative detention without proper justifcation, for the
reason that such detention becomes a punitive rather than precautionary measure that
is tantamount to anticipating a scntence.").
183. See Alon Harish & Alexis Shaw, Man Forced to Work in Prison Sues Under Anti-
Slaver Amendment ABC NEWS (Aug. 10, 2012), http://abcncws.go.com/US/man-
alleging -prison-labor-vxiolatcd-anti-slavely-amcndment/story id=16970464 (quoting
Columbia Law School professor jamal Greene, who stated that "[i]fyou haven't been
convicted at all, your pre trial detention is not a form of punishment.").
184. Interview wih Anonymous Official, supra note 181.
185. Interview withJorge Richter Amallo, supra note 18.
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b. Recidivism as a Basis for Pretrial Detention
The fact that recidivism is grounds for ordering pretrial
detention is another glaring example of a violation of the
process related justification for pretrial detention. I86 First,
ordering pretrial detention on this basis is inconsistent with the
goal that pretrial detention is intended to serve: to ensure that
the criminal justice process will progress by restricting the liberty
of a defendant who is otherwise likely to flee or interfere with
the discovery of the truth. Additionally, ordering pretrial
detention based on past conduct violates the presumption of
innocence by assuming that if an individual was previously
convicted, he is also guilty of committing the crime for which he
is currently accused. Further, this analysis of guilt and innocence
should not even be considered at this stage of the process187
In cases of recidivism, pretrial detention is, in practice,
mandatory. If judges do not order pretrial detention, they face
the danger of being detained themselves. As one judge said,
y[i]f ou see that there's somebody with a background, we have
186. CPC 007, supra note 66, art. 234(8) (citing "repeated or previous criminal
activity" as a grounds for determining flight risk). See also supra note 70 explaining that
CPC 007 incorporates Law 2494's addition of the risk of recidivism as a basis for the
application of precautionary measures, including pretrial detention. For a discussion of
the risk of recidivism as grounds for pretrial detention and the types of evidence
submitted to the court to demonstrate this risk, see FUNDACION CONSTRUIR REPORT,
supra note 7, at 194-97.
187. The dangers of using recidivism as the basis for pretrial detention include
the following:
[W]hcn reasons related to recidivism are incorporated either as an
autonomous justification or as eriteia that the judge is asked to consider
when examining the issue of flight risk or obstruction of justice, the function
of pretrial detention in the system goes beyond the strict logic of ensuring the
success of the criminal process. The danger in this is the possibility that there
will be a return to the logic associated with early sentencing or alarmist
considerations. CEJA INTRO REPORT, supra note 25, at 13.
Furthermore, "when the questions to be asked are related to whether or not the crime
produces alarm in the community or whether the defendant will commit more crimes,
the judge must make a projection regarding future conduct that is eminently contri ary
to the right to be presumed innocent." Id. Speaking of the 2004 reform that added
recidivism, one lawyer discussed the way in which this new law further restricted the
rights of defendants:
The criminal procedure code was good, and protected defendants but they
added some articles in the last few years. For example, if a defendant repeats
a crime he is incligible for alternative measures. The 2004 and 2007 laws
made the system worse and don' respect the fundamental rights of
defendants. Interview with Silvia Salame Farjat, supra note 91.
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to look into their records and if you don't put them into pretrial
detention, they will detain us so we're really not a guaranteeing
system anymore." 188 If prior crimes exist, "there's no discretion
and we have to put them in pretrial detention for the citizen's
safety."'89
c. Length of Pretrial Detention Violates Procedural Purpose of
Pretrial Detention
Finally, given the process related goals that pretrial
detention is intended to serve, the time limits with respect to the
maximum duration of pretrial detention are excessive. oo This is
especially true given that actors in the criminal justice system do
not use these time periods to collect evidence, conduct
investigations, or engage in other activities necessary to prepare
for an oral trial.191 As a result, pretrial detention fails to serve its
intended process related purposes:
The people in control are not using pretrial detention
as it is intended. The law says the goal of pretrial
detention is not to get in the way of the process, but to
guarantee the presence of the accused in the process.
Unfortunately those principles have not been applied
well by the people who administer the justice system. 192
Additionally, even if criminal justice actors were using the
preparatory stage for its intended purpose, there is no practical
purpose served by this extensive period of pretrial detention.
These long periods are especially unreasonable in the case of
188. Interview with Margot Perez Montaio, supra note 69.
189. Id.
190. See supra Section 1(B) (3); see also CEA INTRO RLPORT. supra note 25, at 16
(discussing restrictions on the duration of pretrial detention as stipulated in reformed
criminal procedural codes in many Latin American countries: "The timie periods
allowed by reformned kgislations are extensive if one takes into account the fact that the
goal is to ensure that the defendant will appear at trial or protect the evidence (periods
of 12, 18 and even 24 months are common)."). As a judge explained, "In kgal terms
... Artice 221 of the CPC . . . talks about the reach of preventative neasures. It
indicates that it has a totally procedural character to ensure the finding out of the
truth, the development of the process, and the application of the law." Interview with
Dr. Angel Arias Morales Fono, supa note 168.
191. Interview with Enrique MacClean Soruco, supra note 77. During what should
be the investigative stage of the criminal justice process, "[p]ublic defenders are not
preparing defensive investigations." Id.; see also infra Part II(B) (2).
192. Interview with Ramiro Leonardo Iquise Pally, upra note 2.
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minor crimes or flagrante delicto cases 9" when there is a minimal
amount of evidence to be discovered and collected or the
identity of the accused is clear and, given that the person was
caught in the act, the evidence exists at the scene of the crime. 194
3. Absence of Evidentiary Requirements
"This is illegal detention. All the prosecutor has to do is accuse you, he
doesn't need evidence. The prosecutor can have no proof '"6
Whether judges look to one or both factors listed in the
CPC, they exercise excessive discretion and great subjectivity in
their decision-making, without requiring supporting evidence
from the prosecutor. As a result, the right to the presumption of
innocence and other due process rights are violated; the burden
of proof is reversed,9"b and pretrial detention is applied as the
193. CPC 1970, supra note 33, art. 230. One prosecutor suggested that in flagrante
delicto cases, "you can finish the wholc thing in six months. You can present the
preliminary investigation, the charge, and the accusation all at the same time-once
you present the charge, you can present the accusation almost immediately after."
Interview with Sandro Fucites Miranda, Prosecutor of the District of Potosi. in Potosi,
Bolivia (May 16, 2012).
194. See CEjA INTRO REPORT, supra note 25, at 16 ("This problem is even more
serious if we consider the fact that most of the crimes that the systems investigate with
any lcvel of effectiveness involve cases in which the person is caught in the act. In other
words, the defendant's identity is clear, and most of the evidence is present at the time
of the arrest.")
195. Interview with Anonymous Detainee of Cantumarca Prison Men's Unit, in
Potosi, Bolivia (May 16, 2012).
196. Intelview with Dr. Roger Valverde Perez, supra note 33 ("The law clearly says
the burden is on the accuser ... With the accusatorial, the burden of proof is on the
prosecutor. Because of this, the defendant has the right but not the obligation to
present proof. The obligation is on the prosecutor and the victim to bring evidence
... It's the prosecution who has the obligation-the prosecution has the responsibility
and not the judge. The judge should act on the evidence given by the prosecution ....
[However, this is often reversed since] [t] he lack of tools by the Public Ministry means
that the defendant has to show his innocence and show that he is not a flight risk for
example."); Interview wvith Alain Nutez Rojas, judge, Supreme Court of the
Department of Santa Cruz and Member, Commission for the Modification of the
Criminal Procedure Code, in Santa Cruz, Bolivia (May 18, 2012) ("In many cases we
have given the defendant the burden to prove his conditions including even his
innocence, when that should be the prosecutor's job and that kind of behavior by the
prosecutors is later ratified by the judges in their decisions. I think this is an error that
is very habitually made.").
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rule, as opposed to the exception.197 As a result of the fact that
actors in the system do not carry out their respective roles-
judges do not require evidence from prosecutors to support
their requests for pretrial detention and prosecutors fail to
collect this evidence-illegal pretrial detention occurs, and
more broadly, the legitimacy of the criminal justice system is
undermined. I"
From the outset, judges are "predisposed towards pretrial
detention." '9 They have a "tendency" to order pretrial
detention and in fact "almost always grant it."2oo This is partly
because they believe that the accused are guilty: as one official
stated, "judges have this idea that the accused are criminals and
shouldn't be released from jail."20o
Given that evidence is essentially not required and that a
prosecutor's request for pretrial detention 2o1 will generally
guarantee that an accused individual is placed in pretrial
detention, the prosecutor has little if any incentive to gather and
present evidence. 0 " As a result of the lack of strict adherence to
the CPC, detention is ordered on unsubstantiated grounds. 204
197. Interview with Anonymous Official, supra note 181 ("The worst thing that we
have seen is that judges make a determination without evidence or any real
examination of flight risk or obstruction of justice."); Interview with Ximena Lucia
Mendizabal Hurtado, Examining Judge, in Sucre, Bolivia (May 15, 2012) (affirming the
"need to train judges so that they wvill learn that pretrial detention is not the rule").
The following sentiment was repeated with regularity: "Pretrial detention is only an
exception in the law, but not in reality." Interview with Jorge Richter Amallo, supra
note 18. This wvas emphasized by another lawyer, who observed that "[i] n practice it
works that way [that pretrial dctention is the rule, not the exception], but kgally it
should not." Interview with Reynaldo Imana, supra note 79.
198. Interview with Ramiro Leonardo Iquise Pally, supra note 2 ("The people who
operate the justice system don't use the penal code well and the law of criminal
execution and criminal procedure.").
199. Interview wvithJorge Richter Amallo, supra note 18.
200. Interview with Vladimir Nilo Medina Choque, supra note 172. See FUNDACTON
CONSTRUIR RLPORT, supra note 7, at 104 (stating that in a clear majority of pretrial
hearings, pretrial detention is imposed, as opposed to the application of alternative
measures).
201. Interview with Ramiro Llanos, supra note 1.
202. Interview with Vladimir Nilo Medina Choque, supra note 172 (noting that
prosecutors almost always request pretrial detention and in fact, it is "very rare" for a
prosecutor to not ask for pretrial detention). One examining judge went so far as to
state that in trials for precautionary measures, "the prosecutor wvill ask for pretrial
detention 100% of the time." Margot Prez Montafno, supra note 69.
203 . The impact of this reduced incentive is that "[u]nfortunately, the
prosecutors go directly to charging and if they don't have sufficient elements of proof,
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In addition, the term "elements" in the CPC20 is overly
broad and inclusive, lending itself to this discretion and
resulting excessive application of pretrial detention. As a
National Public Defender Service of Bolivia (El Servicio
Nacional de Defensa Piblica, or "SENADEP") lawyer explained,
this term 'llows too much judicial discretion or interpretation,
[contributing to] a culture of presumption of guilt."20o Another
lawyer reiterated that "[a] nything now can be interpreted as
either flight risk or obstruction of justice, which stands in
opposition to and is contrary to the presumption of
innocence."2o? When a prosecutor simply makes a statement
such as: "I think that the accused will flee," judges are
convinced.218
Additionally, flight risk is automatically assumed2 " This is
especially evident in areas of the country that border foreign
countries, such as Beni, in the north of Bolivia, which borders
Brazil: in the minds of judges, "Closeness to the Brazil border
equals risk of flight . . . there is the presumption of risk of
flight."210
they still ask for pretrial detention." Interview with Ramiro Leonardo Iluise Pally, supra
note 2. In the two months of pretrial hearing observations that Fundaci6n Construir
conducted, the percentage of instances in which the prosecutor presented evidence
was very small-for example while arguing for pretrial detention on the basis of flight
risk in 102 cases, they presented evidence for this in only twenty-six percent of cases; in
the case of obstruction of justice the figures were 75 and twelve percent, respectively.
While evidence was always presented in cases when pretrial detention was requested on
the basis of recidivism, the type of evidence presented was not in conformity with the
CPC. See FUNDACTON CONSTRUTR REPORT, supra note 7, at 189.
204. This is similar to the practice in Mexico, where " [p]rctrial detention is being
misused to punish accused persons, often only on the basis of police assumptions and
suspicions of their guilt." LECU ONA, sapra note 11, at 17.
205. CPC 007, supra note 66, art. 233.
206. Interview with Dr. Juan Carlos Chaurara Ojopi, National Public Defender
Service of Bolivia ("SENADEP"), in Guayaramiern, Bolivia (May 17, 2012). For a
definition and explanation of SENADEP see infra Part IV.A 1.
207. Interview with Dr. Edwin Cocarico, supra note 49.
208. Interview with Anonymous Official, supra note 181.
209. CEA BOLIVIA RLPORT, supra note 33, at 42 ("Finally the Tribunal has also
made reference to the impossibility of judges' basing their resolutions on mere
assumptions about the risk of flight or obstruction in SC1635/2004-R. which noted that
the circumstances for csen in Arts. 234 and 235 of the CPC must be provcn by the
accuser: re reernc andprption of risk offlight or obstuction not being uficient,
given that under Art 16 11 and 6 of the CPC, the defendant is presumed innocent until proven
guiltY.'").
210. Interview with Juan Carlos Chaurara Ojopi, supra note 206.
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Judges themselves have an incentive to order pretrial
detention because of State pressure, and in fact, criminal
proceedings can be brought against judges who do not order
pretrial detention.2 I According to "the policy of the State . .
. pretrial detention should be given for all serious crimes.
Judges should not give liberty to the accused and this has been
established by people in all parts of the government."212 More
explicitly, the Public Ministry has issued a recommendation to
prosecutors to "impose pretrial detention in all cases of serious
crimes."1'3 Compliance with this order is monitored through
staff sent out by the government to report on judges: "If they
suspect that there's a bad judgment for not having detained the
person, they [the judge] can be accused."214 Non-compliance
can even result in punishment: one lawyer cited the case of two
examining judges who were imprisoned because they did not
order pretrial detention. He explained: "The other judges are
now afraid. So when they want to release criminals, they need to
think twice. The government through the Public Ministry can
accuse judges and put them in prison. This explains why there
are so many people in prison."215
4. Reversed Burden of Proof
"The defendant has to prove to the Court that he has a
family, ajob, and a home.
[Does this violate the presunption of innocence?]:
"According to our system, no.'"l
"We have this law [on the presumption of innocence],
but because of the mentality and values, it is inverted.
In Bolivia, the operator of the system thinks the
211. Interview with Dr. Roger Valverde Perez, supra note 33.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Interview with Anonyinous Judge in La Paz, Bolivia, (May 24, 2012).
215. Interview with Boris Wilson Arias Lopez, Law Clkrk at Constitutional Court,
in Sucre, Bolivia (May 15, 2012); Interview with Audalia Zurita Zelada, Attorney, in La
Paz, Bolivia (May 22, 2012) ("The government puts pressure and even brings them
[judges] to court if they fail to impose pretrial detention."); see also FUNDACI(N
CONSTRUJR REPORT, supra note 7, at 222 (providing information on the criminal
prosecution of judges and prosecutors who fail to adequately "punish" alleged
criminals).
216. Interview with Sandro Fuertes Miranda, supra note 193.
PRETRIAL DETENTIONIN BOLITA 8
defendant is guilty. There's more a presumption of
culpability than innocence. It is against the law.'21
In direct violation of the presumption of innocence and the
fact that the burden of proof legally lies with the accuser, judges
often order pretrial detention in the absence of any evidence to
support the request or without providing the defense with an
opportunity for rebuttal. 218 In other cases, judges explicitly
reverse the burden, requiring defendants to prove that they are
not a flight risk or will not obstruct justice2' Not only is the
burden of proof reversed, but while judges require minimal if
any evidence from prosecutors requesting pretrial detention,
they demonstrate great rigidity in the evidentiary requirements
that a defendant must furnish to prove that he is not a flight risk.
The CPC includes a range of factors that a judge can
evaluate to determine flight risk.22o However, in practice, judges
tend to look only for proof of the first factor: "hether the
defendant has a regular domicile or residence, or family,
business or work established in the country."2*1 Further, rather
than allowing the defendant to present different forms of
evidence, a judge is "like a horse . . . with blinders" and is
"inflexible" in examining anything other than a set of specific
documents2 Again and again, interviewees explained that the
217. Interview with Anonymous Attorney, in Potost, Bolivia (May 16, 2012).
218. Interview with Abel Bikini Villanor, Detainee in Riberalta Prison, in
Riberalta, Bolivia (May 16, 2012) (relating that at his pretrial hearing, he was not asked
to produce anything. When his lawyer was called into the hearing, he did not say
anything cither. At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge ordered pretrial
detention); Inteiview with Daniel Chavez Ortiz, Detainee in Riberalta Prison, in
Riberalta, Bolivia (May 16, 2012) (explaining that at his first hearing, after the
prosecutor requested pretrial detcntion, the judge, without asking him anything,
ordered pretrial detention).
219. Interview with Dr. Teresa Ledezma, supra note 69 (explaining that the
burden has fallen on the defendant to prove he is "not a flight risk or pose a risk of
obstruction of justice").
220. CPC 007, supra note 66, art. 234.
221. Id. art. 234(1). "In the decisions made by judges, the judges themselves will
oftcn say that the defendant did not show proof of home or family and use that as a
reason to give the defendant pretrial detention." Interview with Dr. Roger Valverde
Perez, supra note 33.
222. Interview with Jorge Fernandez, Attorney, SENADEP, in Cochabamba,
Bolivia (May 15, 2012). The complete reliance on written documents is also counter to
the adversarial system and demonstrates that one of the most central aspects of the
inquisitorial systin-the reliance on written documents, as opposed to oral-has been
retained in the criminal justice system despite reforms. See infra Part IA.4
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decision to order pretrial detention rests entirely on the
defendant's ability to furnish a collection of very specific
documents to prove employment, home, family and good
standing. 22 Judges neglect to apply the law in its entirety-for
example, they do not seek evidence as to whether the defendant
has the means to flee or is preparing to flee, elements that the
CPC includes as factors suggestive of flight risk.224
One lawyer laid out the process as follows:
hlen I say that the prosecutor has the burden of
proof, the prosecution has to show the danger of flight
risk or obstruction of justice. The prosecution should
show a lack of home, job, family, or that the defendant
can easily leave the country because he has a visa or
often does leave or that the defendant can easily hurt
witnesses . . . You should go to the place where the
person lives and use that to prove he has no home.
The accused under law does not have to bring proof of
his home or other types of evidence. But, in reality,
that is how it is.22
This practice also violates the provision of Bolivian law that
allows for the restriction of liberty only when necessary to ensure
truth discoverv and, more broadly, "the development of the
process."2 26 The rigidity and formality that judges demonstrate
with regard to acceptable forms of proof runs counter to the
purpose for which these documents are sought. Consequently,
pretrial detention is assigned not as a result of an analysis as to
223. Interview with Margot Prez Montafno, supra note 69 (explaining that the
burden has shifted to defendants to prove that they have a job, a home, etc.); Interview
with Jorge Fernandez, supra note 222 ("In pretrial hearings, the prosecutor is supposed
to prove the basis with original papers, but the judge doesn't enforce this. The burden
is effectively shifted to the defense."); Interview wvith jorge Richter Amallo, supra note
18 ("In the accusatorial systeml, the prosecution has the burden of proof, but in
practice the opposite occurs."); Interview with Nehna Teresa Tito Araujo, supra note 81
(explaining that while it is the responsibility of the prosecutors to provide proof, "that's
not the case on the ground").
224. CPC 007, supra note 66, arts. 234(2)-(3).
225. Interview with Dr. Roger Valverde Perez, supra note 33.
226. CPC 1970, supra note 33, art. 221. See CONSTITUTION, supra note 75, art.
23(I) (providing for restrictions on liberty only "within the limits set forth by law");
Interview wvith Alain Nuiez Rojas, supra note 196 ("it doesn't do its any good to keep
detaining people if they are never going to have a sentence. So the end goal of
preventative detention is not to punish people ... its to make sure they get to the
sentence and if they don't get to the sentence it's not useful to its.").
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whether the accused is a flight risk or is likely to obstruct justice,
but solely because he does not have, or is unable to procure,
within the limited time available, the necessary documents.227 In
effect, the criminal justice system penalizes defendants by
imposing stringent requirements that are not legally required
and, from a practical standpoint, often impossible to satisfy.
a. Requirement to Prove Employment and Housing
Many individuals, even if they are employed, do not have
the type of employment proof required because they are
employed in the informal job sector. 22 For example, a
SENADEP attorney explained: "Everyone should have work
certification, but most people do not because they are
informally employed."'229 Additionally, while the job certificate
must contain a seal, in order to get this seal, "you have to show
that you have contributed to the pension and the employer must
be registered at the National Labor Ministry."2o However, such
pension plans often do not exist in the informal job sector.
Similarly, with respect to proof of housing, most people do not
have a copy of their lease.2sI Further, while both documents
must be dated before the date of the alleged commission of the
crime,232 given that individuals do not have reason to have such
documents in their possession, they are generally unable to
meet this requirement.)33
227. Interview wvith Dr. juan Carlos Chaurara Ojopi, supra note 206 (noting that
as a result of people not having papers, they get pretrial detention"); Interview with
Nelna Teresa Tito Araujo, supra note 81 ("Peoplc don't have time to get all the papers.
After the crime, they go to the judge and don't have an opportunity to collect their
papers. The prosecutor should have to prove these things.").
228. Interview with Joe Loney, supra note 172 ("Seventy percent of people don't
have formal jobs approved by the Labor Minister. A guy shows that he will be a
carpenter's helper. The judge says no because he has no training and wasn't a
carpenter's helper before.").
229. Interview with Dr.Juan Carlos Chaurara Ojopi, supra note 206.
230. Id.
231. Id. (noting that "[a]t the pretrial hearing, renters must present the lease
contract that date [s from] before they were arrested").
232. Id. (describing the dating rcquircncnt: "[t]he job certificatc must be dated
before the commission of the crime in order for it to be useful at the pretrial
hearing").
233 . Interview with Anonymous Detainee in Guayaramerin Prison, in
Guayaramncrin, Bolivia (May 17, 2012) (explaining tha[ her certificates were rejected
because they wvere dated after her arrest).
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b. Time Restrictions
The time within which these documents must be collected
proves to be an impossible hurdle for most individuals to
overcome. In the case of flagrante delicto cases, these documents
must be furnished within twenty-four hours.21 In the words of
one SENADEP attorney, "twenty-four hours is nothing,"26 and
"85% [of accused individuals] can't produce these documents
for the first meeting with the judge. For flagrante cases, there is
no chance to get the documents."@2 The fact that the police do
not always allow the accused individual to call for assistance
from family or defense attorneys upon arrest23 makes it even
more difficult, if not impossible, for an individual to gather the
necessary documents in just twenty-four hours. While the
accused has twenty days until the pretrial hearing in non-
flagrante cases, this is still insufficient.2
c. Financial Costs
The financial cost of obtaining these documents is also a
serious impediment, especially for the poor. One lawyer
explained that "because of timing and because of poverty
people usually don't have these elements. They don't deserve to
be detained, [but] what can you do?"2' In some cases, whether
legitimately or not, obtaining these documents costs money.
One detainee shared: "The lawyer told me he needed a
certificate from immigration about travels in the past years, a
certificate from work, and a certificate about the house. The
lawyer said it would cost US$350."240 There are also implications
for corruption, given the incentive to procure falsified
documents.24'
234. CONSTITUTION, supra note 75, art. 23(4).
235. Interview with Dr.Juan Carlos Chaurara Ojopi, supra note 206.
236. Interview with Attorneys, SENADEP, in Trinidad, Bolivia (May 15, 2012).
237. Interview with Jorgc Fernandez, supra note 222 ("SoIctines the police don't
allow a detained person to make a call, so we have to go to the police department and
ask who is detained, etc.").
238. See CPC 007, supra note 66, art. 300.
239. Interview with Jorge Fernandez, supra note 222.
240. Interview with Anonymous Detainee in Palnasola Prison, in Santa Cruz,
Bolivia (May 17, 2012).
241. See infra Section IV.C.
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Further, while in some cases it is the inability to obtain
documents that results in pretrial detention, in other cases, the
poor do not in fact have ajob or a home and it is this reality that
prevents them from disproving an allegation of flight risk.
Without analyzing whether these factors actually suggest that the
defendant poses a flight risk, the decision to order pretrial
detention is discriminatory. 24 2 That is, being homeless should
not be used as a proxy for flight risk. One individual explained
that:
The poor are more likely to be placed in pretrial
detention. Poor people are the most vulnerable
because the way to not get pretrial detention is to have
a good job with a family-a stable lifestyle. The poor
are not in a normal stable situation with jobs and
sometimes even a house.24
5. Cessation of Pretrial Detention
The CPC allows for the possibility of defendants to
request a hearing for the cessation of pretrial detention if they
are able to obtain evidence that detention is no longer
warranted or if the legal time limits for their detention have
expired. 44 However, under the first option, they are often
unsuccessful because the documents that they produce as
evidence are repeatedly rejected on grounds of minor details;
furthermore, because of the passage of time between each of
their cessation hearings, detainees often have to obtain and
renew documents prior to each hearing. 245 In the case of
242. Extreme Poverty Report, supra note 153, 73 ("Often, States invoke grounds of
public safety, health or security in an attempt to justify the restriction of human rights
through penalization measures. However, human rights law establishes strict
requirements for the imposition of limitations on individual rights. Any restriction on
the enjoymcnt of human rights by those living in poverty must comply with several
safeguards, including requirements that they be legally established, non-discrininatoly
and proportionate, and have a legitimate aim. The burden falls upon States to prove
that a limitation imposed upon the enjoyment of rights by those living in poverty is in
conformity with international human rights law.").
243. Interview wvith Dr. Maria Esther Padilla Sosa, Coordinator of Centro Juana
Azurday, in Sucre. Bolivia (May 15, 2012); see infra Part IV.
244. CPC 007, supra note 66. art. 239.
245. Interview with jose Geruiau Vaca Ortiz, Detainee in San Pedro Prison, in La
Paz, Bolivia (May 25, 2012) (explaining that he has repeatedly been denied his request
for cessa[ion onl the basis that his certificates had expired); Interview with Anonymous
Detainee in Guayaramerfn Prison, in Guayaramerin, Bolivia (May 17, 2012).
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expired time limits, given that accused individuals often do not
have any further contact with the criminal justice system after
their initial pretrial hearing, they are often unable to even
present their case for cessation, much less win their motions.246
Furthermore, given the delays in the system, their cessation
hearings are likely to be postponed, further extending the
duration of pretrial detention. 247 Additionally, even if they
succeed in their motions, this does not excuse or compensate
for the fact that they should not have been detained in the first
place, particularly on grounds of missing documents. Finally,
while a successful request for cessation of pretrial detention
results in the termination of pretrial detention, the judge can
then apply alternative measures that continue to restrict the
liberty of the accused.248
B. Justice Delays: Continuing Violations After the Accused is Placed in
Pretrial Detention
"The main problem is the delay of justice. They don't follow the
law. If they did I would be free. . . . Sometimes I wish I had a sentence
so I could know when I could get out. With pretrial detention, there's no
certainty . . . I am in detention without knowing until when. "
"People are still being held after the time limit for pretrial detention
expired. 'n5oi
"Justice that delays isjustice that never arrives. "
246. Interview with Juan Alberto Melgar Taborga, Detainee in Guayaramerfn
Prison, in Guayaramerin, Bolivia (May 17, 2012) (describing how after his initial court
appearance soon after his arrest in October 2009, he "never again had contact with a
prosecutor or judge."). When the Crowley delegation met this detainee in May, 2012,
two years and seven months after his arrest and the start of his pretrial detention-
beyond the eighteen month time limit for which he was cligible for the cessation of his
pretrial detention-he remained in prison. Id. Another detainee who has been held in
pretrial detention for more than three years after being arrested for robbery has not
seen a judge since his initial hearing two days after being arrested. Interview with
Anonymous Detainee in San Pedro Prison, La Paz, Bolivia (May 25, 2012).
247. One detainee who had been in pretrial detention for thiree years and nine
months as of May 2012 recounted that he has presented cessation motions thirty times.
However, only one hearing had taken place as a result of the fact that the others were
suspended on the basis that the prosecutor or the judge was not present. Interview with
Einireo M Candori, Detainee in San Pedro Prison, La Paz, Bolivia (May 24, 2012).
248. See CPC 007, supra note 66, arts. 239-40.
249. Interview with Jose Gcruiau Vaca Ortiz, supra note 245 (who had been
detained for three years and seven months as of May 2012).
250. Interview with Anonymous Official, supra note 59.
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Even after an individual is placed in pretrial detention,
violations continue. As discussed above, the CPC limits the total
duration of the criminal justice process 5 and also places limits
on the amount of time an individual can be held in pretrial
detention. 25 In addition, there are delineated time limits
restricting the length of different stages of the criminal justice
process.254 However, even these limits do not ensure that a
defendant will be released after three years or, more broadly,
that his case will be extinguished or achieve some other type of
finality. Given that extensions are requested and granted with
frequency and that suspensions and other delays occur
throughout the criminal justice process, these time limits,
already excessive, are additionally extended well beyond three
years. These factors only further exacerbate human rights
violations, particularly the right to be tried without undue delay.
In response to the three-year maximum cap on the duration of
the process, a lawyer said that " [i] t takes much longer. The
courts have invented more and more reasons why the process
can take longer."25
Not only do delays needlessly extend the period of time
that an accused individual is held in detention, they also impede
the goals of criminal justice. When a case is unable to proceed
and hearings are continually suspended, conviction and
sentencing are delayed, potentially indefinitely. If an oral trial is
ultimately never held, justice is not served for anyone and the
criminal justice system has failed: defendants are neither
acquitted nor convicted, victims receive no answers, and justice
is not served.
1. Legal Ambiguities
The CPC's time limits are not absolute and the vagueness of
the language describing the exceptions to these limits leaves
251. Interview with Jerjes Justiniano Atala, supra note 173, (describing a popular
saying with respect to the manner in which the implementation of Law 1970 occurred).
252. CPC 1970. supa note 33, art. 133.
253. CPC 007, supra note 66, art. 239.
254. See supra notes 140-41, and accompanying text.
255. Interview with Arturo Ydficz Cortez, Attorney and Vice-President of the
Illustrious Bar Association of Chuquisaca, in Sucre, Bolivia (May 14, 2012).
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room for great discretion. First, an exception to the maximum
duration of three years occurs "in cases of contempt of court."256
Further, "grounds for suspension of the statute of limitations
shall suspend the term of the procedure."257 An exception to the
cessation of pretrial detention is that the delay must not be
"attributable to the defendant's dilatory acts." 258 Ambiguity
about what acts on the part of the defendant might constitute
grounds for these exceptions creates disincentive to mount a
vigorous defense, given the lack of clarity as to what steps on the
part of the defense might result in even longer durations of
pretrial detention. '59 For example, despite the maximum
ceilings placed on pretrial detention:
"[I]f you use your resources that are set forth in the
law, you are seen to be interfering. For example, if you
appeal to a higher court, this will be seen as
obstruction of justice by the defendant and because of
this, the thirty six months is extended because the
defendant does not merit liberty. "26o
256. CPC 1970, supra note 33, art. 133.
257. Id.; Inteiview with Sandro Fucrtes Miranda, supra note 193 (noting that
under the law " [t]he time frame from arrest to sentence must be 3 years or less. But in
article 133, there arc many factors which can be used to extend the time because of
dclays"). It is by no means the case that the criminal proceeding will be declared
extinct once it has passed the three year limit. For example, "[t]he court has said cases
should extinguish because of surpassing [the] three year limit only if the delay is the
fault of the Statc." Interview with Cesar Suarez Saavedra, Appellate Court Judge, in
Santa Cruz, Bolivia (May 15, 2012).
258. CPC 007, supra note 66, art. 239.
259. See Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crinic and the
Treatment of Offenders, Akug. 27-Sept. 7, 1990, Basic Principles on the Role ojLawyers. art.
13, U.N. Doc A/(ONF.144/28/Rcv.1 (Sept. 7, 1990) (stating that the duties of lawyers
towards their clients shall include: "(a) Advising clients as to their legal rights and
obligations, and as to the working of the legal system in so far as it is relevant to the
legal rights and obligations of the clients; (b) Assisting clients in every appropriatc way,
and taking legal action to protect their intcrcsts").
260. Interview with Dr. Roger Valverde Perez, supra note 33. With respect to the
thicc-ycar limit, "it used to be that after thirty-six months [the detained] would get
bond. Now the Supreme Court says the time limits can be suspended. The upper limit
for all to be done is suspended as well." Interview with Joe Loney, supra note 172.
Intciviewces discussed various ways in which the thiree-year limit can be extended. One
lawyer mentioned that trial time itself does not count toward the three year limit and
that the judge must verify when the clock on the three year period started and that
some days" don't count. Interview with Jorge Fernandez, supra note 222. The creation
of additional accusations is another way for the process to be extended: " [I]f [tilc] ime
period allotted is about to finish, they will bring new accusations and new charges to
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The fact that a maximum cap is placed on the duration of
pretrial detention261 reduces the incentive for criminal justice
actors to take steps to ensure that the investigative stage will
progress to the oral trial and thus undermines the criminal
justice system.262 These actors fail to investigate and pursue
other activities aimed at truth discovery that justify the process
related purpose of pretrial detention. Ironically, while the
purpose of the preparatory stage during which the individual is
held in pretrial detention is for the police to conduct an
investigation under the prosecutor's direction, the fact that an
accused individual is detained lessens the urgency of
investigation. As one lawyer explained, "pretrial detention . .
. is used as a tool for investigation, and, therefore, relaxes the
investigation activities. Since the accused are already being held
in pretrial detention those in charge don't really care about
speeding things up."263
In fact, prosecutors even use pretrial detention as a
substitute for investigation: when asked why prosecutors tend to
request pretrial detention, one judge responded: "They're lazy.
They don't want to investigate."264 She explained that when she
asks prosecutors what they have done in the course of the six-
month investigative period, "Eighty percent of prosecutors have
prolong [the] pretrial detention period." Interview with Reynaldo Imana, supra note
79. Another lawyer pointed to Supreme Court jurisprudence according to which the
three year period can be extended for certain crimes:
For crimes against life, and state patrimony, there is no maximum duration
for the process. For other crimes, the court held that the maximum duration
which once was three years, could turn into ten years. because other things
have to be accounted for, such as whether there are too many detainees, if
there is flight risk, or whether there have been changes to the prosecutor or
the defense attorney. And when you put all these things together, the process
can just get drawn on, and on.
Interview with Audalia Zurita Zelada, supra note 215.
261. CPC 007, supra note 66, art. 239 (establishing an eighteen month limit if the
person has not been indicted, and a three year limit if the person has not been
sentenced).
262. Interview with Kathryn Ledcbur, Andean Information Network, in
Cochabamba, Bolivia (May 14, 2012) (explaining that both prosecutors and judges
want to let the three years run"); Interview with Alain Nufnez Rojas, supra note 196
(" [T]he people who have failed are the operators. The police don't really investigatc.
It's easy and comfortable for the prosecutor to have a case that'sjust sitting there and
the judgc doesn't pressure them to continue the process.
263. Interview with Reynaldo Immafra, supra note 79.
264. Interview with Iris justiniano, supra note 179.
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nothing to show."265 And yet, despite their failure to collect
evidence, "the prosecutor wants the accused to go straight to
trial."266
Defense attorneys similarly fail to fulfill their
responsibilities and even advise their clients to wait out the
maximum period6 7:
The problem with the public defense is that it exists in
paper but not in reality. The main strategy for the
public defender is to wait and then negotiate pretrial
detention with the prosecutor. They know they are not
going to advance in the investigation, and they advise
their clients to wait until the eighteen-month period
expires. Public defenders litigate against time.
Ironically, because there is an eighteen-month limit,
very few defense attorneys are looking at the clock.268
In some cases, the accused individuals themselves have an
incentive to keep their cases stagnant for three years. As one
official explained,
In the end it's almost convenient for them to have
their hearings delayed so they can make cessation
demands. Sometimes it's better for detainees to wait
eighteen months without anything because they can
ask for cessation . . . when the hearing date is
approaching, detainees hide. The prisoners are also
not saints, they have developed their own strategy, they
also try to delay their case.2 69
The fact that pretrial detention results in the failure of all actors
in the system to execute their duties points to serious failures
within the criminal justice system.
265 Id.
266. Id.
267. Interview with Daniel Chavez Ortiz, supra note 218 (revealing that his public
defense attorney advised him to wvait out the three years in pretrial detention at which
time a request for recase would be made).
268. Interview with Enrique MacCIcan Soruco, supra note 77.
269. Interview with Ramiro Llanos, supra note 1.
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2. Negligence by Criminal Justice Actors
"The right to trial within a reasonable time does not depend on the
accused requesting the authorities to expedite proceedings '!o
While all institutional actors should be equally invested in
protecting the integrity of the judicial system and ensuring
compliance with the CPC by enforcing relevant time limits, this
responsibility falls on the accused or his defense attorney. Where
time limits have been exceeded and requests for cessation are
brought, a judge explained that it is generally the defense
attorney who brings a motion for cessation Further, as one
lawyer explained, " [i]f you reach eighteen months, you need a
diligent attorney to file cessation."2 72 However, given human
resource limitations, this is generally not an option.
Despite the requirement that prosecutors inform judges of
the progress of the investigation every three months and that
judges compel action if prosecutors fail to comply with time
limits, one judge revealed that while judges might notify the
prosecutor and defense of the expiring time limits, " [i] n these
cases, the detainee also has to push for it because otherwise, it
will look like the judges are being partial." 24
Indeed, as the delegate for the prisoners incarcerated at
Mocovi prison explained, "those who insist get attention."2 75
However, detainees are often unable to "insist" that their cases
move forward because they are denied a meaningful defense.)76
When asked whether detainees are released when the
prosecution doesn't bring an accusation in a timely manner,
270. FAIR TRIALS MANU Al, supra note 137, at I16. See ICPR, supra note 93, art.
14(3)(c) (establishing a right to trial without undue delay); American Convention,
supra note 94, art. 8(1) (requiring that all trials are conducted "within a reasonable
tine").
271. Intelview with Margot Perez Montafno, supra note 69.
272. Interview with Enrique MacClean Soruco, supra note 77.
273. See CPC 1970, supra note 33, art. 134.
274. Interview with Margot PCrez Montafno, supra note 69 (discussing situations in
which the defense attorney fails to bring an action for cessation because of negligence).
275. Interview with Marco Antonio Roque, Detainee and President of the Council
of DelegateS in Mocovi Prison, in Trinidad, Bolivia (May 18, 2012).
276. See infra Part I,.
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detainees at Cantumarca Prison in Potosf responded, "No, all
cases stay here."2'
Even if it does not serve their interests to call attention to
expiring pretrial detention periods, it is the responsibility of
criminal justice actors to do so in the interests of upholding the
criminal justice system. When they instead rely on the accused
individual to initiate and advocate for cessation or other
measures, they neglect to fulfill their own duty to uphold the
law; given practical realities, their lack of action is likely to result
in individuals being held in pretrial detention for longer than
the legal limits.
3. Extensions
The right to trial without undue delay extends to individual
stages of the criminal justice process. 278 Delays during the
investigation stage and the trial itself can constitute undue
delays that contribute to delays in reaching the ultimate stage of
conviction and sentencing or acquittal.
Interviewees revealed that it is very common for prosecutors
to request extensions throughout the criminal justice process.2 *
Prosecutors' motivations for doing so are varied, and not always
legitimate: a SENADEP attorney explained that "The prosecutor
will always ask for time extensions because he is lazy and because
the dockets are overcrowded and because it is a strategy so that
the case can get buried, the trial will be delayed and there will
be an abreviado."280
While the CPC allows for extensions both during the
preliminary investigation and the preparatory stage, judges fail
277. Interview with Detainces of Cantumarca Prison Men's Unit, in Potosi, Bolivia
(May 16, 2012).
278. See ICCPR, supra note 93, art. 14(3) (c); Human Rights Committce General
Comment 13, para. 10 (explaining that ICCPR art. 14(3) (c) "provides that the accused
shall be tried without undue delay. This guarantee relates not only to the time by which
a trial should commence, but also the time by which it should end and judgemeInt be
rendered; all stages Inust take place 'without undue delay.' To make this right effective,
a procedure must be available in order to ensure that the trial will proceed 'without
undue delay,' both in first instance and on appeal.").
279. Interview with Margot Pdrez Montafno, supra note 69 (noting that prosecutors
ask for extensions "ninety percent of the time").
280. Interview with Defense Attorneys, SENA)EP, in Trinidad, Bolivia (May 15,
2012). An abreviado is similar to a guilty plea. Email interview with Yerko Ilijic Crosa,
Human Rights Attorney (Apr. 5, 2013).
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to examine whether the legal grounds warranting an extension
exist and often do not require prosecutors to justifv the basis for
their requests.281 1 When asked about the frequency with which
judges grant extensions, a prosecutor responded, "In reality,
since I started working here, I do not know of any times that the
extension of pretrial detention has been denied by the judge." 2
Given the ease with which judges grant extensions and the fact
that they grant them for a full eighteen months, there is little
incentive for prosecutors to conduct timely investigations.
Furthermore, even extended time limits are not adhered to.
HWhen asked what the foremost problem in Bolivian criminal
justice is, one interviewee explained that it was "lack of
application of the law," namely that the six to eighteen month
investigative limit is not observed.28 As a result, the process does
not progress to subsequent stages of the criminal justice process,
truth discovery is delayed and, all the while, the accused
individual remains in prison.
4. Practical Reasons for Time Delays
Even when attempts are made to comply with time limits,
there are practical reasons for delays. As one judge explained,
"it's impossible to get through the entire process in the time the
law requires." 2 For example, backlogs prevent trials from being
held within established time limits. One judge noted that " [t] his
backlog affects pretrial detention because even though pretrial
detention is only supposed to last for eighteen months
maximum, currently the next open court dates are two years
away."2 It is worth noting that the liberty of prisoners remains
restricted throughout these delays.
281. Interview wvith Anonymous Offcial, supra note 181. For example, judges do
not ask the prosecutor how long the investigation will take, nor do they set a date for
the next hearing to set a time limit within which the investigation should completed.
Id.
282. Interview with Prosecutor, supra note 171.
283. Interview with Anonymous Member of the Judiciary, supra note 179. This
interviewee identified the high caseload that the prosecution carries as the primary
reason for delays at this stage. Id.
284. Interview with Ximena Lucia Mendizabal Hurtado, supra note 197.
285. Interview wvith Cesar Suarez Saavedra, supra note 257. An additional barrier is
that, for examplc in the case of Palnasola prison in Santa Cruz. an intcrvicwcc revealed
that detainces have to pay fees associated with attending their hearings and have to pay
police officers. Interview with Anonymous Official, supra note 181.
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5. Motions
The filing of motions-sometimes filed for the specific
purpose of delaying the criminal justice process-as well as
delays in responses to these motions, also leads to delays in the
criminal justice system and resulting pretrial detention periods
that exceed legal limits. @ The following scenario illustrates how
these delays play out:
According to law, the entire process should take only
three years. But in many cases, we get to three years
and we're only halfway through the process. The
reasons include defendant's motions and the slow
reaction time of the judiciary. Judges don't comply
with deadlines. For example, I filed a motion in
November 2011. The prosecutor didn't respond until
January 12, 2012. The victim's lawyer responded by
January 30th. Now, today [May 2012], we are still
waiting for the judge's response. If the judicial system
were faster, something you requested in November
would get a response the same month.28
These filings are especially harmful when they interfere
with or prevent an oral trial from occurring: "There are lawyers
who try to make the process last longer than three years. This
causes a situation where the person in pretrial detention never
even appeared for a hearing. They presented all types of
motions and objections."28 8 Again, when an oral trial to establish
criminal responsibility is never held, justice is not served for
anyone -neither the accused, victims, nor society.
6. Suspensions
Repeated suspensions of hearings also result in delays. With
each suspension, subsequent stages are delayed, triggering even
further delays. As a result, legal and factual determinations are
not made in a timely manner and ultimately, an accused person
is held in pretrial detention for an even longer period of time,
286. Interview wvith Dr. Maritza Suntura Juaniquina, Magistrate, Supreme
Tribunal of Justice, in Santa Cruz, Bolivia (May 15, 2012).
287. Interview with Jcijcs Justiniano Atalt, supra note 173.
288. Interview with Iris justiniano, supra note 179.
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potentially beyond legal limits.1 9 Suspensions occur with great
frequency-one NGO recalled a case that was suspended sixty-
three times over the course of more than four years291"-and for
a variety of reasons."' Frequently, hearings are suspended due
to the absence of parties.9 Because of the large caseload carried
by both defense attorneys and prosecutors and the large
number of hearings over which judges preside, these actors are
unable to attend to all of their cases.2"( For example, "some
289. The suspension of pretrial hearings results in delays in the preliminary
investigation as well as remaining stages of the criminal justice process. See FUNDAICON
CONSTRUTR REPORT, supra note 7, at 166. While the maximum duration of the process
is set at three years, the suspension of hearings contributes to the suspension of the
clock. The vagueness of the language in the CPC regarding grounds for suspension
contributes to ambiguity as well as violations of the law. CPC 1970, supra note 33, art.
133 .
290. Interview wvith Vladimir Nilo Medina Choque, supra note 172.
291. Rclevant actors sometimes fail to appear at hearings because of the deficient
notification system: "It is so common that a hearing is suspended bccause the victims
and prosecutors aren't notified. This increases the length of time people help in
pretrial detention and increases the uncertainty." Interview with Ninoska Ayala Flores,
supra note 83. Similarly, an official noted that, "[w] e have noticed that the system of
notiication of parties is deficient. This causes the hearings to be cancelled." Interview
with Anonymous Official, supra note 181.
292. The FUNDACION CONSTRUIR RLPORT report extensively documents
suspensions. In their study, which was conducted over the course of almost two months,
and involved observations of pretrial hearings in El Alto and La Paz (home to more
than twenty percent of judicial activity in Bolivia), seventy-two percent of cases were
suspended. See FtNDACTON CONSTRUJR REPORT, supra note 7, at 161. The reasons for
suspensions included the absence of relevant actors (the absence of the accused in
thirty-four percent of cases, the absence of the prosecutor in thirty-three percent of
cases, the absence of the defense attorney in eighteen percent of cases, the absence of
the complainant in eight percent of cases and the absence of the judge in seven
percent of cases). See id. at 164.
293. See inja Part IV(A); see also Interview with Vladimir Nilo Medina Choque,
supra note 172; Interview with Susana Saavedra Badani, Attorney and Program
Coordinator, Fundaci6n Construir, in La Paz, Bolivia (May 21, 2012); Interview with
Anonymous Official, supra note 181. Additionally, different interpretations exist among
criminal justice actors as to whether the absence of certain actors legally justifics the
suspension of hearings. One lawyer described the fact that prosecutors do not show up
to trials and that cases are thus suspended as "terrible" and went on to say:
ItS not established in law that anything in the case should move forward
without the prosecutor. ItS not a cause for the suspension of the hearing
unless the prosecution can show he's doing something and cannot show up.
When the prosecution doesn't show up and the case is complicated, the judge
doesn't dare hear the case without the prosecutor present. Today, I was at a
hearing. The judge wvanted to suspend it because the prosecutor didn't show
up. The non-attendance of the prosecutor isn't Set forth in the law as a reason
to suspend a hearing but its being applied that way.
Interview with Dr. Roger Valverde Perez, supra note 33.
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prosecutors are given back to back trials and cannot be expected
to be in two places at once. The prosecutor sometimes has 400
cases so the judge is understanding because the prosecutor can't
be in two places at once." 294Similarly, referencing the frequency
with which prosecutors fail to appear at pretrial hearings, an
attorney responded, "All the time, they don't make a schedule
of their work." 95 Almost everyone in the Men's Unit of the
Cantuimarca Prison in Potosf raised their hand to indicate that
the prosecutor had failed to appear at their hearing, sharing
that "it happens all the time, and then the hearing is postponed
ten to fifteen days." '2 As to why judges do not enforce the
attendance of prosecutors, responsibility was placed on the "lack
of judicial authority." 297 While "the judges in reality have
obligations to punish the prosecutors for not showing up,"*298
they grant them leeway because of their heavy caseloads.
Defense attorneys are also often absent from hearings. An
organization that advocates on behalf of victims shared that
"many times we go to a hearing and the accused doesn't have a
lawyer so the case can't proceed."29 G Another official explained
that "sometimes they [defense attorneys] don't come to
hearings because there are too many hearings and their
schedule is too tight."soo
It is not only lawyers and judges who fail to appear for
hearings; the accused is often absent as well. The Constitutional
Court of Bolivia has established that the defendant must be in
attendance at the pretrial hearing.soi The very justification for
294. Interview with Dr. Roxana Valverde, Professor of Criminal Law I and II,
Catholic University of Bolivia "San Pablo." in La Paz, Bolivia (May 25, 2012).
295. Interview with Dr. Luis D. Lopez Rosalcs, Forimer National Director of Public
Defenders, in Potost, Bolivia (May 16, 2012).
296. Interview with Detainces of ( antunarca Prison Men's Unit, supra note 277.
297. Interview with Dr. Teresa Ledezma, supra note 69.
298. Id.
299. Interview with Radir H. Alvarado & Jorge Cabral Berdecio, Jessika Borda
Foundation of Assistance to Victims of Crime, in Santa Cruz, Bolivia (May 16, 2012).
300. Interview with Anonymous Official, supra note 181.
301. CEJA BOLIVIA REPORT, supra note 33, at 41 (explaining the Constitutional
Court's decision in SC 760/2003-R, and noting that "[h]carings which provide for the
application of precautionary measures require the presence of the defendant to ensure
the right to a defense and the validity of inmmediacy and orality, which goverin the new
criminal procedure. Failure to do so results in injury to the right of defense and
transgression of the principles of orality and immediacy. The defendant
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pretrial detention - to ensure the presence of the accused at
trial - is entirely defeated when an individual in pretrial
detention fails to appear at a hearing. In reference to such
absences, one official noted that: "it is incredible that the
accused is not there, who is technically arrested and is being
held in order to ensure his presence at the hearing."so1
7. Lack of Enforcement of Time Limits
Finally, the failure to enforce time limits results in high
rates of pretrial detention and extended durations of pretrial
detention.sos This is partially attributable to a faulty record
keeping system. As one prison official explained in regard to
whether a prison would make an attempt to contact a prosecutor
once an individual had been in pretrial detention for more than
three years: "we use a very archaic system-a handwritten
register and archive-so unfortunately, no. It's almost like a
century old."304 A significant contributing factor to lack of
enforcement is also the absence of repercussions for failure to
comply with these time limits. While the CPC contains
provisions ordering that "negligent officials" be subjected to
disciplinary and criminal liability for failure to meet deadlines
and that those guilty of "malicious delay" be punished for delays
of justice,so5 given the lack of legal enforcement, the law fails to
deter non-action. As one NGO explained, while disciplinary
measures exist to hold judges, prosecutors and public defenders
accountable, "For a case being delayed, there's not much of a
consequence."30
must be present at the hearing, as implied by Art. CPI 226, which states that the
hearing should be at the disposal of the judge.").
302. Interview with Anonymous Official, supra note 181. One victims' organization
noted that detainces sometimes deliberately avoid attending their hearings: "If the
hearing doesn't benefit them, then they [the detainees] hide in the prison." Interview
with Kadir H. Alvarado &Jorge Cabral Berdecio, supra note 299.
303. "The lack of clear, enforeable time limits is also a factor in high rates of
pretrial detention following the commencement of formal criminal proceedings."
OPEN SOCYJUSTICE INITIATIVE, IMPROVING PRETRIALJUSTICE: THE ROLES OF LAHYERS
AND PARALEGALS 33 (2012) (discussing the issue of pretrial detention worldwide).
"Even where there are absolutc statutory time limits, they may not be complied with in
practice, nor be enforceable." Id.
304. Interview with Ramiro Llanos, supra note 1.
305. CPC 1970, supra note 33, arts. 135, 177.
306. Interview with Ramiro Orias Arredondo, supra note 172.
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111. CITIZEN SECURITY CONCERNS AND PRETRIAL
DETENTION
"[W]here there is media pressure or social pressure, there is
always pretrial detention. There is one extreme case, a
seventeen-year-old boy was arrested . . . for stealing a
backpack. The judge said she wouldn't give pretrial detentionjust for a backpack. But she was forced to recuse herself
because there was pressure from the prosecutor. The pressure
was incredible, the parents of the group were in the courtroom
screaming at the judge. The next judge gave pretrial
detention. There are two types of pressure: media and social
pressure - this happens such as in the case of the backpack or
in homicide cases and this is related to citizen insecurity and
the pressure that is put on the prosecutor and judge.'07
A. Societal Perceptions of Citizen Security and Pretrial Detention
The excessive application of pretrial detention is also
influenced by "citizen security" concerns. Not only have these
concerns resulted in changes to the law, " they continue to
impact judicial decisions to impose pretrial detention, and they
have instigated current legislative efforts that will likely further
increase the use and duration of pretrial detention.s0
There is a perception in many segments of Bolivian society
of a direct causal relationship between the guarantee of
procedural rights which restrict the use of pretrial detention and
rising crime rates.31 One lawyer explained, "[T]here is this
conception that the respect for procedural guarantees and
procedural due process increases crime." 311 Society fails to
distinguish between an arrested individual and a convicted
individual, instead assuming that anyone arrested is in fact
307. Interview with Anonymous Offcial, supra note 181.
308. See supraPar I(A)(3).
309. Interview with Alain Nuiez Rojas, supra note 196 ("Unfortunately instead of
advancing towards respect, we are thinking about going backwards to make a Code with
measures that are much more harsh, even if they're also not just.")
310. See, e.g:, Interview with Enrique MacClean Soruco, supra note 77 (" [T]he
perception is that the system is bad ... because it gives rights to the accused.") An
additional challenge is posed by the lack of reliable statistics. See id. ("It is very difficult
to tell whether crime has risen or not, because no one keeps records. The police
manipulate[] the data for [their] own interests. The National Bureau of Statistics does
mostly economic [records]. NGO studies are sporadic.").
311. Interview with Reynaldo Irnaa, supra note 79.
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guilty. 1 2 As one lawyer explained, "Unfortunately we have a
situation where people believe if someone is brought before a
judge, they are probably the author of the crime."." Further, as
one organization described, "Detainees sew their lips shut and
tie themselves to the cross but the general population doesn't
mobilize because the feeling is that they're bad people doing
bad things."s14
Relatedly, society fails to understand that the process-
related reasons for pretrial detention are distinct from the
punitive reasons for post-conviction imprisonment. 3 15 As a result
of the failure to understand the requirement for a legal basis to
justify pretrial detention, when judges do not order pretrial
detention based on evidentiary requirements not being met,
"the citizens say, 'Look! The police arrested someone and now
the corruptjudge is letting them go."'3 1 6
B. Influence of Societal Views on Pretrial Detention Decisions
While societal views in and of themselves are not necessarily
detrimental to the protection of human rights, what is
dangerous is that these societal concerns about citizen security
and accompanying misunderstandings about the law affect
judicial decisions to order pretrial detention.3 1 7 The government
312. See id. ("People in society now say that people who committed crimes are
free."); see also OPLN SOC'YFOUNDS., supra note 3, at 44 ("A lack of awareness can also
lead to hostile attitudes toward pretrial detainees: many people assume that the
arrcsted must be guilty and deserve to bc mistrcatcd.").
313. Intcrvicw with Jerjcs Justiniano Atala, supra note 173.
314. Interview with Kathryn Ledebur, supra note 262.
315. For a discussion of socicty's failurc to distinguish proccdural and punitive
reasons for pretrial dctcntion in Mcxico, sec LECUONA, supra note 11, at 13 ("In this
atmosphere of insecurity, judges often opt to further limit the right to liberty of the
accused in the name of protccting society against the thrcat they supposedly pose, and
in spite of their right to bc presumed innoccnt.").
316. Interview with Anonymous Official, supra note 59.
317. For a cross-regional analysis of criminal procedural reforms, see CEJA INTRO
RLPORT, supra notc 25, at 43-44 ("[A]bove and beyond legal rcforms, a social
environment has developed in most countries in the region in which judges' decisions
regarding pretrial detcntion arc closcly scrutinized. The perccption of impunity
inspircd by the relcasc of defendants who have bcen arrestcd and identified by
witnesses and the growing climate of insecurity generated in part by the same
phenomcnon havc placcd a grcat dcal of pressure on judges to apply prctrial dctcntion
indcpendcnt of the rcal dangcr that the dcfendant may posc to the process. This
climate of keen observation and criticism of investigative judges' decisions regarding
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has prioritized satisfying society at the expense of ensuring due
process and related human rights guarantees upon which the
criminal justice depends for its legitimacy. Excessive weight is
placed on satisfying citizen concerns about security and
responding to society s demand for pretrial detention. "'As one
detainee stated, one reason pretrial detention rates in Bolivia
are so high is because of "social pressure . . . the public
opinion has the impression that the person is guilty," 19
suggesting that societal pressure and beliefs tangibly affect the
imposition of pretrial detention. As a result of "pressure from
society or from the victim," judges order pretrial detention even
when prosecutors and victims have not been able to "objectively
show" the required evidence, and thus order pretrial detention
"even without a legal basis."32 Vhile it might be natural for
society to identify with victims rather than the accused, 21 on the
other hand, in the words of one lawyer, "if you are in a
government position you have a duty to guarantee the rights of
all."3  As this lawyer went on to say, "The greatest challenge of
the reform is to change the mentality of the authorities in
charge of the justice system and of society, and to acknowledge
the rights of detainees while also preserving citizen security. In
other words, to show that it is possible to both protect rights and
preserve citizen security."3 23 Currently, the authorities are failing
pretrial detention generates different kinds of pressure, making factors external to the
law take on an important role for the decision that is to be made in a specific case.").
318. For an analysis of a similar situation in Mexico, see LLCUONA. supra note 11,
at 17 ("With respect to the rights of victims, the authorities have begun to treat pretrial
detention as preemptive punishment, in an attempt to convince vctisrn and society at
large that justice is being served. This use of pretrial detention-to satisfy a public
demand for swift justice-comes dangerously close to acceding to public cries for
revenge, offering as a spectadce the detention of a few to distract the public from the 97
percent of crincs in Mexico that remain unpunished.").
319. Interview with Detainees of Cantumarca Prison Men's Unit, supra note 277.
320. Interview with Dr. Roger Valverde Perez, supra note 33.
321. Society perceives a dichotomy between victims' rights and the rights of the
accused. Specifically, the human rights of the accused, in the form of the procedural
guaranteCes ensured by the CPC, are viewed as being in direct opposition with, and even
contradictory to, victims' rights. lInterview with Dr. Edwin Cocarico, supra note 49
("Society doesn't care and wvon't until they stop identifying so much wvith the victims.
Society identifs with the victim, not the accused.").
322. Interview with Reynaldo limiana, supra note 79.
323. Id.
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to meet this challenge at the expense of the rights of the
accused and the guarantees as established in Bolivian law.
C. The Role of the Media
Pressure by the "sensationalist" press and media, among
whom there exists "a sentiment of fear against criminality""4
also impacts judicial decisions to order pretrial detention, thus
seriously compromising judicial independence. One official has
"observed that where there is media pressure or social pressure,
there is always pretrial detention."3 On the other hand, if there
is a decision to not order pretrial detention, "the press will put
their lights on."N As one judge described, "If the judge doesn't
order pretrial detention, the prosecutor will go to the press and
claim that the judge isn't doing his job or is part of the
crime."327
D. The Influence ofNeighborhood Groups
An even more dramatic example of the influence of societal
concerns about crime on pretrial detention is the role that
"highly organized groups of neighbors" play.? The range of
activities that these groups, as well as less organized community
groups, engage in include "go [ing] to the doors of hearings and
protest [ing] "329 as well as "social group marches or groups that
ask for justice." " Their activities affect judicial decisions to
impose pretrial detention, the duration of pretrial detention
and even judicial decisions as to whether to grant a request for
the cessation of pretrial detention."' Throughout Bolivia, there
324. Interview with Boris Wilson Arias Lopez, supra note 215.
325. Interview with Anonymous Official, supra note 181. See also Intervicw with
Alain Nunez Rojas supra note 196 ("the judges arc the face of the criminal justicc
system, so the television and papers are always focused on them. So that makes pretrial
dctcntion more important in thc eyes of the judge because they have this scrutiny on
thcn.")
326. Interview with Arturo Ydfiez Cortez, supra note 255.
327. Intcrview with Xiicna Lucia MendizAbal Hurtado, supra notc 197.
328. Interview with Vladimir Nilo Medina Choquc, supra note 172.
329. Id.
330. Interview with Dr. Ramiro E. L6pez Guzminn, supra note 84.
331. One NGO explained [hat if judgcs were to follow the parameters of the law
with regard to pretrial detention, the rate of cessation would be higher but factors such
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are incidents in which "social pressure has influenced in some
way that the judge takes a different type of decision."332 While
one judge explained that he does not allow these groups to
physically enter the hearings, nevertheless, he admitted that "yes
we do indirectly value that outcry and request from society in
our resolutions of pretrial detention." 3 He went on to say that
the marches and stoppages pressure judges to "not apply
presumption of innocence" despite the legal guarantees to this
right.34 At times, judges give in to this pressure to the point that
they do not enforce certain legal provisions because it is "easier"
for them not to and "the community will protest and they don't
want problems with the community. They're not strong enough
to follow the law."a 5
Neighborhood groups even engage in violence: "In some
cases, judges and prosecutors have been hurt and hit by the
population for not having listened to the social outcry."33
Sometimes, judges fear for their own lives:
The population doesn't believe in justice, so they're
becoming involved in things like lynching. They think
justice is on the side of the criminal, that he'll be
detained for eight hours and then let out. There's not
a lot of credibility in the criminal justice system. So, the
judge many times sees the situation to not use other
[alternative] methods so they can please the
population because if not they'll want to lynch him
too.M7
Judges also order pretrial detention to protect defendants.
As one judge explained: "If we don't take into account the social
outcry, there may be lynchings of the accused we released." 3
This judge shared an example of a case where a mayor was
denounced for public corruption and, when pretrial detention
was not ordered, the community lynched, burned and killed
as "social pressure" influence decisions. See Interview with Vladirnir Nilo Medina
Choque, supra note 172.
332. Interview with Dr. Angel Arias Morales Fono, supra note 168.
333. Intervicw with Dr. Ramiro E. L6pcz Guzminn, supra note 84.
334. See id.
335. Interview with Anonymous judge, in Bolivia (May 16, 2012).
336. Intervicw with Dr. Angcl Aiias Moralcs Fono, supra note 168.
337. Intervicw with Ramiro Leonardo Iquise Pally, supra note 2.
338. Interview with Dr. Ramiro E. L,6pez Guzrnn, sqpra note 84.
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him."' While obviously the safety of both judicial actors and the
accused must be of paramount concern and measures to protect
them should certainly be put into place, pretrial detention
should not be the solution.
E. Additional Impacts ofBasing Pretr al Detention Decisions on Citizen
Security Concerns
1. The Rule of Law is Undermined When Societal Fears, Rather
than Law, Drive the CriminalJustice System
When judges impose pretrial detention irrespective of
whether the legal requirements are met, they fail to uphold the
law and to protect human rights. By allowing external influences
-whether in the form of neighborhood groups or more general
societal or political pressure-to influence their decisions,
juidges compromise theirjuidicial independence.340
Accused individuals directly suffer the resultant human
rights violation of illegal detention. As one detainee in the
Men's Unit at Cantumarca Prison in Potosf said, "Because of
social pressure even if something is written in the law it's not
applied. So there are many people here that don't belong
here."34 1
Even more broadly, a violation against any one person
poses a threat to a democratic and lawful society that, through
its own national and international legal obligations, is obligated
to guarantee the rights of all individuals. When external
influences outside of, and even contrary to the law interfere with
judicial decisions, and explicit legal protections for the accused
are disregarded, the entire legal system is seriously undermined
and the crim l ,justice process loses its legitimacy. While
judicial decisions to order pretrial detention might momentarily
339. Id.
340. One lawyer explained that it is difficult for the Public Ministry to remain
objective, given that "society has their eyes on the prosecutor and the judge." Interview
with Jorge Fernandez, supra note 222. In reference to alternatives to pretrial detention,
such as rilease or relcase on bond, an NGO that works with prisoners explained,
Judges feel tremendous social pressure not to ket peoplc out or to allow bond."
Interview with Joe Loney, supra note 172. See also supra notes 211-215 (discussing the
explicit recoinnendations issued by the Public Ministry to order pretrial detention in
certain situations).
341. Interview with Detainees of Cantumarca Prison Men's Unit, supra note 277.
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satisfy the public demand for security, overriding legal
protections ultimately undermines the judiciary as an institution
as well as public confidence in the judiciary. When judges make
decisions without an adequate legal basis, this undercuts societal
trust and faith that they will operate within the confines of the
law in other respects. 342 The government is responsible for
guaranteeing the rights of all citizens and cannot sacrifice the
rights of the accused because of citizen security concerns; their
response to citizen security concerns must be consistent with
their human rights obligations.343
2. Society is Not Safer as a Result of Widespread Use of Pretrial
Detention
Excessive and arbitrary pretrial detention does not actually
improve citizen security. By acting as though pretrial detention
is a "solution," the government hides behind and neglects to
address structural problems in the criminal justice system.
a. False Perceptions of Increased Safety
The practice of pretrial detention might make society think
they are safer: in the words of one lawyer, "[s]ociety is calm if
somebody is accused and is sent to jail. They feel secure."34 4 The
government even uses pretrial detention as a deliberate tactic to
pacify society: "They put people in prison so people think they
342. See OPEN SOC'Y FOUNDS., supra note 3, at 22 ("Pretrial dectention can
provide a window into the effectiveness and efficiency of a particular state's criminal
justice system, as well as its conunitment to the rule of law.").
343. See ICCPR, supra note 93. The I((PR guarantees the following: "Nothing in
the present Covenant may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person
any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of
the rights and freedoms recognized herein or at their limitation to a greater extent
than is provided for in the present Covenant." Id. art. 1; see also Mauricio Duce &
Rogelio Pcrez Perdomo. Citizen Security and Reform of the Criminal Justice System in Latin
America, in CRIME AND VIOLENCE IN LATIN AMERICA: CITIZEN SECURITY, DLM(OCRACY,
AND THE STATE 69, 89 (Hugo Frfihling et al. eds., 2003). In their analysis of criminal
reforms in the criinnal justice systems in Latin America, the authors stated, "The great
challenge is for the authorities, politicians, technical personnel, those participating in
the system, and the population as a whole to understand what is at stake. The issue is
not simply a problem of combating crime and increasing security, but rather one of
respect for the human rights that are the basis for our civilization."
344. Interview with Dr. Teresa Ledezma, supra note 69.
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can sleep better at night."" 4 By appearing to respond to crime by
readily ordering pretrial detention, the government garners
good will: "These laws [regarding pretrial detention] are made
to make people feel protected from the bad guys so they will
think the laws are good." 346 The government has an incentive to
increase citizen security to increase its own popularity, so "to say
all criminals are in jail is a good thing for them.""4 Put another
way, " [w] hat sells politically is putting suspects of crimes in
jail."34 Because "crime is seen as such a serious problem" and
"society needs protection," judges operate with the
understanding that "pretrial detention must be applied
profusely.""' In cases in which pretrial detention is not ordered,
"there's a sense that the judge has allowed impunity." 5 0
Given the deficiencies in the criminal justice system,
including severe delays,sa and the fact that a case is unlikely to
proceed to either an acquittal or conviction and sentence,
pretrial detention in effect serves as a substitute for a conviction
and sentence that would be achieved in a functioning criminal
justice system.352 As one lawyer said: "In Bolivia all victims want
pretrial detention. Unfortunately the system is very slow . .
. Almost all cases take three to four years. Because of this delay,
what victims want above all is for the defendant to be held in
jail."35
b. Citizen Security is Not Improved
While justification for the changes to the CPC were made
on the basis that they would increase citizen security, they have
not.354 Contrary to the belief that "harder laws and higher
345. Interview with Boris Wilson Arias Lopez, supra note 215.
346. Interview with Arturo Ydihez Cortez, supra note 255.
347. Interview with Anonymous Official, supra note 59.
348. Interview with Dr. Teresa Ledezma, supra note 69.
349. Interview with Dr. Roger Valverde Perez, supra note 33.
350. Interview with Jejes Justiniano Atala, supra note 173.
351. See supra Part 11(B).
352. Interview with Alain Nufiez Rojas, supra note 196 ("We have people who at
the beginning are being detained and then later don't have a trial, and that's where the
system fails.").
353. Interview with jerjes justiniano Atala, supra note 173.
354. This is evident in statistics collected by an NGO that has closely monitored
pretrial detention practices. They found that "the level of complaints to the police has
increased which is the opposite of what was expected under the harsher laws."
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sentences would decrease crime," in fact, "the figures show that
these harsher measures have not increased the security of
Bolivian persons." 55 A link between increased use of pretrial
detention and lower levels of crime has not been established. As
one lawyer explained:
It should be generally understood that the violation of
these guarantees [the rights of the accused] and of the
human rights of detainees is not, has not been and
never will be an effective way to reduce crime. The
violation of these guarantees has not reduced crime.
The extreme harshness of the penal laws has also not
been shown to be an effective way of reducing crime.35"
For citizen security concerns to be addressed, there must be
"a popularly administered justice system that actually holds
criminals accountable"; however, "this is not happening in
Bolivia."357 In the absence of timely and effective investigations,
trials, and ultimately convictions and sentences, there is no
finding of guilt. As a result, the guilty continue to live in society
and the innocent are imprisoned which certainly does not make
for a safer society.
In fact, when individuals are detained, there is reduced
incentive to move the case through the criminal justice system.
This starts with the fact that investigations do not advance. For
Interview with Ramiro Orfas Arredondo, supra note 172. While statistics following the
inplcinentation of Law 007 in May 2010 arc not yct readily availabic, the following
statistics are telling, given that legal reforms, most relevantly Law 2494, provisions of
which are incorporatcd into Law 007, wcre enactcd prior to the enactment of Law 007:
"Thc premise of the criminal counter-reforin was that a criminal regiic that was
tougher and more punitive would lead to less crime. However, the number of crimes
reported to the Bolivian Police-according to data from the Ministry of Governmcnt-
has seen an increasc of seventy perccnt betwccn 2005 and 2010. According to a survcy
conducted by ILatinobar6metro in 2010, fifty percent of lBolivians consider Bolivia a
country wherc it is morC unsafc to live evcry day. According to a survcy conducted by
the Latin Amcrican Project on Public Opinion ("LAPOP"), the average pcrccption of
citizen insecurity in liolivia, at 48.7% is one of the four highest in Latin America."
Ramiro Orias Airedondo, "Lejes duras, penas altas y seguridad ciudadana" [Harsh Laws,
High Penalties and Citizen Security], PAGINA SIETL (Bol.) (Mar. 18, 2012),
http://www.paginasiete.bo/2012-03-19/Opinion/)estacados/ 140piOO219-03-12-
P720120319LUN.aspx. Citizcn confidence in the justicc systcm stands below forty
pcrccnt and citizen insccurity has increased scventy pcrccnt bctwecn 2005 and 2010.
See FUNDACTON CONSTRUT R REPORT, supra note 7, at 33-34.
355. Intervicw with Ramiro Orias Arredondo, supra notc 172.
356. Intervicw with Reynaldo imafia, supra notc 79.
357. Interview with Audalia Zurita Zelada, supra note 215.
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all practical purposes, "[wihen the accused is in pretrial
detention, the case is already closed."3 58 That is, "prosecutors
use pretrial detention to satisfy victims" and then "just abandon
the case, then go to [the] victim, say the criminal is already in
jail, but the victim doesn't know the process isn t over, not even
the investigative phase."'15
As a result, sentences are not issued: a victims' organization
that works on behalf of women, while critical of the fact that it is
difficult to prove the need for pretrial detention in cases that
involve female victims of certain types of crimes, also
acknowledged that "those who are detained stay in prison for
more time than they should," and "[tihe real problem is the
system takes too long and the prison is always full of people who
are not sentenced." s6o This organization discussed the slow
speed of the judicial process and the fact that "there is no
judgment because the process is always longer than it should
be. "361
Following an investigation, the next step in the criminal
justice process should involve a formal charge followed by an
indictment. However, statistics demonstrate that a high
percentage of cases never reach these stages. For example, only
about one-third of cases for which a preliminary investigation is
begun result in a formal charge.362 Between 2008 and 2010, on
average, the Public Ministry attended to between fifty-seven and
sixty-one percent of these formal charges per year., The
number of formal charges that then resulted in indictments
decreased by thirty-nine percent in that time period.3 64 On
358. Interview withJorge Richter Anallo, supra note 18.
359. Id.
360. Interview with Sylvia Ortiz, Attorney for the Densc of Women, Centro
juana Azurday, in Sucre, Bolivia (May 15, 2012). The relative difficulty of proving the
need for pretial detention in the case of donestic violence cases can be explained as
follows: "An exception to the practice of excessive and arbitrary pretrial detention in
Bolivia and other countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, including Mexico and
Honduras, often occurs in thc case of domestic violence cases in which judges are less
likely to order pretrial detention for thc alleged perpetrators of these crincs."
Interview wvith Denise Tornasini-Joshi, Assistant Dean for public Service, former Legal
Officer, Open Socicty Justice Initiativc. New York, New York (Apr. 3, 2013).
361. Intrcivicw with Martha Noya Laguna, Executivc Director. Centro Juana
Azurday, in Sucre, Bolivia (May 15, 2012).
362. See FUNDACI6)N CONSTRUIR RLPORT, supra note 7, at 94.
363. Id. at 101.
364. Id. at 118.
886 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 36:812
average, in 2012, seventy-five percent of cases for which an
investigation was started by the prosecution remained pending
or unfinished, seventeen percent were rejected and only in
seven percent of the cases was a formal charge issued. 36 While
on the one hand, a substantial number of cases are filed in
court, as the case makes its way through the criminal process,
these figures decrease considerably, such that the number of
cases that result in sentences is of concern. 66
And finally, the criminal justice process results in
convictions and sentences at a worryingly low rate. In 2010, out
of the 20,670 formal charges that were filed, 874 received final
judgments, representing only four percent of the total number
of formal charges. 67 This figure "is of great concern because we
cannot speak of justice while the justice system does not
guarantee a restorative timely response for victims, nor certainty
for the accused." 68
c. "School of Crime"
Finally, pretrial detention has the potential to increase
crime by "creating" criminals, thus making society even less safe.
Throughout interviews, the term "school of crime" 69 was
repeatedly used to explain the phenomenon that pretrial
detainees actually learn how to become criminals while
imprisoned. 370 This is due first to State failure to separate
convicted prisoners from pretrial detainees: While Bolivian law
and international human rights law dictate that individuals in
pretrial detention be separated from convicted prisoners, 71 in
365. Id. at 47.
366. Id. at 119.
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. See Interview with Pastoral Penitenciaria Worker, in Potosi. Bolivia (May 16,
2012) ("Prison is a crime school."); see also Reynaldo Imaila, supra note 79.
370. OPEN SOC'YJUSTICE INITIATIVE, THE SOCTOECONOMIC IMPACT OF PRFTRIAL
DETLNTION 19 (2011) ("Because it so often exposes detainees to crinLogenic
influences, the excessive and arbitrary use of pretrial detention may actually increase
the number of potential offenders in a society. There is significant evidence to show
that prisons foster criminal behavior by serving as schools or breeding grounds for
crime.").
371. CPC 1970, supra note 33, art. 237; 1((PR. supra note 93, art. 10(2)(a);
American Convention, supra note 94, art. 5(4); Body of Principles, supra note 112. at 8;
Council of Europe, Comm. of Ministers, Recommendation Rec(2006)2 of the Comm.
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practice, the Bolivian State fails to do so. 372 As one lawyer noted,
"The defendants live in prison with convicted prisoners . .
. The pretrial detainee is sitting next door to a convicted
prisoner but the law says they're supposed to be separate. The
rate of criminality inevitably increases."373
Simply by occupying the same space as criminals, pretrial
detainees learn criminal behavior. As one academic noted,
"There is a feeling of citizen insecurity and there are more
people detained. Everyone gets put in the same place regardless
of the crime committed-there's no classification. It's
infectious-it's a university of crime."37 4 A judge similarly noted
that "In reality, they [prisons] are universities of crime. A person
ends up worse coming out of pretrial detention than they were
coming in." 7 5
of Ministers to member states on the Eur. Prison Rules, at 18.8(a), 2006 O.J. (C952)
(Jan. 11, 2006); Tokyo Rules, supra note 116, 1 8(b).
372. In their prison visits, the Crowley delegation observed that there was no
separation between convicted and pretrial detainces. This observation was reinforced
through information learned in interviews: one lawyer explained that while legally,
there should be separation on the basis of age and status (pretrial detention vs.
sentenced), this does not occur in practice because of the lack of infrastructure.
Interview with Dr. Roger Valverde Perez, supra note 33. A judge similarly explained
that, "[w]ithin our prisons, we don't have separate areas for pretrial and sentenced
prisoners." Interview with Margot P6rez Montafno, supra note 69; Interview with Juan
Carlos Octavio Pinto Quintanilla, National Director, SIFDE [Servicio Intercultural dc
Fortalecimiento Democratico, Tribual Supremo Electoral, Organo Electoral
Plurinacional], [Intercultural Service of Democratic Strengthening, Supremc Electoral
Court, Plurinational Electoral Organ], in La Paz, Bolivia (May 22, 2012) (discussing the
non-classihcation of detainees); Interview with Marfa Angelica L,6pez Morales, Director
of the Prison System of Chuquisaca, , in Sucre, Bolivia (May 17, 2012) (explaining that
pretrial and sentenced prisoners are not separated).
373. Interview with Boris Wilson Arias Lopez, supra note 215. The Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights ("IACHR") noted this regional trend: "[T]heire is a
direct relationship between the proper functioning of the prison system and the States'
obligation to protect and ensure the human rights directly at stake in the policy on
citizen security. Most prison institutions in the region arc today a breeding ground for
the violence with which the societics in the Hemisphere are coping." Citizen Security
Report, supra note 110, 1 155. In a study examining torture in the context of pretrial
detention, the following relevant findings were rcealed: The failure to separate
pretrial detainees from convicted prisoners can also augment the risk of inter-dctainec
violence. In many countries, a lack of specific remand facilities makes such a separation
impossible. When mixed with convicted, long-term prisoners, pretrial detainecs risk
being exposed to a violent offender subculture. In some prisons, daily life is dominated
by violence, abuse, drug addiction, and internal gang structures. OPEN SOC'Y FouNDS.,
supra note 3, at 38.
374. Interview with Dr. Roxana Valverde, supra note 294.
375. Interview with Anonymous judge, supra note 335.
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This occurs because when pretrial detainees occupy the
same space as convicted and sentenced criminals-often for
extended periods of time, given the extensive duration of
pretrial detention-the concept of criminality becomes
normalized. 36 As one defense attorney explained, "Other
inmates influence each other, including juveniles, and they start
to think it's normal to commit crimes." 7 In addition, pretrial
detainees learn criminal behavior from fellow detainees who
have been convicted and sentenced. A representative of an NGO
explained this phenomenon as follows: "Sometimes detainees
are learning criminal ways from the sentenced prisoners-it's
like a school. When really the purpose of pretrial detention is to
guarantee the investigation." 8
Yet another way in which prison can operate as a "school of
crime" for pretrial detainees is as a result of learning criminal
behavior through the criminal activity that occurs within
prisons:37
Pretrial detention does not guarantee that somebody
will not engage in criminal activity such as narco-
trafficking and car theft. This is because of the
phenomenon of criminality within the prisons. Even if
the law says that those in pretrial detention should be
treated differently and separated from the sentenced,
this doesn't actually occur."o
376. See OPEN SOC'YJUSTICE INITIATIVE, Supra note 370 (" [F]ntering prison-even
while innocent-increases the likelihood of further conflict with the law. The risk is
greater in places where sentenced and unsentenced prisoners are not separated, or
where pretrial detainees charged with minor offenses are incarcerated with detainces
suspected of having committed serious crintes-common scenarios in many
overcrowded prison systems around the wvorld.").
377. Interview with Attorney, SENADEP. in Riberalta (May 17, 2012).
378. Interview with Vladimir Nilo Medina Choque, supra note 172.
379. The way in which Bolivian prisons operate also affects this situation. While
State authorities are in charge of security on the outer parameters of Bolivian prisons,
inmates manage and operate the internal workings of the prisons themsclves. While the
specifc details depend on the prison, in general, inmates elect delegates or
"delegados" to manage such issues as security, the collection of payment for food, cells
and beds, and prison dues. See Photo Journal: Inside a Bolivian Jail BBC NEWS.
http://newvs.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/
picture-gallery/06/americas insidc a bolivian-jail/html/1.stm (last visited, Apr. 26,
2013).
380. Interview with Dr. Edwin Cocarico, supra note 49.
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An additional issue arises as a result of the fact that children
up to six years of age are allowed to live with their parents in
prison and often continue to live there beyond age six.81 These
children, exposed to the criminal activity within prisons, are not
only subjected to violence, they also learn this behavior.,2 When
a child, unconnected to the criminal justice system except
through a parent who is accused of committing a crime lives in
prison and is directly exposed to convicted and sentenced
individuals, he or she becomes schooled in criminal ways. The
prison serves as a breeding ground for crime and can be the first
step and trigger for a lifetime of criminal activity. This issue is
even more stark in the case of children who are born in prison.
One official noted this tragic phenomenon with regard to these
children: "They are born in prison, and they will die in
Chonchocoro." "
Juveniles in pretrial detention are also particularly
vulnerable to influence by convicted and sentenced prisoners,
especially because the State fails to separate them from adultsm
381. Ley de Ejecuci6n y Supervision [Law of Criminal Enforcement and
Monitoring] Law No. 2298, 20 Dec. 2011. Artidce 26, available at http:,//ww.oas.org/
juridico/ spanish/ gapeca-sp-docs-bol2. pdf; Gerardo Bustillos, "Kids are at Home, With
Parents, in Bolivia Prisons," JAKARTA GLOBE (Oct. 14, 2012),
http: //www.thcjakartaglobe.com /international/kids-are-at-home-with-pare nt s-in-
bolivia-prisons/550114; Interview with Ninoska Ayala Flores, supra note 83.
382. UNHCHR Addendum, supra note 68, 1[ 72 ("OHCHR-Bolivia is also
concerned about the presence of children of school age and adolescents living in
prison with their parents deprived of liberty, or who in some cases may be themselves
illegally detained with adults, being at risk of abuse and sexual exploitation.");
Interview with Ninoska Ayala Flores, supra note 83; Interview with Juan Carlos Octavio
Pinto Quintanilla, supra note 372.
383. Chonchocoro is the maximum-security prison in La Paz. See Interview with
Ramiro Llanos, supra note 1 ("The pariens don't want to Icave thcir children at home
with the fathers or to orphanages-they'd rather have their children close. If a child is
with his father, there's a dual purpose-the child stays close and the child helps work.
Sometimes, they use the kids to bring in drugs or alcohol so thc children live in
environments that harm them. . . . There are many cases of fathers raising their
daughters in San Pedro and after the father is released, the girls will stay in jail or act as
prostitutes.")
384. See Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations: The
Plurinational State of Bolivia 1[ 81. CRC/C/BOL/CO/4 (Oct. 16. 2009) ("The
Committce welcomes the fact that present legislation Sets the minimum age of criminal
responsibility at 16 years, but is concerned at the fact that deprivation of liberty is not
used as a measure of last resort and at thc wide use of preventive detention for children
between 16 and 18 years."). In response to whether juveiiles are separated from adults
in San Pedro Prison in La Paz: "There is no division, they are all mixed in." Interview
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in contravention of its legal obligations. 8 5 As a result, "youth
who are not criminal become criminals" and "the juveniles
become criminals for the rest of their lives." 8 This sentiment
was repeated elsewhere: "In Bolivia, people keep thinking that
putting people in jail is good when in reality it's a university of
delinquency. A lot of people in jail are teenagers. "387
d. Use of Pretrial Detention to Mask Other Reasons for Citizen
Insecurity
When the State uses pretrial detention as a tool to convince
society that citizen security is being addressed, it essentially
masks and neglects to address underlying structural issues that
contribute to crime and to problems that prevent the criminal
justice system from functioning efficiently. Rather than
addressing these issues, the government uses pretrial detention
to provide a veneer of justice that conceals other issues.388
with Ninoska Ayala Flores, supra note 83. Regarding Qalauma, a Juvenile detention
facility in La Paz, Ms. FlorCs notcd, "This is the only centcr of its kind in Bolivia and its
objective is to separate children from other prisoners. This is the most vulnerable
group." Id. On their follow-up trip to Bolivia in January, 2013 the Crowlcy dclegation
visited Qalauma and had the opportunity to incet with Roberto Simoncelli, Progetto
Mondo Mlal; Colonel Deap Hugo Vila Aramayo, Director of Qalauma; Ruben Dario
Lobat6n Ortiz, Chief of Police Sccurity at Qalauina; and Josc Colque, Agronomy
Educator at Qalauma. It is worth noting that Qalauina is only for young incn and that a
comparable institution does not exist for young women.
385. CONSITUTION, supra note 75, art. 23(11) ("The imposition of freedom-
dcpriving incasurcs to adolescents will be avoided. Every adolesccnt that is dcprivcd of
liberty will receive preferable attention by the judicial, administrative and law enforcing
authoritics. Thesc shall assurc at eycry moincnt the rcspcct to its dignity and the
rescrvc of its idcntity. The detention shall be complcted in diffcrcnt facilities than
those assigned for adults, taking into account the own needs of its age."); see also
ICCPR, supra note 93, art. 10(2) (b); American Convcntion, supra note 94, art. 5(5);
Tokyo Rulcs, supra notc 116, 1 8(d); Recommendation Rec (2006)2 of the Cominittec
of Ministers to Member States on the Eur. Prison Rules, supra note 371, art. 18.8(c). See
also Unitcd Nations Rulcs for thc Protcction of Jtiveniles Deprived of their Libcrty,
United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvcnile Justicc
(The 11eijing Rules).
386. Interview with Padrc Thomas Herimes, Pastoral Penitenciaria, in Potosf,
Bolivia (May 16, 2012).
387. Interview with Angela Olivia lieltran Sandoval, Pastoral Penitenciaria, in
Sucrc, Bolivia (May 17, 2012).
388. A study conductcd in Mcxico obscrved: The governmcnt trcats prctrial
detention as preemptive punishment in an attempt to convince victims of crime and
society at largc that justicfc is being scrved. The use of prctrial dctcntion to boost
public confidcncc in the country's ability to maintain ordcr is a siiiokescrccn that hides
the most important problem: the inability of criminal justice institutions to respond to
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According to one analysis: "[a]ll we do is offer the public a
solution that is not really a solution. They think the best way is to
lock up the problem and that's why we have this inversion of
pretrial detention not being the exception."3
For example, while the reforms to the CPC, including the
expansion of crimes for which pretrial detention can be applied,
were "responses to the feelings of State insecurity,"s9o they have
failed to "address structural problems." 91 While some laws were
enacted on the premise that they would increase safety, political
motivations often lurked behind these efforts, and once laws
were enacted, the State failed to fully implement them: " [t] he
promises of such laws are just used by political parties for their
re-election. They then do whatever they want, more or less. " 2
Following the enactment of laws, accompanying changes such as
institutional and structural reform that would have enabled the
legal changes to take full effect were not put into place."
Instead, there was an over-reliance on the power of the law
alone to improve the criminal justice system.3 94 As one NGO
noted, " [t] here have been too many changes in the laws but the
institutions themselves haven't changed . . . [t]he deficiencies
crime and the overwhelming reality that 97 percent of crimes committed go
unpunished. LECUONA, supra note 11, at 12.
389. Interview with Dr. Edwin Cocarico wpra note 49.
390. Interview wvith Anonymous Offcial, supra note 181.
391. Id. Another lawyer stated, "The State just throws out laws willy-nilly to just
scare the criminals. Bolivia doesn't have a strong institution." Interview with Marcelo
Barrios Arancibia, supra note 91.
392. Interview with Ar turo Yfiez Cortez, supra note 255.
393. Duce & Perdomo, supra note 343, at 85 ("The chances that reforinm will
produce concrete improvements in citizen security depend on structural changes in
the criminal justice system, on designing and impleinenting specific prograns to
achieve highly circumscribed objectives and on reorienting institutions within the new
structure to address the specific objectives."). Also "member states are responsible vis-h-
vis their citizenry to conduct effective plans and programs to prevent crime and
violence. based on a strategy that involves state institutions in various sectors, ranging
from the police and judicial system to methods of social, community or situational
prevention, which institutions in the education, health, labor and other sectors are to
conduct, engaging as well national and local governments." Citizen Security Report,
supra note I 10, Chapter IV: Citizen Security and Human Rights, 66.
394. Duce and Perdono, supra note 343, at 85 ("The reforim of rules alone does
not necessarily increase efficiency, nor does it automatically translate into a significant
improvement in citizen insecurity ") This issue has been highlighted as one
affecting the reforim of criminal justice systems in Latin America broadly: "Reform
requires maijor efforts regarding implementation and substantial support fromi thie
community and political authorities." Id.
2013] 91
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are blamed on the criminal procedure code and laws but in
reality the laws were never enacted the way they were meant to
be because the system was not prepared for the changes."""
Similarly, a lawyer explained, "[t]he institutions were not
prepared to adopt such a big change."0b
As long as the State continues to use pretrial detention as
the primary response to crime, meanwhile failing to examine
other reasons for and solutions to crime, citizen security will not
improve. One lawyer countered the idea that pretrial detention
reduces crime by stating, "[yI ou can't fight crime with pretrial
detention." 19 In using pretrial detention excessively and
arbitrarily to respond to citizen security concerns, and by
ignoring the root causes of crime, the State allows these factors
to not only persist, but to intensify.
The State also meanwhile neglects to address other social
justice and human rights issues. Left unaddressed, citizen
security will not only not improve, but, as long as these other
issues are neglected, it is likely to worsen. For example, poverty,
including "the incapacity of the State to address the citizen's
basic needs, the enormous gap between the rich and the poor
and social exclusion" 3 is one major reason for increased
crime. 3" Therefore "what will decrease crime is reducing
poverty. "410 More specifically, another lawyer discussed the fact
395. See also FUNDACI)N CONSTRUIR RLPORT, supra note 7. at 221 ("Attempts to
improve the capacities of criminal prosecution have focused on punitive and normative
measures, which can be called 'punitive populism' and 'legal fetishism.' The fact that.
according to the Justice Studies (enter of Amcrica, Bolivia has one of the highest rates
of prisoners who have not been convicted in the continent is no accident. It is a result
of the fact that changes were introduced to the criminal system without institutional
development or measures of implementation. Laws were changed, but institutions were
not. Penalties were increased, without strengthening the criminal system.").
396. Interview with Jorge Richter Amallo, supra note 18.
397. Intciview with Audalia Zurita Zclada, supra note 215.
398. Interview with Reynaldo Irnaa, supra note 79.
399. Interview with Jorge Richter Amallo, supra note 18 ("The cases aren't always
about crime but really about other issues, poverty, social breakdown, etc."); Interview
with Audalia Zurita Zelada, supra note 215 ("The economic crisis has created an
increase in the rate of crime."); Interview with Dr. Edwin Cocarico, supra note 49
("There are structural issues related to politics and the conomy that society does not
realize.").
400. Interview with Anonymous Official, supra note 59 ("The criminal code
doesn't prevent peoplc from committing crime. The government, incorrectly thinks
that increasing sentences will decrease crime. What will decrease crime is reducing
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that in order to fight crime, the State must create jobs and take
other steps that will make citizens safer. 41 Another lawyer
discussed the broader issues that must be addressed: "[tihe
solution [to crime and fears about criminality] isn't the stricter
laws, but to work on the social, cultural, education, and
economic matters." 402 By not addressing poverty, the State allows
one of the major underlying determinants of crime to continue
to fester.
One reason the State has not addressed key problems in the
justice system is because "the current government cares so little
about the system of justice, and those appointed had no prior
experience." 40 More specifically:
I don't think that there ever was a party that was
genuinely concerned with the judiciary. The judiciary
is the orphan of the State, no one wants to take care of
it, not even the lawyers because they benefit from all
the flaws . . . Other people just see the judiciary as a
tool. The political priority is not the judiciary . . . No
one has genuine interest in the judiciary.404
F. Counter-refolrms
The effects of citizen security concerns continue to
influence efforts aimed at further restricting the rights of the
accused and increasing the use of pretrial detention. 405 As one
official explained, "Since 2010 there has been a hardening of
positions. People think that the code is too protective of the
accused." 400b A lawyer explained that currently "they are thinking
of changing these precautionary measures so they can be
stricter" and this would include a new criminal procedural
poverty. The only thing increasing sentences will do is increase the amount of people
in prison.").
401. Interview with Audalia Zurita Zclada, supra note 215.
402. Interview with Boris Wilson Arias Lopez, supra note 215.
403. Interview with Audalia Zurita Zclada, supra note 215.
404. Interview with Enrique MacCIcan Soruco, supra note 77.
405. Interview with Boris Wilson Arias Lopez, supra note 215 ("The media
provokes and the law gets stricter and stricter. Now they arc thinking of changing these
precaultionary mcasures so they canl be strictr.").
406. Interview with Anonymous Official, supra note 59.
2013] 93
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code. 4 7 Overall, these reforms would result in "significantly
reducing due process rights that exist within the law." 40 As
another lawyer explained, "Every time there is some serious
incident, or someone is released from pretrial detention with an
alternative measure, there is a move to make the law stricter."409
For example, among other measures, counter-reforms that
would further curtail defendants' rights by limiting the number
of times a defendant can object and prohibiting the filing of
certain motions, are currently under consideration. 410 It is
deeply worrisome that these changes are being considered in
light of the grave human rights violations already taking place
under current laws.
IV. HUMAN RESOURCES & POVERTY
"I see a failure in the justice system, and in justice
operators. '411
Serious underfunding of the criminal justice system, and in
particular the system for indigent defense, stemming from the
government's lack of prioritization of this sector, is a major
factor impacting pretrial detention rates and broader due
process protections in Bolivia. The lack of budgetary and other
attention impacts the criminal justice system generally, and the
situation of pretrial detention specifically, in three distinct but
interrelated ways. First, public defense is severely inadequate,
largely as a result of a poorly funded system and the attendant
problems of lack of training. Second, persistent poverty results
in a population that is unable to defend itself and for whom
private defense is unaffordable and thus not an option. Third,
further complicating each of the forgoing issues is the high level
of corruption. Together, these factors result in persistent human
407. Interview with Audalia Zurita Zelada, supra note 215 ("They [the
government] have told the people that thcy are going to make prccautionary icasurcs
stricter, justifying it as a means to increase citizen security."); Interview with Boris
Wilson Arias Lopcz, supra note 215.
408. Intervicw with Kathryn Ledcbur, supra note 262.
409. Interview with Reynaldo Imaia, supra note 79.
410. Intervicw with Anonymous Member of the Judiciary, supra note 179.
411. Interview with Limbor Poral Scqouiz, Detaince and President of the
Delegate's Council in San Pedro Prison, in La Paz, Bolivia (May 25, 2012).
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rights violations and the inability of defendants to exercise the
rights guaranteed under the Constitution and the CPC.
A. Insufficient Resources
1. Lack of Prioritization and Resource Allocation by the State
Bolivia's Constitution establishes a public defender system
that obligates the State to provide for a defense attorney at no
cost to defendants41 2 SENADEP is responsible for carrying out
the constitutional mandate of providing indigent defense 413 but
lawyer and judge interviewees identified a lack of government
prioritization resulting in insufficient resources to SENADEP 41 4
and as a result, a severe shortage of defense attorneys. Poor
funding for legal aid severely limits the capacity of SENADEP
and affects the criminal justice system more broadly.4 15 Without
State funding, SENADEP is dependent on funding from foreign
donors, which amounts to seventy-six percent of its budget
412. See supra note 152.
413. The National Public Defender Service was established by Supreme Decree
No. 23253 of 31 August 1992 as part of the Office of the Under-Secretary of.Justice of
the Ministry of the Interior, Migration, justice and Social Defence, and was then
converted by National Public Defender Service Act No. 2496 of 4 August 2003 into a
body attached to the Ministry of Justice. Ar ticle 2 states that SENADEP's aim is to
guarantee the inviolability of the right to a defense by providing criminal defense
services to all accused persons who lack suffiicint means and to those who have not
designated a defense lawyer. Pursuant to Article 3. this defense scrvice is to be provided
starting from the first stage in criminal proceedings and continuing until a judgment
has been handed down; it is also to be made available while such persons file and
pursue the successive appeals provided for by law. CAT Report Mar. 5, 2012. 1 28-29.
Committee against Torture, Consideration of reports submitted by States parties under
article 19 of the Convention, Second period reports of States parties due in 2004,
Plurinational State of Bolivia, 5 March 2012, CAT/C/BOL/2, para. 28-29.
414. SENADEP national oflicers asked the justice Ministry for an increased
budget but this request was rejected. See Interview with Dr. Epiphanio Quispe Conde,
Director, SENADEP. in Trinidad, Bolivia (May 15, 2012). According to one official,
"[t]he Danish cooperation council is providing financing for public defense in rural
areas. The StatC is not interested in increasing their budget or providing services in this
area-this is a very critical situation." Interview with Anonymous Official, supra note
181.
415. Asked what the biggest problems in the criminal justice system are, one
factor that was mentioned is "resources (cconomnic)." Interview with Jorge Fernandez,
supra note 222.
896 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 36:812
according to one report,416 to stay operational.417 Problems arise
when foreign funding is cut.4 18
The result is very low salaries for public defenders,
particularly in comparison to what they could be earning
elsewhere. 419 The average salary of a public defender is between
3000 and 3500 Bolivianos (US$420-$490) a month.4201 Ajudge in
Sucre explained: "There is a [public defense] office of three to
four attorneys. Every year, the Supreme Court chooses six or
seven attorneys to be public defenders, but they don't get
paid." 421 Low salary also reduces the motivation for lawyers to
become public defenders 422 and contributes to the high
turnover rate.4 23 In the words of one foreign funder: "For public
defenders it's impossible to hold up under the pressure, the
cases, the salary."424 As the director of SENADEP explained:
There's too much turnover. The disadvantage is that
after two years, they will be offered better jobs and
then the new person comes in and has to be trained all
over again because they have no work experience. It's
416. According to statistics gathered by Fundaci6n Construir, the annual budget
for SENADEP is Bs.8,172,204 (approximatcly US$1,175,000). About seventy-six perccnt
of this budget comes from international donors. FUNDACRON CONSTRUTR REPORT, supra
notc 7, at 61.
417. According to the national director of SENADEP, in 2012, the Danish
Embassy provided two million Bolivianos (approximately US$287,380) in support of
SENADEP, mostly to strcngthcn the organization and cxtend its prcsence in rural
areas. Intervicw with Justo Salazar Rodas, National Dircctor of SENADEP, in La Paz,
Bolivia (May 22, 2012).
418. For examplc, "[b]cforc public dcfcndcrs had funding from Canada, now
thcy don't, making thcm evcn morc overworked." Intervicw with Kathryn Lcdebur,
supra note 262.
419. In the words of one SENADEP attorncy, "Bcfore coming to SENADEP I was
earning a salary twicc the amount than I am carning here." Interview with Dr. Alberto
Andrado Dorado, Attorney, SENADEP, in Trinidad, Bolivia (May 15, 2012).
420. Intervicw with Fcrnando Medina, supra notc 178; Intervicw with Dr. Luis D.
Lopcz Rosales, supra notc 295.
421. Interview with Marcelo Barrios Arancibia, supra note 91.
422. Intervicw with Dr. Luis D. Lopcz Rosalcs, supra notc 295 ("Now, in Bolivia,
public defendcrs get Bs.3,000 [approximately US$430] pcr month. Anothcr
professional would get twice that. For that reason, not a lot of people want to be public
dcfcnders. An attorncy in his own officc would make double.").
423. Saying that the salaries in Bolivia for defense attorneys and prosccutors "arc
ridiculous," one lawyer explained that as a result of low pay, "the ones that are left
aren't good. The best left, though some staycd becausc they lovc their country."
Intcrvicw with Silvia Salaime Farjat, supra note 91.
424. Interview with Fernando Medina, supra note 178.
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all because the salary is so low. If the salary was the
same as at other public ministries, they would likely
stay.4 2
Lack of motivation also stems from the fact that lawyers
often work at SENADEP in order to better position themselves
to secure employment at the prosecutor's office or in the
judiciary, rather than because they are committed to defense
work. Even the national director of SENADEP recognizes that a
job at SENADEP is seen to function as a "school" for attorneys
to learn about the criminal justice system: "They learn and then
they go," he lamented.426
SENADEP attorneys themselves expressed this view. One
attorney in the SENADEP office in Trinidad explained, "I came
to SENADEP because I wanted to start a professional career."2 7
Although the salary is "too low," he hopes to move into an
administrative career track.428 Working at SENADEP was also
characterized as a "trampoline" or a "stepping stone."42 1 Finally,
because there is no job performance evaluation,4 0 motivation to
provide a zealous defense is further reduced. Lawyers
recognized that this is "bad for the clients." 431
It is not only SENADEP that is grossly underfunded-the
same is true for the prosecution. 4 2 Lack of motivation and high
turnover rates there prevent the criminal justice system from
operating at its best. The result is both inexperienced
prosecutors and delays caused by inefficient handover. As one
425. Interview with Justo Salazar Rodas, supra note 417.
426. Id.
427. Interview with Dr. Alberto Andrado Dorado, supra note 419.
428. Id.
429. In Trinidad. lawyers at SENADEP said working there is the equivalent of a
Master's Degree which can open fiture job opportunities. Specifically because of the
four year ninimuin kgal experience required as a prerequisite for a job at the Public
Ministry, work experience at SENADEP makes you "well-suited." The regional director
of SENADEP prior to the current director (as of May 2012) went on to become a
prosecutor. Interview with Defense Attorneys, SENADEP, supra note 280.
430. The evaluation is based on reports written and submitted to the regional
office and points received for working at SENADEP. Id.
431. Interview with Dr. Luis D. Lopez Rosales, supra note 295.
432. Interview with Joe Loney, supra note 172 ("The prosecutor's office is under-
funded."). Prosecutors' caseloads are high because "there's not enough money to
employ more prosecutors." Interview with Sandro Fucrtes Miranda, supra note 193.
433. In describing the prosecutors: "They have very little capacity. This is obvious
to us in the trainings." Interview with Anonymous Oflicial, supra note 181.
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judge noted, " [t] here are always changes happening within the
prosecutor's department ... The one who is leaving must have
an inventorv of cases to give to the new attorney, but this causes
a lot of delay."43 4 Those who receive training move on to other
careers-one estimate was that only ten percent of people
trained as prosecutors remain in that position. 435 One judge
criticized prosecutors as being "not professional, not objective,
and [that they] don't comply with the laws and constitutional
rights. They're handpicked, without experience, with political
objectives. That's the reality today."4 3 6
2. Inadequate Capacity
"Everyday SENADEP gets two more cases to investigate so
once somebody is put in pretrial detention, no investigation
takes place because of the caseload."3
"There are not enough judges and there are too many cases
for the judges.'*
Because the budget allocated to criminal defense is so low,
there is a sheer absence of a sufficient number of defense
attorneys.43 This is particularly stark in more remote areas of
the country.440 Without enough lawyers, attention to individual
clients suffers. At the most basic level, defense attorneys do not
434. Interview with Margot Perez Montano, supra note 69.
435. Interview with Dr. Teresa Ledezma, supra note 69.
436. Interview with Fernando Orellana Medina and Iris Justiniano, Examining
Judges, in Santa Cruz, Bolivia (May 16, 2012).
437. Interview with Attorney, SENADEP, supra note 377.
438. Interview with Sandro Fuertes Miranda, supra note 193.
439. The number of public defenders who provide free legal assistance to persons
nationwide is sixty-six. This figure remained the same throughout the period of analysis
by Fundaci6n Construir (between 2008 and 2011). See FU NDACION (ONSTRUTR REPORT,
supra notc 7, at 54. Furithcr, thrc arc a large number of interim officials serving as, for
example, prosecutors and defense attorneys. For cxamplc, the national director of
SENADEP with whom the Crowley delegation met, had been "interim" since 2009.
Interview with Justo Salazar Rodas, supra note 417. Givcn their interim status, thcse
individuals arc unable to make certain decisions. Interview with Kathryn Lcdcbur, supra
note 262.
440. The nuinbcr of defenders and their distribution in different dcpartments has
not changed in recent years. La Paz, with the greatest number of defenders, continues
to have the lowest caseload per public defender in relation to Beni, Pando and Tarija,
which arc the departments with the lowest number of public defenders in Bolivia. For
exampic, [li caseload per defender in La Paz is 265; in Beni. the nuimbcr is 508. See
FUNDACION CONSTRUTR REPORT. supra note 7, at 57.
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go to prisons to meet with their clients, and thus cannot work on
a strategy to best represent them. 4 1 Furthermore, they are
unable to attend hearings, leaving their clients defenseless at a
critical stage of the criminal justice process. 442 A defense
attorney spoke of the challenges that he faces: "I go into jails,
people beg for help, I want to help people but can't help
everyone with their paperwork."4 43 The lack of capacity affects
defendants at every stage of the process, even immediately
following arrest when police sometimes prevent the arrested
individuals from making calls, thus depriving them of their right
to a defense attorney at the earliest stage of the process. 444 As a
result, many detainees are left without legal aid, less able to
counter arguments proffered to impose pretrial detention, more
likely to be treated in a way that is unfair or unequal and,
ultimately, more likely to be placed in pretrial detention.
The absence of an attorney can have an especially strong
impact at the pretrial hearing. Although by law the burden of
proof falls on the prosecutor to prove that pretrial detention is
necessary, in practice, a defendant is required to show that he is
not a flight risk or will not obstruct justice.445 Without the legal
assistance of a defense lawyer, a person charged with a crime is
likely to be placed in pretrial detention, affecting his subsequent
defense at trial: "when in prison, the defendant won't see his
lawyer as frequently and cannot follow the evidence against him.
It works to his disadvantage." 4 4
However, even having a defense attorney does not
guarantee quality legal defense .447 While the govxeHmient is
obligated not only to provide defense, but quality legal
assistance,448 in Bolivia public defense is often of poor quality,4 49
441. Interview with Enrique MacClean Soruco, supra note 77 ("What the inmates
tell me is that public defenders rarely go to jail, and rarely coordinate defense
stratgy.").
442. See id.
443. Intervicw with Jorge Fernandez, supra note 222.
444. Id.
445. See s upra Part II (A) (4).
446. Interview with Marcelo Barrios Arancibia, supra note 91.
447. "The public defenders who are chosen are mostly junior attorneys, so its not
a good thing for the defendants." Id.
448. Extreme Poverty Report. supra note 153, 1 82(c) ("Access to legal
representation is of utmost importance and underpins all forms of penralization of
persons living in poverty. States shall ensure quality legal aid for the poorest segments
2013] 99
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and in some cases described as "really bad." 450 A frustrated
detainee described her experience:
The defense attorneys never explain to us our rights.
In the hearings, they only speak to the judges. They
don't explain anything to the client. For example, one
of those [accused women] could have been given an
alternative measure because she was in the middle of
breastfeeding her child but she was put in pretrial
detention. They don't do enough investigations into
the alternatives or other ways of helping us. It's easier
for them to send us here.4 5 '
It is not uncommon for defense lawyers to not even attempt
to provide a defense at pretrial hearings.452 Lawyers explained
that defense attorneys "don't know enough"4 H and that " [public
defenders] are young lawyers without experience and will surely
lose their cases."454 It is defendants who suffer the repercussions
when legal aid is ineffective as a result of the diminished quality
and capacity of legal defense attorneys.45
It is not only the defense that lacks capacity. There is also a
serious dearth of prosecutors45 and judges4 57 and this problem
of society, not only for criminal proceedings but also with respect to issues which are
particularly relevant for persons living in poverty, such as social benefit appeals,
eviction and child protection procedures.").
449. Interview with Detainces of C anturnarca Prison Men's Unit, supra note 277.
450. Interview with Detainces of Cantunarca Prison Women's Unit: FUNDACI(N
CONSTRUJR REPORT, supra note 7, at 214.
451. Id.
452. As one detainee explained, at his first pretrial hearing, "the prosecutor asked
for pretrial detention, the judge accepted this request and the defense attorney said
nothing." Interview with Abel Bikini Villanior, Detainee in Riberalta Prison, in
Riberalta, Bolivia (May 16, 2012).
453. Interview with Anonymous Criminal Attorney, in Sucre, Bolivia (May 14,
2012).
454. Interview with Silvia Salaic Farijat, supra note 91.
455. Interview with Justo Salazar Rodas, supra note 417.
456. There are no longer career prosecutors but rather prosecutors elected in the
interim, who are transitory. Interview with Anonymous Official, supra note 181. In the
period analyzed in their study (2008-11), Fundaci6n Construir found that there was an
average national increase of two percent in the number of prosecutors, which is
insufficient, considering that the number of cases in the same period increased
thirteen and one half percent. See FUNDACTON CONSTRUIR REPORT, supra note 7, at 49.
The data demonstrates that the increase in cases has been significant-thc national
average in the number of cases per prosecutor has increased froin 165 to 179 bctwccn
2008 and 2012, representing an 8.5% percent increase. Id. at 51.
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is particularly acute in remote areas.45 8 As a result, these officials
are often unable to fulfill even their most basic duties.t5' One
official went so far as to describe the lack of capacity as well as
the lack of institutionalization of the careers of all actors in the
criminal justice system as constituting a "structural crisis." 460
3. Lack of Training
Whereas the quality of defense can be at least partially
addressed by training, the lack of funding dedicated to training
prevents improvement.461 Without comprehensive and sustained
457. According to 2010 statistics, the number of examining judges nationwide
was 52. The population at that time was about 5.5 million persons which means that
each judge was responsible for approximately 106,000 persons. FLINDACION CONSTRUIR
REPORT, supra note 7, at 42. Interview with Dr.Jose Ayaviri Siles, Criminal Enforcement
Judge [JuCz de Ejccucion Penal]. in La Paz, Bolivia (May 24, 2012) ("Its almost
impossible [for judges] to devote enough resources to each [case]."); Interview with
Margot Perez Montano, supra note 69 (noting that with the number of cases, "there are
too many hearings here for them all to be heard. It is excessive.").
458. FLINDACION CONSTRUIR RLPORT, supra note 7, at 49 (With respect to the
distribution of prosecutors between capital cities and provinces, the central cities (La
Paz/El Alto, Cochabamba and Santa Cruz) have more than sixty percent of the total
number of prosecutors); FUNDACION CONSTRLIR RLPORT, supra note 7, at 50. In 2011,
the total number of prosecutors was 424, with 312 prosecutors assigned to capital cities
and 112 assigned to provinces. FUNDACTON CONSTRUR REPORT, supra note 7, at 46. Of
the total number of examining judges, the following capitals contained the highest
numbers: Santa Cruz (14), La Paz (10), Cochabamba (7), and El Alto (5). The
remaining capitals had either two or three such judges. With respect to caseload, in
2010, judges in the departments of Cochabamba and Santa Cruz were responsible for
more than an average of 3,000 cases each; examining judges in three departments were
responsible for more than 2,500 cases each: judges in four departments for more than
1,000 cases each; only in Potosf was the average caseload below 1.000.
459. See Interview with jorge Richter Amallo, supra note 18; Interview with
Vladimir Nilo Medina Choque, supra note 172: Interview with Sandro FucrtCs Miranda,
supra note 193; Interview with Criminal Lawyer, in Sucre, Bolivia (May 14, 2012);
Interview with Joe Loney, supra note 172; Interview with Cesar Suarez Saavedra, supra
note 257; Interview with JCijes Justiniano Atala, supra note 173. Given the caseload that
judges carry, "From a practical perspective, it is impossible for a judge to act with
promptness and the attention to detail and caution merited in each decision made with
respect to the application of precautionary measures." FtNDACTON CONSTRUIR REPORT,
supra note 7, at 47.
460. Interview with Anonymous Official, supra note 181. A lawyer agreed, stating:
"Fundamentally, we don't have institutionality of judicial power. This applies to the
Public Ministry, the judicial power, the police." Interview with Dr. Roger Valverde
Perez, supra note 33.
461. Interview with Cesar Suarez Saavedra, supra note 257 ("In the first few three
to five years after the new code went into effect, few cases were brought. That caseload
was used to determine the budget by the Consejo de la Judicatura [Judicial Council].
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training, judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys are unable
to perform to the best of their abilities, thereby impacting the
quality of the criminal justice system and, more broadly, pretrial
detention.
In general, in the words of one lawyer, "trainings almost
never happen now."62 When the Crowley delegation asked one
SENADEP attorney if he had received any training, he
responded: "No, none at all. I had a trial my first day of work.46
The SENADEP office in Trinidad revealed that the SENADEP
national officers do not offer capacity building.464 The absence
of training in the face of substantial reforms in the criminal
justice system-reforms both to the CPC and the Penal Code-
is especially problematic. Due to limited staff in the Trinidad
office, 465 conducting trainings in individual offices would
significantly detract from the time available to work with
clients. 466 As a result of this "deficient" training, public
defenders "don't present evidence to show the defendant is not
a flight risk or does not present a risk of obstructing justice."4t7
The lack of training thus affects the imposition of pretrial
detention.
The prosecutors office has not fared much better; the
termination of foreign funding from the Spanish cooperation in
2009 resulted in the end of training for prosecutors by the
Public Ministry Training Institute (Instituto de Capacitaci6n de
Ministerio Piblico).468
4. System-Wide Impact of Limited Funding
The absence of other personnel resources and tools also
contributes to systemic problems. For example, there are no
Even though caseload has increased, the budget still reflects the previous low caseload.
Prosecutors are bringing more cases now.").
462. Interview withJorge Richter Amallo, supra note 18.
463. Interview with Jorge Fernandez, supra note 222.
464. See Inteiview with Dr. Alberto Andrado Dorado, supra note 419.
465. At the time that the Crowley delegation visited in May 2012, the office of
SENADEP in Trinidad in the department of Beni was composed of one director, one
defense attorlley, one attorney advisor. and one executive administrator for a
population of approximately 160,000 persons. See Id.
466. Id.
467. Interview with Anonymous Official, supra note 181.
468. Id.
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court recorders in Bolivia. The NGO Pastoral Penitenciaria
explained that the "judge or legal reporters usually have a tape
recorder. [Hearings] have to be transcribed, which can take two
months or more." 469 Even at the investigation stage, the lack of
resources is palpable. For example, "there is only one office that
can do forensic investigations so they need to send this evidence
to La Paz." 4 * Further, basic systems-including a registry of
information about detainees from the date when they were
detained to monitor the maximum duration of their legal
detention-are neither utilized nor maintained. As a result,
officials operate based on incomplete or inaccurate information,
contributing to illegal pretrial detention when individuals are
detained for longer than allowed by law. In the words of one
detainee, "The big thing here is, 'I can't find your name in the
system.' That happens with the public defenders a lot, you go to
them and give them your name to find out about your case and
they can't find anything. "471 As an NGO explained, "There's a
system whereby prosecutors should register each case and its
progress but it's not enforced well."47 Furthermore, "There's no
consequence if the prosecutor doesn't register the
information,"4 7 thus further reducing the incentive to follow
such procedures.
B. Poverty and Pretrial Detention
"If you have money you 'l be released, if you don't you'll be
put in pretrial detention. "474
"The people that are detained are the poorest people. "4/5
"Yes there are people who are more vulnerable -for example
the poorfamilies. For them sadly there is no justice. "476
469. Interview withJoe Loney, supra note 172.
470. Interview with Angela Olivia Beltran Sandoval. supra note 387.
471. Interview with Morris Brown, Detainee in Palnasola Prison, in Santa Cruz,
Bolivia (May 17, 2012).
472. Interview with Susana Saavedra Badani, supra note 293.
473. Interview with Ramiro Orias Airedondo, supra note 172.
474. Interview wvith Ramiro Llanos, supra note 1.
475. Interview with Reynaldo Imafia, supra note 79.
476. Interview with Ricardo Jaines G. Pastoral Penitenciaria. in Potosi, Bolivia
(May 16, 2012).
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1. Vulnerability and Access to Defense
Pretrial detention laws, policies, and practices impact the
poor differently such that they are more likely to be detained in
the first place, to be held in detention for longer, and to
experience the effects of pretrial detention in a manner that is
particularly intense and long-lasting. Discriminatory treatment
of the poor violates equality and non-discrimination provisions
under Bolivian law as well as international human rights law.4 7
While the many structural limitations discussed above,
especially those affecting the defense,478 have a direct impact on
the right of all detainees to a fair proceeding,479 given the strong
correlation between poverty and pretrial detention, the poor are
disproportionately impacted.
477. Extreme Poverty Report, supra note 153, If 18 ("Discrimination is prohibited on
a number of enumerated grounds, including economic and social status as implied in
the phrase 'other status,.' which is included as a ground of discrimination in the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights."); ICCPR, supra note 93, art. 2 ("Each State
Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals
within its territory and subject to it jurisdiction thc rights recognized in thc present
Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or othcr opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.");
id. art. 26 ("All persons are equal before the law and are entitlcd without any
discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit
any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and cffective protcction against
discrimination on any ground such as race, colour. sex. language, religion, political or
other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status."); ICESCR.
supra note 93, at art. 2.2 ("The States Partics to the present( Covenant undertake to
guarantee that thc rights enunciated in the present Covenant will be exercised without
discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status").
478. The principle of "cquality of arms" in the criminal process is not adequately
reflected in the Bolivian system, since the number of SENADEP officials is limited
particularly in comparison to the number of resources available in thc Office of the
Public Ministry. See FUNDAC6)N CONSTRUIR REPORT, supra notc 7, at 54: see also
Interview with Fernando Medina, supra note 178 ("it is hard for someone who feels
thcir rights are being violated to find justice. How can the State ensure that due process
and thc sentence are completed").
479. Extreme Poverty Report, supra note 153 ("The inability to access competent,
comprehensive legal assistance prcsents a scrious threat to thc human rights of persons
living in poverty. Without adequatc representation or advice individuals arc more likely
to be convicted. While in detention they have no accessible means of protesting
infringements of thcir rights, such as unsafe or unsanitary conditions, physical or
mncital abuse or lengthy delays, and there is a higher likelihood that they will be
requested to pay bribes, which they will experience difficulties in paying.").
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A number of different factors contribute to the fact that the
poor make up a disproportionate percentage of the pretrial
detainee population. 480 First, they tend to be at a disadvantage
with respect to knowledge of the criminal justice system and how
to navigate it, given low levels of education, low literacy rates,
and in the case of indigenous persons, the fact that their first
language is not Spanish, but rather an indigenous language such
as Quechua or Aymara, and that the legal system, despite its
legal obligation to do so, 481 fails to provide for interpretation
and translation.482 Given these factors, these individuals are at a
480. Viccministcrio dc Justicia y Derechos Humanos [Deputy Ministcr of Justice &
Human Rights], Plan Nacional de Acci6n de Derechos Humanos Bolivia Para Vivir
Bien 2009-2013 [National Plan of Action of Human Rights of Bolivia to Live Well 2009-
2013] 166 (Dec. 2008), available at http://ww.derechoshuianosbolivia.org/archivos/
biblioteca/PNDIH%20FINAL.pdf ("More than 70% of the prison population consists
of indigenous persons or persons living in poverty or those with scarce resources. These
statistics point to the essence of the system of the deprivation of liberty. which is the
criminalization of poverty and the situation of the indigenous and a clear violation of
the principle of equality before the law."); OPEN SOC'YJUSTICE INITIATIVT, PU NTSHING
THE POOR: EXPLORING MEASURES IN SOCIAL POLICE THAT PLNALISE, SEGREGATE,
CONTROL OR UNDERMINE THE AUTONOMY OF PEOPLE LIVING IN POVERTY 4 (Oct. 25,
2011), available at http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sitcs/default/files/
goldston-pretrial-2011 1027.pdf (" [P]crsons living in poverty come into contact with the
criminal justice system with disproportionately high frequency-leading to the
excessive arrest, detention, and imprisonment of the poorest and most vulnerable Bail
conditions are often oncrous, legal assistance is often absent or difficult to come by,
and the personal costs to detainees are high in terms of health and even torture.");
OPEN SOC'Y JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 370, at 4 ("Pretrial detention
disproportionately affects individuals and families living in poverty: they are more likely
to come into conflict with the criminal justice system, more likely to be detained
awaiting trial, and lss able to make bail or pay bribes for their relcase. Those living
in-or at the edge of-poverty have the fewest resources to handle the sociocconomic
shocks of pretrial detention and they are more easily plunged into (or further into)
destitution, including hunger and homelessness.").
481. For non-Spanish speakers, translation and intcrpretation must be provided
by the court. See CPC 1970, supra note 33, art. 10 ("A defendant who does not
understand Spanish ... shall be entitled to choose a translator ... to assist him in all
acts necessary for his defense."); CONSTITITION, supra note 75, art. 120(11) (providing
that "[a]ll persons subject to a legal proceeding" shall be assisted by an interpreter
when necessary).
482. Intciview with Marco Antonio Roque, supra note 275 ("Many peoplc come
from rural areas and don't understand the legal system; they have no idea about what
justice is."); Human Rights Council, Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights,
Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to
Development 12, U.N. Doc A/HRC/8/4 (May 13, 2008) (by Leandro Despouy) ("The
most serious obstacles barring access to justice for the very poor include: (a) their
indigent condition; (b) illiteracy or lack of education and information; (c) tie
complexity of procedures; (d) mistrust, not to say fear, stemming from their
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significant disadvantage upon entering the criminal justice
system and are generally unable to defend themselves. Officials
and detainees alike recognized that "Most of the people here
are here . . . because they are poor."483 This is consistent with
patterns both internationally and regionally.484
Being unable to defend themselves, 415 the poor are
dependent on legal aid, which, as discussed above, is largely
nonexistent. Even where they do exist, legal aid services are not
always free.486 Either due to fees or because of corruption, "you
experience of the -justice system, either because they frequently find themselves in the
position of accused, or because their own complaints are turned against them; (c) the
slow pace of justice, despite the fact that their petitions often relate to very sensitive
aspects of life (such as return of children) which need to be dealt with rapidly; and (f)
in many countries, the fact that they are not allowed to be accompanied or represented
by support organizations which could also bring criminal indemnification
proceedings."). A discussion of the particular ways in which indigenous persons are
affected by pretrial detention practices is beyond the scope of this report but is
particularly relevant in Bolivia where, according to a 2009 report by the Special
Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples at the time, Rodolfo Stavenhagen,
sixty-two percent of the Bolivain population at the time consisted of indigenous
persons. A/ HRC/ II/ , 18 February 2009, p. 2, available at
http://wwv2.ohchr.org/cnglish/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/ 11session/A.HRC.11.11.pdf.
483. Interview with Detainees of Cantumarca Prison Men's Unit, supra note 277.
484. See OPEN SOC'YJUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 370, at 22 ("Reports from
around the world indicate that those entering pretrial detention come from the
poorest and most marginalizcd echelons of society, who are lkast equipped to deal with
the criminal justice process and the experiences of detention."); LECUONA, supra note
11, at 17 ("Pretrial detention is often disproportionately imposed on the most
disadvantaged and vulnerable members of society, such as the poor or disabled or
ethnic minorities. Faced wvith rising public pressure to deal effectively wvith crime and
insecurity, Mexico's criminal justicc system and policymakers are seeking out not the
perpetrators of crimes, but those whom it can most easily punish.").
485. A lawyer explained: "Most of the people in pretrial detention are men and
poor because thcy don't have money to pay for an attorney, and they don't know how
to defend themselves in the process." Interview with Boris Wilson Arias Lopez, supra
note 215.
486. Not only are defendants denied access to free lkgal services, but they arc
also forced to pay for additional services including for the intervention of the judgc as
well as to make payments to the prisons for their incarceration. Interview wvith Ramiro
Llanos, supra note 1 ("There are also cases where peoplc have to pay to stay in jail, and
pay for the judge's intervention-in some facilities the inmates pay 300 or 500
Bolivianos [approximately US$43-45] for the rent of their cell to other inmates.
Defendants have to pay for trial, for a judge's intervention-thc law doesn't allow it but
it happens. There is a law that says you can't charge someone for access to thc justicC
system. It's like one dollar a week-the average per trial price-but if you're held there
for years, its a lot of money. The sentencing judge will decide how much money will be
owed as a fine before release."); Interview withi Juan Carlos Octavio Pinto Quintanilla,
supra note 372 ("In order to go into any of the sections in San Pedro, you must pay an
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need money to pay functionaries." 487 According to numerous
people with whom the Crowley delegation spoke, " [t] he actors
in many ways will do their work only when people pay in some
way."488 The only remaining option-to hire a private attorney-
is not a realistic option given their inability to afford it.489
As a result, individuals who are poor or otherwise
vulnerable, including women, fare worse in a number of ways, 4"0
including being more likely to be placed in pretrial detention
and to then be detained for longer periods of time than those
who are not poor. For example, as one lawyer noted: " [T] hey
entrance free, less than a quarter-between 50 to 100 lBolivianos. If you cannot afford
it, you pay with work. This is a rule made by the inmates and this finances the internal
economic movement within thejail.").
487. In response to a question about whether detainces have contact with their
lawyers once they arc in pretrial detention, one detaince stated, "If you pay your lawyer
you can see them as often as you like." Interview with Detainees of Cantumarca Prison
Men's Unit, supra note 277; see also Interview with Pastoral Pcnitenciaria, in Sucre,
Bolivia (May 17, 2012).
488. Interview withJorge Richter Amallo, supra note 18.
489. As one lawyer said, "If soicone can afford a defense attorney, it's very
unlikely they would be in pretrial detention." Interview with Ivan Liia, Private
Attorney, in La Paz, Bolivia (May 21, 2012); see also Interview with jorge Richter Amallo,
supra note 18 ("Fees for private defense lawyers are generally charged per stage of the
process, but not necessarily. There are two ways of charging a criminal client. The Bar
Association gives out a fee sheet which sets the minimum fee. Because before, a lot of
attorneys charged under the limit and stole clients from each other.").
490. While a discussion of the impact of detention on other vulnerable groups
including women is beyond the scope of this Report, a report issued by the Bolivian
Office of the Ombudsperson in March 2013, based on a serics of questionnaires, focus
groups, and interviews of women in prison revcals that only twcnty-four percent of
women deprived of liberty have received a sentence. The report discusses the wide
range of rights violations that women in prison face as well as violence that occurs
among and towards women in prison. Bolivia: Situacion de los Derechos de las Mujeres
Privadas de Libertad [Bolivia: The Situation of the Rights of Women Deprived of Liberty],
Dcfcnsorfa del Pucblo [The Ombudsperson's Office], La Paz, Bolivia, 2013 (on file
with author). See United Nations Rules for the Treatment of Women Prisoners and
Non-custodial Measures for Women Offenders (the Bangkok Rules), U.N. Doc.
A/C.3/65/L.5 (Oct. 6, 2010) regarding specific standards with respect to women
prisoners. See also Global Campaign for Pretrial Justice Latin American Region,
"Women and Pretrial Detention: Individuals presumed innocent suflering punishment
and abuse,"
http://wwx.rcdjusticiaprevia.com/ portal/ images/ stories/ red muj cresprision inglcs
060513.pdf; For increased attention to this topic, note University of Chicago L aw
School Expert Group Meeting with the UN Special Rapporteur on Violence against
Women, Its Causes and Consequences, Ms. Rashida Manjoo, May 14, 2013 in which the
author participated.
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[poor or indigenous persons] are the ones that stay longer in
the prisons."491
2. Impacts of Pretrial Detention on the Poor and Poverty
By focusing on pretrial detention as the "solution" to crime
and citizen insecurity,492 the government fails to address the
underlying causes of crime. Prime among these is the need to
alleviate poverty, as well as investment in institution building
and education.* The money that the government directs to the
cost of incarceration494 is money diverted away from fulfilling the
economic, social and cultural rights that they are obligated to
ensure.49
Because Bolivian prisons house a much greater number of
prisoners than capacity allows, and since prisons provide limited
food and medical care, it could be argued that the State's costs
491. Interview with juan Carlos Octavio Pinto Quintanilla, supra note 372.
492. See supra Part III.
493. Poverty restricts the right of peoplc to fully enljoy their human rights. A full
discussion of the links between poverty and human rights is beyond the scope of this
Report. However, most international bodies have recognized that the condition of
poverty goes beyond poverty in income or cconoinic wealth. The CESCR has defined
poverty as "a human condition characterized by sustained or chronic deprivation of the
resources, capabilities, choices, security and power necessary for the cnjoymcnt of an
adequate standard of living and other civil. cultural. cconomic, political and social
rights." Comm. On Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Distr. General, Substantive
Issues Aiising in the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights: Poverty and the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, 8, U.N. Doc. E/C. 12/2001/ 10 (May 10, 2001). For a luller
discussion, see Elisabeth Wickeri, Nojustice, No Peace: Conflict, Socio-Econoric Rights, and
the New Constitution in Nepal, 2 DRLXLL L. RLV. 427. 455-57 (2010).
494. "The direct costs to the State of pretrial detention include operating
detention facilities (including prison guards and administrators), warehousing
detainees (including food, clothing, beds. and hcalthcarc-assuming these are
provided), and pursuing cases against detainees (including the investigation and
judicial process)." See OPEN SOCY J.USTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 370, at 35; see also
Interview with Dr. Roxana Valverde, supra note 294 ("Pretrial detention represents a
large burden and high cost on the State.").
495. See OPEN SOCYJUSTICE INITIATIT, supra note 370, at 36 ("Every dollar or
peso a government spends on incarceration is a dollar or peso that cannot be spent on
healthcare or policing or education . . . . Excessive pretrial detention-especially for
persons charged with minor, non-violent offenscs-is costly and restricts States' ability
to invest in sociocconomic development."). Id.; see also Extrene Povert Report, supra note
153, 1 4 (" [W]hile poverty may not in itself be a violation of human rights, often States'
actions or omissions that cause. exacerbate or perpetuate poverty amount to violations
of huian rights. In this context, penalization measures represent a scrious threat to
States' observance of their human rights obligations.").
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to house its inmates are somewhat limited. In fact prisoners
sometimes purchase necessary supplies for the police and other
prison staff:
The inmates' organizations are the ones who purchase
the mattress and beds and showers for the policemen.
They also have their own visiting records - they buy the
notebooks for the visitors to sign. In some cases, the
administration of the guards demand from inmates
that inmates lend them computers so that they can do
their administrative work because they don't have their
own tools. 496
However, costs are passed on to inmates and their families:
"[Biy skimping on expenses for the maintenance of pretrial
detention facilities and the care of inmates, governments do not
reduce the overall cost of pretrial detention. Rather, such costs
are transferred elsewhere, usually to detainees, their families,
and the broader community."497
As a result, pretrial detention worsens families'
socioeconomic situations, sinking them deeper into poverty and
perpetuating the cycle of poverty.498 One reason for this is
because families lose the income of the person who is
detained.499 This impact is felt even after his release because
people with criminal records-even those who are not
496. Interview with Juan Carlos Octavio Pinto Quintanilla, supra note 372.
497. OPEN SOC'YjUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 370, at 35.
498. See id. ("The actual cost of pretrial detention is often hidden. Assessing the
true costs of pretrial detention requires considering the full impact of excessive pretrial
detention on notjust the detainees, but their families and communities-a calculation
that is both difficult to make and politically unpalatable to most governments."); see also
Interview with Elvira Alvarez Ali, Founder, Vida Nueva. in La Paz. Bolivia (May 24.
2012) (Pretrial detention also takes a severe emotional toll on families: "Sometimes,
the family says, 'I can't keep going with this. I need to take on another part of my life' .
. . . Detainces are abandoned for economic reasons."); Interview with Pastoral
Penitenciaria, in Sucre, Bolivia (May 17, 2012) ("If you go to prison the first impact is
that it breaks the family."); Interview with Detainees and President of the Council of
Delegates, Mocovi Prison, in Trinidad, Bolivia (May 18, 2012) ("Their families start to
forget about them.").
499. See SchAntcich, supra note 4, at 11, 22 ("Detention, like incarceration,
disproportionately affects individuals and families living in poverty. When an income-
producing parent is detained, the family must adjust to the loss of that income. The
impact can be especially severe in poor, developing countries where the state does not
provide reliable financial assistance to the indigent and where it is not unusual for one
breadwinner to financially support an extended family network.").
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convicted-have a harder time finding work.50 Not only do
families have to pay for some of the living expenses for their
family member in detention, including basic necessities that the
government fails to provide,2<' but they also often have to pay
any fees, including bribes,50 2 associated with the legal defense
and appeals processes. 51 Additional costs associated with
maintaining contact with the detainee while he is imprisoned
involve taking time off from work or school, as well as bus or fuel
fare to and from the prison, to make these visits possible.5o4
500. The economic and social costs of detention and incarceration can be
devastating for persons living in poverty. See Interview with Dr. Roger Valverde Perez,
supra note 33 ("When someone is deprived of liberty, he loses access to family, friends,
job, etc. The public and private institutions don't accept someone with a criminal
record as an employee."); Extrene Poverty Report, supra note 153 1 68 ("Detention not
only means a temporary loss of income, but also often leads to the loss of employment,
particularly where individuals are employed in the informal sector, and a criminal
record creates an additional obstacle to finding employment."); id. 1 71 ("Those who
are poor and vulnerable are therefore likely to leave detention disproportionately
disadvantaged financially, physically and personally. After their rilease they will have
depleted assets. reduced employment opportunities, limited access to social benefits
and severed community ties and family relationships, and will be subject to added
social stigmatization and exclusion, diminishing even furithcr their prospects of
escaping poverty."); OPEN SOC'Y JIUSTICL INITIATIVE supra note 370, at 28 ("Persons
detained awaiting trial cannot work or earn income while detained, and frequently lose
their jobs-oftcn after only a short period away from their work. If the period of
detention is lkngthy, detainces' future earning potential is also
undermined. . Pretrial detainees are not only at risk of losing their employment at
the time of detention, but also risk long-term unemployment or underemployment
after release. The stigma of detention, combined with lost education or training
opportunities, severely limits detainees' lifetime incomes. This is exacerbated by the
fact that most pretrial detainces are between ages 20 and 40-thcir wage-carning peak.
Income lost at this point in their lives almost certainly cannot be regained.").
501. See Interview with Dr. Roxana Valverde, supra note 294 (" [T]he detainee can
only have one meal a day. This doesn't even account for the children living in jails so
the mCals have to be divided even more for them."); OPLN SOC'YJUSTICE INITIATIVL.
supra note 370, at 30 ("In developing countries, authorities often fail to provide basic
necessities, so detainecs must pay for food, water, clothing, and bedding.").
502. See OPLN SOC' YJUSTICE INITIATIVE supra note 370, at 31 ("In addition to lost
income, the families of pretrial detainees must wrestle with legal fees, the cost of bribes
to corrupt criminal justice officials, and other expensCs."); see also infra Part TV.C.
503. See Extreme Poverty Report. supra note 153, 1 69 ("Families are forced to use
their limited income or sell assets to pay for bail, legal assistance, access to goods and
services within penal facilities (C.g., food or telephone usage), or travel to visit the
detaince.").
504. See id. ("Children's education is also often disrupted when their parents are
detained. In this context, detention represents a serious thrCat to the financial stability
of the detainec's whole family and serves to perpetuaLte the cyce of poverty."); see also
OPEN SOC'YJUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 370, at 28-29 ("For even pretrial detainee
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Finally, rampant overcrowding, inadequate healthcare facilities,
and grossly subpar services in prisons also have health
consequences for detainees and potentially for the families to
whom they return.5os
C. Corruption
"Here, money is law, the law is money.
The lawyer said that ifyou can give me 8,000 dollars,
I can fix everything with the judge and the prosecutor.
"Things don't move ifyou don't pay a bribe. 'so
Corruption is a critical problem in the Bolivian criminal
justice system and impacts the overuse of pretrial detention. The
poor are especially vulnerable to persistent corruption.@5 "8 Bolivia
has joined international efforts to combat corruption5o9 and
who loses his job as a result of detention, there is a family paying the price. In some
cases, his spouse-and even his children-must find work to make up for the lost
income. But in other cases, his spouse must quit work because of the demands imposed
by incarceration, including court appearances, prison visits, and taking food and other
necessities to the incarcerated spouse.").
505. See Lxtree Poverty Report. supra note 153, 1 70 ("Detention and incarceration
can also have serious health implications for the poorest and most vulnerable, who are
likely to be subjet to the worst treatment and conditions. including overcrowded cells.
inadequate hygiene facilities, rampant disease transmission and inadequate health
care. In some cases, overcrowding in prisons can have such a severe effect on detainees
that the conditions may even amount to a form of cruc and inhuman treatment.").
506. Interview with Matthew Anthony, Detainee, Palnasola Prison, in Santa Cruz,
Bolivia (May 17, 2012).
507. Interview with Marco Antonio Roque, supra note 275.
508. See Extrene Poverty Report. supra note 153, 1 13 ("There is a higher likelihood
that they [persons living in poverty] will be detrimentally affected by corruption or
asked to pay bribes .... "); see also Interview with Detainces of Cantunarca Prison
Men's Unit, supra note 277.
509. For example, Bolivia is a party to the Inter-American Convention against
Corruption (Ratified 1/23/97). The Convention applies:
"to the following acts of corruption: a. The solicitation or acceptance,
directly or indirectly, by a government official or a person who performs
public functions, of any artidce of monetary value, or other benefit, such as
a gift, favor, promise or advantage for himself or for another person or
entity, in exchange for any act or omission in the performance of his
public fiunctions; b. The offering or granting, directly or indirectly, to a
government official or a person who performs public functions, of any
article of monetary value, or other benefit, such as a gift, favor, promise or
advantage for himself or for another person or entity, in exchange for any
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Bolivia's own Constitution contains several provisions addressing
corruption. 10A separate law on corruption-Law 004-defines
corruption as:
[T]he solicitation or acceptance, the offering or direct
or indirect granting, of a public servant, a natural
person or entity, domestic or foreign, of any article of
monetary value or other benefits, such as gifts, favors,
promises or advantages for himself herself or another
person or entity, in exchange for the act or omission of
any act that affects the interests of the State.?'
Despite these obligations, corruption in the judicial system
was a recurring theme in interviews conducted by the Crowley
delegation A1 Sentiments regarding corruption were expressed
act or omission in the performance of his public fiunctions; c. Any act or
omission in the discharge of his duties by a government official or a
person who performs public fiunctions for the purpose of illicitly obtaining
benefits for himself or for a third party[.]"
Organization of Ainrican States. lInter-Aincrican Convention against Corruption,
Mar. 29, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-39, O.A.S.T.S. No. 1-58, 35 I.L.M. 724, 729
(1996), available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/cnglish/sigs/b-58.htil. Similarly,
according to the United Natioins Convention against Corruption, Ratified by Bolivia 5
Dec 2005, Article 15:
Each State Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be
necessary to establish as criminal oflences, when committed intentionally: (a)
The promise, offering or giving, to a public official, directly or indirectly, of
an undue advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person or
entity in order that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of
his or her official duties; (b) The solicitation or acceptance by a public official,
directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage, for the official himself or
herself or another person or entity, in order that the official act or refrain
from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties. UN Convention
against Corruption, supra note 165.
510. CONSTITUTION, supra note 75, art. 108(8) ("The following are the duties of
Bolivian males and females: ... 0To report and fight against all of the acts of
corruption."); see id. art. 123 ("The lawv only stipulates with regards to the future and
will not have a retroactive effect, except . . . in corruption matters, to investigate,
process and sanction the crimes committed by public servants against the interests of
the State."); see id. art. 231(5) ("The functions of the Attorney General of the State are,
besides those established by the Constitution and the law: ... To re(luest the maximum
executive authority of public entities the trial of the male or female public servants
who, for negligence or corruption, cause damage to the patrimony of the State.").
511. Law of the Fight Against Corruption, Illicit Enrichment and Investigation of
Fotunes, Law "Marcelo Quiroga Santa Cruz" No. 004. art. 2, 31 March 2010 (Bol.).
512. Interview with Joe Loney, supra note 172 (emphasizing the "high levels of
corruption); Interview with Vladimir Nilo Medina Choque, supra note 172 ("The rate
of corruption in the Bolivian justLice system is very high."); Interview with Ninoska Ayala
Flores, supra note 83 ("Corruption is a widespread problem.").
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by detainees, judges, lawyers, prosecutors, and others. For
example, the system was described as "a sea of corruption"513
and as being "permeated by corruption."15 4 A range of actors
were implicated, including judges, 51 prosecutors, 66 defense
attorneys,517 the police,5' 8 and prison guards.519 One detainee
characterized the system as follows: "The Bolivian justice system
is very corrupt. Their philosophy in the prison is that you're not
judged by your crime, but by your class."5 2 1
Interviewees identified insufficient funding and resulting
low salaries as contributing to the prevalence of corruption
throughout the system. One official pointed out, "there is
corruption among the police. The average salary is what a maid
makes - 200 [Bolivianos] or less a month. There is no access to
training - they mostly come from rural areas with little formal
education . . .[This] doesn't justify corruption but there are
reasons why police look for other ways to get money."5'2
Corruption was also identified by interviewees as prevalent
throughout different stages of the criminal justice process, and
513. Interview with Rarniro Llanos, supra note 1.
514. Interview with Kathryn Ledcbur, supra note 262.
515. Interview with Vladimir Nilo Medina Choque, supra note 172 ("One judge
was also caught red handed for taking bribes."). Another lawyer also identified judges
as being corrupt. Interview with Audalia Zurita Zelada, supra note 215.
516. Interview with judge, in Bolivia (May 16, 2012) ("The law says one thing but
the results can be different. The other side can pay the prosecution or the judge."); see
also Interview with Emitirco M Candori. Detainee in San Pedro Prison. La Paz. Bolivia
(May 24, 2012). Another lawyer explained that one reason for the excessive
application of pretrial detention is because "[i]t is very easy to bribe a judge or
prosecutor to get a favorable result." Interview with Jcjcs Justiniano Atal, supra note
173.
517. Interview with Matthew Anthony, Detainee, Palnasola Prison, in Santa Cruz,
Bolivia (May 17, 2012).
518 . See Interview with Michael Klode, Coordination Assistant, Deutsche
Gesellschaft fur Ilnternationale Zusaminenarbeit (GIZ) [Geriman Soc'y for Int1 Coop.],
in La Paz, Bolivia (May 24, 2012) (stating that " [c]orruption involves prosecutors and
the police"); see also Interview with Enrique MacClean Soruco, supra note 77
(" [W] orking in the prisons is an opportunity to get bribes [for the police that work in
prisons].").
519. Interview with Iblin Fores V., Pastoral Penitenciaria, in Potost, Bolivia (May
16, 2012).
520. Interview with Limbor Poral Scqouiz, supra note 411.
521. Interview with Anonymous Oficial, supra note 59. Another lawyer, when
asked whether low pay invites corruption responded: "Of course! I'm not saying the
ones who get less money should steal but it is one more reason for corruption."
Interview with Silvia Salame Farjat, supra note 91.
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as having a particular impact on pretrial detention. As a
representative of the Public Ministry explained, "There is
corruption in assigning pretrial detention."5 22 Being unable to
pay bribes, the poor are more likely to be placed in pretrial
detention in the first place. As one detainee expressed, "The
corruption in judges is eighty or ninety percent. If you have
money you're not here.""5 23 One interviewee explained that in
some cases "victims pay the prosecutors who will then contact
the judge. Last year for example, three prosecutors were
arrested being caught taking bribes."524 In other cases, bribes go
directly to judges and others who work in the courts, such as
those in charge of managing evidence.525
Bribes are sometimes paid by victims to ensure that judges
will assign pretrial detention when they otherwise would not.5 26
In other cases, the accused pay judges to not order pretrial
detention, resulting in a bidding war between opposing sides.57
The bribe-paying system has become more organized and
sophisticated, taking the shape of networks consisting of law
firms that have been formed to pay off judges.28 One detainee
described that while prosecutors and judges do not necessarily
directly ask for money, there is a "brokering" system whereby
particular inmates are designated as point persons for judges.5"
In some instances the prosecutors themselves request bribes.1
Further, while there are prosecutors and judges who cannot be
bribed, "you can pay a lawyer to switch the judge or
prosecutor,"531 thus finding a way to engage in corruption.
522. Interview with a Representative of the Public Ministry, in La Paz, Bolivia (May
22, 2012).
523. Interview with Detainees of Cantunarca Prison Men's Unit, supra note 277.
524. Intervicw with Vladimir Nilo Medina Choquc, supra note 172.
525. Id. ("Bribingjudges and prosecutors and people who are working at the trial
level. For example, the custodian of evidence. ")
526. Id. (Explaining, "It's cither way. Whatever the victim wants."). As one judge
explained: "The system we have now with people held in pretrial detention has become
a mechanism for victims to engage in extortion activities too." Interview with Margot
Pcrez Montano, supra note 69.
527. Interview with Vladimir Nilo Medina Choque, supra note 172.
528. Id. ("There arc nctworks that have been formed to pay off the judges. They
are made up of law firms and j udges.").
529. Interview with I imbor Poral Seqouiz, supra note 411.
530. See Intcrview with Detainees, El Abra Prison. in Cochabamba, Bolivia (May
14, 2012) ("The prosecutor asked for money.").
531. See Interview wvith I imbor Poral Seqouiz, supra note 411.
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One detainee in Potosf argued that one of the primary
reasons Bolivia has one of the highest rates of pretrial detention
in the world is because judges and prosecutors are only paid
bribes by victims when they assign pretrial detention, but not
when they order alternatives to pretrial detention. 1 On the
other hand, one lawyer explained that in the case of defendants
who are alleged narco-traffickers, who can afford to hire private
lawyers "whose specialty or skill is bribery," the exact opposite
outcomes result. That is, they are released even before an oral
trial commences and given alternative measures that poorer
defendants who are unable to pay bribes are not likely to be
assigned.5 3 Even the fear of being suspected of taking bribes
affects judicial decisions: as one lawyer suggested, "judges
haven't decreased the level of pretrial detention significantly
because if they do the view is that they're being bribed if they
don't have enough guilty verdicts."534
Bribe taking also occurs at the stage of release from pretrial
detention. A detainee in Riberalta described how his motion for
cessation of pretrial detention was denied, despite having been
detained for the legal limit of three years. He was told that the
motion would be granted if he paid: " [T] he judges don't respect
that regulation [the cessation of pretrial detention after three
years without a sentence], because they want from us, they
demand from us, that we pay them . . . "535 Another example
was shared by a South African detainee in Palmasola prison in
Santa Cruz:
My lawyer says he'll get me out. I need to pay US$1500
now and another US$2000 when I get out. The lawyer
says the money is to pay for documents to be released -
to set up a marriage with a Bolivian woman, to get a
job certificate, to get a housing certificate. . . . Once
532. Interview with Detainees of Canturnarca Prison Men's Unit, supra note 277.
533. See Interview with Juan Carlos Octavio Pinto Quintanilla, supra note 372.
While Artidce 240 of CPC 007 allows for alternativc measures to be ordered under
certain circumstances, for a crime such as narco-traflicking, which likely carries a
sentence of greater than three years, without the influence of bribes or othier corrupt
practices, it is likely that pretrial detention would be considered the appropriate
measure.
534. Interview with Kathryn Ledcbur, supra note 262.
535. Interview with Wilfredo Vasquez, Detainee and Delegate, Riberalta Carceleta,
in Riberalta, Bolivia (May 16, 2012).
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the money is paid, it should be twenty days until I am
released.366
Another example, shared by a volunteer with the Pastoral
Penitenciaria, provides the perspective of the vastly different
outcomes that are reached based on whether accused
individuals engage and participate in corruption:
The most impressionable thing in my thirteen years of
volunteer work in the Pastoral was those four people
that were apprehended on the bus on the way from La
Paz . . . The three people had been given fifty kilos
of cocaine in a carafe, and the woman from San Boija
had been given a small package . . . She said she
didn't know what was in the package, it could be
because she's someone that doesn't have many
resources and is ignorant . . . She came to Riberalta
to be seen because she had cancer and she came to get
an operation . . . She was paid 500 bolivianos to take
the package, and she took the money, it was welcome
because she was coming here to Riberalta to be seen by
a doctor. The four of them go to jail. I heard a lawyer
[saying] . . . "4000 [bolivianos] each and in a month
they're out of jail." He distributed the money that he's
going to give to the secretaries, judges, and all that.
Look at the justice that goes to some corrupt people,
the ones who had fifty kilos were freed . . . and the
woman with three hundred and fifty grams of cocaine
got twelve years of prison . . . There's a lot of
injustice, considering that poor people are there, and
the rich people don't even step at the door of the jail.
They have good lawyers and they get out . . with
friends, influence, and money, buying the authorities.
537
CONCLUSION
The Crowley delegation's research and interviews with
individuals in Bolivia demonstrate that the excessive and
arbitrary use of pretrial detention is an issue of grave concern.
The combination of legal reforms that have made it easier for
536. Interview with Morris Brown, supra note 471.
537. Interview with Maricruz "Pincha" Morales, Pastoral Penitenciaria, in
Riberalta, Bolivia (May 16, 2012).
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individuals to be detained and to be detained for longer periods
of time in combination with the lack of respect for laws that
protect individuals demonstrates the need for stricter
application of existing laws as well as monitoring and advocacy
to prevent the passing of laws that will further restrict rights. In
addition, concerns about citizen security, while themselves
legitimate, cannot be used to justify pretrial detention,
particularly when increased use of pretrial detention does not
make society safer. And finally, the human resource limitations
that contribute to this practice must be addressed. It is all too
easy and all too common for the government and for society to
both ignore and judge individuals who are brought into the
criminal justice system; efforts must be made to ensure full
human rights guarantees for all individuals who come into
contact with the criminal justice system and those in pretrial
detention. They must not be "left to rot."
RECOMMENDATIONS
The Bolivian government must reduce the excessive and
arbitrary use of pretrial detention. Pretrial detention should
only be ordered in limited circumstances as an exceptional
measure and for the shortest period of time possible when no
reasonable alternative can address genuine risk of flight or
obstruction of justice. Towards this end, the Bolivian
government must ensure that legal rights, including increased
protections for persons accused of committing crimes, many of
which were enacted as Bolivia underwent a transition from the
inquisitorial to adversarial system of law, are protected in
practice.
The following are recommendations directed at the
government to enforce existing laws as well as to enact legal and
other reforms. Recommendations are also directed at the
international community and non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) and civil society to advocate for such enforcement and
enactment.
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I. LEGAL
A. EXISTING LAV
The government of Bolivia should establish an independent
oversight body comprised of qualified and independent
members to monitor hearings and periodically review judicial
decisions to ensure compliance with and enforcement of the
following CPC provisions:
Basis for pretrial detention: ensure that judges
" Apply CPC Article 233 in its totality: at the pretrial
hearing, the judge must place the burden of
proof squarely on the prosecution to present
evidence that the accused committed the crime
and that the accused "shall not submit to the
procedure or shall obstruct the discovery of the
truth."
a Enforce CPC articles 234 and 235 in their entirety
by considering a range of factors to decide
whether pretrial detention is necessary. This
analysis should be a holistic one as opposed to a
narrow consideration of whether the accused can
furnish documents such as a lease and work
certificate, requirements that have a particularly
harmful effect on the poor. The judge should
only order pretrial detention when the
prosecution proves the need for detention
through specific and demonstrable evidence.
o Do not use the gravity of the alleged crime as the
only basis for pretrial detention.
o Use pretrial hearings for their stated purpose:
that is, to determine whether pretrial detention is
necessary, rather than to determine the
culpability of the accused.
o Ensure that pretrial detention serves the
procedural purpose for which it is intended: the
"discovery of the truth" and the progression of
the case to subsequent stages of the criminal
justice process.
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Pretrial detention decision: The independent monitoring
body should review decisions and ensure that judges
explain the specific reasons that underlie a decision to
order pretrial detention and the length of detention.
The length should be based on the time required to
bring the preparatory phase of the criminal investigation
forward.
Extensions: The CPC Article 134 requirement that
prosecutors inform judges of the progress of their
investigation every three months must be enforced.
When prosecutors request extensions, judges must
enforce the requirement that they present evidence to
prove the need for these extensions, taking into account
whether they used the preparatory and preliminary
phases of the investigation for the purposes for which
they are intended (including the collection of evidence,
investigative activities and preparation of a defense
strategy, including regular meetings with defendants).
When judges grant extensions, they should base the
length of the extension on the individual circumstances
of the case; the default should not be a full extension.
Repercussions for non-compliance:
o The government should establish repercussions
for judges, prosecutors, defense lawyers and
detainees who do not appear at hearings and thus
cause hearings to be suspended (in the case of
detainees, they should assess who is responsible
for their absence).
o The new body should ensure that "negligent
officials" are subject to disciplinary and criminal
liability for failing to meet deadlines (as required
by CPC Article 135) and that officials guilty of
"malicious delay" are punished (as laid out in
CPC Article 177(2)).
o The body should investigate and expose the
system of punitive measures imposed by the
Public Ministry on prosecutors and judges for not
requesting and ordering, respectively, pretrial
detention or for not adequately "punishing"
2013] 19
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accused individuals. This interference with
judicial independence should be eliminated.
B. LEGAL REFORMS
Revisions to specific CPCprovisions
" Include an "and" between the two enumerated
provisions of CPC Article 233 to provide clarity
about the requirements for pretrial detention and
to reflect a recent Constitutional Court decision.
The revised provision should read:
"Once the formal charge has taken place,
the judge may order that the defendant
submit to pretrial detention at the well-
founded request of the prosecutor or the
victim, even if he has not been established
as the complainant, when the following
requirements are met: the existence of
elements of sufficient conviction to sustain
that the accused is, with probability, the
author or participated in the offense and
the existence of elements of sufficient
conviction that the accused shall not
submit to the procedure or shall obstruct
the discovery of the truth."
a Include specific language about what constitutes
grounds for (1) extensions of the preliminary
investigation (CPC Article 301) and the
preparatory stage (CPC Article 134); (2)
exceptions to the three-year maximum duration
of the criminal justice process (CPC Article 133);
and (3) exceptions to the cessation of pretrial
detention (CPC Article 239).
o Remove recidivism as an independent ground for
pretrial detention.
o Reduce the time limits for the length of pretrial
detention and the maximum duration of the
criminal justice process.
Alternatives to pretrial detention: Expand the range of
available alternatives to pretrial detention under Article
240. Trainings should encourage defense lawyers to
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advocate for and judges to consider these alternatives,
particularly in the case of individuals accused of non-
violent offenses if flight risk or obstruction of the
investigation can still be reasonably avoided. In all cases,
the prosecutor must establish why alternative measures
would be insufficient to guarantee that the process will
proceed. Additional alternatives to pretrial detention
may include a sworn promise by the defendant to attend
court hearings, periodic reporting to a court or other
authority as a condition of remaining free pending trial,
and different types of surveillance.
- Pretrial services program: Study and consider the adoption
of a pretrial services program, looking for guidance to
UMECA (La Unidad de Medidas Cautelares para
Adolescentes or the Unit of Precautionary Measures for
Adolescents) in the State of Morelos in Mexico which
created Latin America's first such program. UMECA
evaluates individual cases and proposes release and
supervision alternatives to detention based on a risk-
assessment report of detainees, based on interviews and
background information.53
- Prevent the enactment of legal reforms that will increase pretrial
detention: Monitor developments that are currently
underway that would make pretrial detention even more
widespread and mobilize to prevent these changes from
being made.
II. INCREASED COLLECTION AND TRANSPARENCY OF DATA
The Bolivian government, under the leadership of the Prison
System [Regimen Penitenciario], should:
- Record-keeping: Create a centralized, national system that
records a prisoners date of entry into pretrial detention
and put into place an alert system based on these records
538. See OPEN SOC'y FOUNDS.- THE GLOBAL CAMPAIGN FOR PRETRIAL JUSTICL:
IMPROVING PRETRIAIJUSTICE IN MEXICO, http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/site
s/default/files/Factshect20PTD% 20Mcxico%2002201 3.pdf (last visited, Apr. 26.
2013).
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to notify relevant judicial authorities when the legal limits
for pretrial detention are about to expire: eighteen
months without an indictment; thirty-six months without
a sentence; no longer than the legal minimum of the
penalty for the most serious offense being tried; or three
years total.
- Basic statistics and injormation:
o Regularly collect and publish official statistics on
their pretrial detention policies, practices, and
population.
o Routinely collect and disseminate statistics on
critical aspects of the criminal justice system
including: the number of people in pretrial
detention, the length of pretrial detention
periods, crime rates, and the number of formal
charges, indictments and sentences.
- Documentation: Document the socioeconomic impact of
pretrial detention on families and communities by
conducting surveys that demonstrate the over-
representation of poor and marginalized communities in
detention.
H. CAPA CITY BUILDINTG
To ensure that actors in the criminal justice system are aware of
the rights of persons accused of committing crimes, the
government must commit to increasing the number of judges,
prosecutors, and SENADEP lawyers in the system, as well as
increasing their capacity. Further, detainees and their families
should be made aware of their rights in order to be better able
to protect and advocate for themselves.
A. INCREASE AND IMPROVE CAPACITY IN THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM
- Increase the number of judges, prosecutors and SE4DEP
lawvers:
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o The government must increase the number of
judges, prosecutors, and SENADEP lawyers,
particularly in remote areas of Bolivia. In
particular, it should allocate sufficient resources
to SENADEP to comply with their national and
international obligations to ensure that accused
individuals are guaranteed the right to legal
advice and assistance from the earliest stages of
the criminal justice process (including at police
stations and during police interviews) and to
guarantee the principle of "equality of arms"
between the prosecution and defense. This will
also contribute to reducing the disproportionately
high percentage of poor people in pretrial
detention.
o Necessary funding: Foreign governments and
funders should maintain or increase funding to
SENADEP to ensure sufficient numbers of lawyers
are available. They should also fund trainings to
ensure that these lawyers provide quality defense.
Bilateral cooperation programs should focus on
increasing the capacity of the judiciary and the
defense in order to have a real and meaningful
impact on the criminal justice system and the
disproportionately high number of pretrial
detainees in Bolivian prisons.
Expand capacity of the system: Recruit and train paralegals
to address the shortage of SENADEP lawyers. 6" These
paralegals can provide legal aid, particularly at the initial
stages of the criminal justice process, and thus help to
reduce the number of people who are arbitrarily and
unnecessarily put in pretrial detention. They can also
539. Countries including Bangladesh, Malawvi and Sierra Leone have put into
place paralegal prograns to address problems associated with pretrial detention. See
OPEN SOC'Y FOUNDS., IMPROVING PRETRIAL JLSTICL: THE ROLE OF LAHYERS AND
PARALEGALS, http://wwW.openIsocietyfoundations.org/Sites/defaut/files/improving-
pretrial-Justice-20120416.pdf (last visited Apr. 26, 2013) and UN Legal Aid Principles,
supra note 150, which recognize paralegals as legal aid providers.
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review the date that individuals were put in pretrial
detention to monitor when pretrial detention terms will
expire.
- Trainings for current actors: Conduct trainings aimed at
judges, prosecutors and defense lawyers on key
provisions of the CPC that impact pretrial detention.
These trainings should emphasize both technical skills
and the foundational principles and values underlying
the adversarial system. Key principles include the
presumption of innocence, the use of pretrial detention
as an exceptional measure, and other due process rights.
- System of review for defense lawyers: Put into place job
performance evaluations for SENADEP lawyers to
increase motivation to provide effective and quality
defense. This also complements CPC provisions that
provide punitive measures for judges and prosecutors
who are in non-compliance with the Code. Because many
lawyers use SENADEP as a stepping stone for positions
with the prosecutor or judiciary, encourage the Public
Ministry and the judiciary to base their hiring decisions
on these evaluations.
- Address corruption within the system:
" Document the extent of corruption in the
criminal justice system and increase oversight,
particularly at those stages of the system that are
most vulnerable to corruption.
o Increase efforts to align practices with Bolivia's
legal obligations with respect to corruption (the
Constitution, Law 004, the United Nations
Convention against Corruption, and the Inter-
American Convention against Corruption).
o Punish officials found guilty of engaging in
corrupt practices.
B. INCREASE CAPACITY OUTSIDE THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM
- Expand access to information for ordinary Bolivians as well as
pretrial detainees:
o NGOs and other civil society actors should create
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"know-your-rights" materials and disseminate
them through outreach efforts and trainings both
in community settings and inside prisons. Pastoral
Penitenciaria and "Training and Citizen Rights"
(CDC) are particularly well placed to conduct
these trainings. These materials will provide
individuals with the knowledge and advocacy skills
and tools they need to navigate through the
criminal justice system if they or their family
members are arrested. They should contain the
following information:
(1) The legal purpose of pretrial detention,
including the fact that pretrial detention is
different from a post-conviction sentence and
therefore must not serve as punishment;
(2) The legal time limits of pretrial detention;
(3) The legal requirements that must be
satisfied to legitimize the use of pretrial
detention. In particular, materials should
stress the fact that the prosecutor must prove
the need for pretrial detention through
evidence and that defendants are not required
to prove that they should not be detained.
- Outreach to vulnerable groups: A particular emphasis
should be placed on outreach to vulnerable groups
including poor communities, indigenous communities
(in their native languages) and women.
- Outreach to impact society-wide understanding of the criminal
process:
" These materials should aim to correct
misunderstandings about the criminal justice
system that form the basis for societal pressure on
judges to impose pretrial detention. They should
be aimed at helping to reframe the mentality of
the citizenry by showing that the criminal justice
system must operate based on principles of due
process.
o Outreach should also be directed at
neighborhood groups to address citizen security
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concerns through joint meetings between
members of these groups, the police, and the
judiciary to discuss how citizen security can be
addressed in a way that does not rely on pretrial
detention.
o Bring a human face to the experiences of pretrial
detainees through a radio program - "detainee
voices"o540 - that brings the personal stories of
pretrial detainees to the public to better inform
society about pretrial detention and human rights
abuses.
Advocacy around society problems: NGOs and civil society
should
a Demand increased transparency about data such
as the number of pretrial detainees and the
number of formal charges, indictments and
sentences. Based on this data, they should expose
the fact that high rates of pretrial detention do
not increase citizen security, particularly given the
extremely low rate of cases that reach the final
stages of the criminal justice process.
o Redirect advocacy to focus on demanding that the
criminal justice system functions and that cases
progress to indictment, conviction and sentence
or acquittal.
o Put increased pressure on the State to address
societal problems underlying crime, particularly
issues related to poverty, in order that the State
fulfills their obligation to address poverty. They
should advocate for greater attention and
investment in poverty reducing steps such as
institution building, education and social services
and monitor the development of the post-2015
generation of the Millennium Development
Goals. This advocacy should join efforts currently
underway to include rule of law and access to
justice, which would contribute to sustainable
540. As part of their follow-up advocacy work, incinbers of the Crowley delegation
created a "detainee voices" script based on the experiences that interviewed detainces
shared. Please contact the author if interested in obtaining a copy of this script.
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development, poverty reduction and improved
citizen security, in these MDGs.
I1. CONDITIONS OF DETENTION
- Separation: Separate pretrial detainees from convicted
and sentenced individuals, women from men, and
juveniles from the adult population in conformity with
both Bolivian and international law.
- Basic necessities: Provide detained persons with basic
necessities (mattresses, nutritious food, water, clothing,
toiletries medical care, and medication) free of charge,
in particular to avoid the gap in conditions for different
individuals based on their ability to pay. Provide
additional rations and medical care to pregnant women.
- Rights of children: Put measures in place so that children
who live with their parents in prison can live as
normalized a life as possible by attending school and
engaging in other activities.
- Independent monitoring system: Independent monitoring
bodies should carry out regular visits to prisons to ensure
that conditions are aligned with requirements under
Bolivian and international law.
- Complaints mechanism: Put into place mechanisms for
detainees to report abuses and seek redress without
putting themselves in danger.
AANEX 1: FEBRURY 2012 ITINERARY
Preliminary Trip by Aya Fujimura-Fanselow to La Paz and
Cochabamba, Bolivia
Friday, February 10, 2012: La Paz
Ramiro Orias Arredondo, Attorney and Executive
Director, Fundaci6n Construir
Susana Saavedra Badani, Attorney and Program
Coordinator,
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Fundacidn Construir
Yedko Ilific Crowsa, Human Rights Attorney
Enrique MacClean Soruco, Attorney and Former Professor
and Litigation Instructor
Sunday, February 12, 2012: La Paz
Cisar Quiroga Soria, Attorney, Consortium of Lawyers
Jean Friedman-Rudovsky, Journalist
Noah Friedman-Rudovsky, Photographer
Monday, February 13, 2012: La Paz
juan JManuelArbona, Associate Professor, Bryn Mawr
College, Pennsylvania, United States
Ivan Lima, Attorney, Lima and Associates
Pamela Delgadillo, Attorney
Rogelio Mayta, Attorney
Dr. Kathia Saucedo Paz, Technical Coordinator, Project of
Support to the Reform Process, German Society for
International Cooperation [Deutsche Gesellschaft fftr
Internationale Zusammenarbeit] (GIZ)
Tuesday, February 14, 2012: La Paz
Cisar Quiroga Soria Gretzel Brozovich, and Se"gio Molina,
Attorneys, Consortium of Lawyers
Dr. Eduardo Rodriguez Veltzi, Dean of the Faculty of Law
and Political Science and Ana Paola Lorberg Romero,
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Coordinator of Academic Pedagogy, Catholic
University of Bolivia San Pablo
janaina Coutinho, Coordinator of Women, Gender
Observatory
Jacob Tamm, Political Section, Delegation of the
European Union to Bolivia
Wednesday, February 15, 2012: La Paz
Rosaly Ledezma, Attorney, Consultant on judicial reforms
Rommrn Raia, Human Rights Unit, Police Department
jorge L6pez Arenas, Former Director General, Bolivian
Prison System
Adriana Montenegro, Filmmaker and Director, Ind6mita
Thursday, February 16, 2012: Cochabamba
jim Schultz, Founder and Executive Director, The Democracy
Center
Representatives, Pastoral Penitenciaria
Friday, February 17, 2012: La Paz
Elvira Alvarez Ald, Founder, Vida Nueva
Maria del Carmen Michel and Ana Ibafiez, Representatives,
Pastoral Penitenciaria
Detainees, Miraflores Women's Prison
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ANNEX II: IAY 2012 ITINERARY
Crowley Delegation Fact-Finding Trip to Cochabamba, Guayaamerin,
La Paz, Potosi, Riberalta, Santa Cruz, Sucre, and Trinidad, Bolivia
Cochabamba and Santa Cruz Team Itinerary, May 14-17, 2012
Monday, May 14, 2012: Cochabamba
Kathryn Ledebur, Director, Andean Information Network
Joe Loney, Volunteer, Pastoral Penitenciaria
Detainees, El Abra Prison
Tuesday, May 15, 2012: Cochabamba and Santa Cruz
Dr.Jorge Fernandez, Attorney, National Public Defender
Service of Bolivia [SENADEP], Cochabamba
Anonymous Member of thejudiciay, Santa Cruz
Cesar Suarez Saavedra, Appellate CourtJudge, Santa Cruz
Doctor Maritza Sun tura Juaniquina, Magistrate, Supreme
Tribunal ofJustice, Santa Cruz
Wednesday, May 16, 2012: Santa Cruz
Fernando Orellana Medina and Irisjustiniano, Examining
Judges
Kadir H. Alvarado fustiniano and jorge Cabral Berdecio,
Attorneys, The Jessika Borda Foundation of
Assistance to Victims of Crime
jerjesJustiniano Atald, Private Attorney
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Maria Rosa V'alencia P, Municipal Director of Gender and
Generational Afairs, Municipal Ombudsman for
Children and Adolescents
Thursday, May 17, 2012: Santa Cruz
Palmasola Prison
Anonymous, Detainee
Matthew Anthony, Detainee
Morris Brown, Detainee
Victor Henr Hall, Detainee
Observation ofpretrial hearing, courtroom of Fernando
Orellana Medina, Examining Judge
Friday, May 18, 2012: Santa Cruz
Alain Nuiez Rojas, Judge, Supreme Court of the
Department of Santa Cruz, and Member,
Commission for the Modification of the Criminal
Procedure Code
Sucre and Potosf Team Itinerary, May 14-17, 2012
Monday, May 14, 2012: Sucre
Arturo Ydfiez Cortez, Attorney and Vice-President,
Illustrious Bar Association of Chuquisaca
Anonymous CriminalAttorney
Tuesday, May 15, 2012: Sucre
Centro Juana Azurday
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Iartha Noya Laguna, Executive Director
Sylvia Ortiz, Attorney for the Defense of Women
Dr. Maria Esther Padilla Sosa, Coordinator
Ximena Lucia Mendizdbal Hurtado, Examining Judge
Marcelo Barrios Arancibia, Sentencing Judge
Silvia Salame Farat, Attorney and President, Illustrious
Bar Association of Chuquisaca
Boris Wilson Arias Lopez, Law Clerk, Constitutional Court
Wednesday, May 16, 2012: Potosf
Pastoral Penitenciaria
Padre Thomas Hernes, Representative
Iblin Flores V., Representative
Laura ivion Calle Bustillos, Representative
Ricardojairnes G, Representative
Nelma Teresa Tito Araujom, President, Second Criminal
Court, Department ofJustice
Dr. Luis D. Lopez Rosales, Former National Director of
Public Defenders
Anonymous julge
Sandro Fuertes JM1iranda, Prosecutor
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Cantumarka Prison
Detainees, Women's Unit
Detainees, Men's Unit
Thursday, May 17, 2012: Sucre
Maria Angelica L6pez MoIrales, Director, Prison System of
Chuquisaca
Pastoral Penitenciaria
Angela Olivia Beltran Sandoval, Representative
Maria Consuelo Cudllar, Representative
Guayaramerin, Riberalta, and Trinidad Team Iinerary. May 15-
18,2012
Tuesday, May 15, 2012: Trinidad
SENADEP
Dr. Epiphanio Quispe Conde, Director
Dr. Alberto Andrado Dorado, Attorney
Da. Marta Bascop6 Mendieta, Attorney
Dr. Marcelo Illanes Saavedra, Attorney
Dr. Edwin Vaca Arce, Director, Penitentiary Regimen,
Department of Beni
Observation of pretrial hearing, Trinidad courtroom
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Wednesday, May 16, 2012: Riberalta
Maricruz "Pincha " Morales, Representative, Pastoral
Penitenciaria
Riberalta Carceleta
Dan iel Chavez Ortiz, Detainee
Klisman Ruiz Pena, Detainee
Wilfredo Vasquez, Detainee
Abel Bikini Villamor, Detainee
Thursday, May 17, 2012: Guayaramerin and Riberalta
Anonymous Prosecutor
Dr. Jesus Martinez Subirana, Attorney, SENADEP,
Riberalta
Guayaramerfn Carceleta
Anonymous, Detainee
Juan Alberto Melgar Taborga, Detainee
Dr.Juan Carlos Chaurara Ojopi, Attorney, SENADEP,
Guavaramerfn
Friday, May 18, 2012: Trinidad
Mocovi Carceleta
Anonymous, Detainee
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Gaspar Alpire Barizo, Detainee
Marco Antonio Roque, Detainee
La Paz Itinerary, May 21-25, 2012
Monday, May 21, 2012
Ramiro Orias Arredondo, Attorney and Executive Director,
Fundaci6n Construir
Susana Saavedra Badani, Attorney and Program
Coordinator, Fundaci6n Construir
Representatives, Pastoral Penitenciaria
Ivan Lima, Attorney, "Lima and Associates"
Roger Valverde Perez, Attorney
Tuesday, May 22, 2012
Anonymous Official
Jorge Richter Amallo, Attorney and Former Member,
Criminal Procedure Code Reform Team
Lic. Blanca Laguna de Vera, Office of the Ombudsman
Anonymous Representative, Public Ministry
Audalia Zurita Zelada, Attorney
Reynaldo Imaffa, Attorney and Former Director,
Implementation Team of the Criminal Reform
Process in Bolivia
Justo Salazar Rodas, National Director, SENADEP
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Juan Carlos Octavio Pinto Quintanilla, National Director,
SIFDE [Servicio Intercultural de Fortalecimiento
Democratico, Tribual Supremo Electoral, Organo
Electoral Plurinacional], [Intercultural Service of
Democratic Strengthening, Supreme Electoral Court,
Plurinational Electoral Organ]
Wednesday, May 23, 2012
Enrique MacClean Soruco, Attorney and Former Professor
and Litigation Instructor
Representatives, Embassy of the United States of America
Vladimir Nilo Medina Choque, Officer, Training and
Citizen Rights [Capacitaci6n y Derechos
Ciudadanos] (CDC)
Ninoska Ayala Flores, Attorney and National Head,
Training Program in Human Rights and the Culture
of Peace, Training and Citizen Rights [Capacitaci6n y
Derechos Ciudadanos] (CDC)
Ramiro Llanos, Director General, Bolivian Prison System
Thursday, May 24, 2012
Ramiro Leonardo Iquise Pally, National Program Manager
of People Deprived of Liberty and the Program of
Disabilities, Office of the Ombudsman
Dr. Ramiro E. L6pez Guzmdn, President, Third Criminal
Court, Department of La Paz
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Dr. Angel Arias MV1orales Fono, Judge and Member,
Commission of Pardons
Fernando ledina, Advisor, Embassy of Denmark
Michael Klode, Coordination Assistant, GIZ
Eva Maria Otero Dorado, Representative, Democratic
Governance Program and Gender, Embassy of Spain
Asa Maria Wallendahl, Representative, Section of
Cooperation, Delegation of the European Union in
Bolivia
Dr. Jose Ayaviri Siles, Criminal Enforcement Judge
Elvira Alvarez Ald, Founder, Vida Nueva
Anonyniousjudge
Maigot Perez Montafo, Examining Judge
San Pedro Prison
Dr. Oscar Benabides, Detainee and Delegate of
Palomar
Eniitireo M Candori, Detainee
Renato Aro Lopez, Detainee
Friday, May 25, 2012
Anonymous Official
Faculty of Law and Political Science, Catholic University
of Bolivia San Pablo
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Dr. Eduardo Rodriguez V eltz6, Dean of the Faculty of
Law and Political Science
Dr. Edwin Cocarico, Professor of Criminal Procedural
Law and Criminal Forensic Practice
Dr. Roxana Valverde, Professor of Criminal Law I and
II
Dr. Teresa Ledezma, Professor of Criminal Law III
San Pedro Prison
Anonymous, Detainee
Jose Geruiau Vaca Ortiz, Detainee
Limbor Poral Seqouiz, Detainee and President of
the Delegate's Council
Miraflores Women's Prison
Maria, Detainee
Theresa, Detainee
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AAEX III: JANUARY 2013 ITINElRARY
Follow-Up Advocacy and Presentation Trip to La Paz and Sucre,
Bolivia by Zohra Ahmed, Stephanie DiFazio, Aya Fujimura-Fanselow,
Zachary Hudson, Jeffrey Severson
Tuesday, January 14, 2013: La Paz
Ramiro Orias Arredondo, Attorney and Executive Director,
Fundacidn Construir
Susana Saavedra Badani, Attorney and Program
Coordinator, Fundaci6n Construir
Yerko Ilijic Crosa, Human Rights Lawyer
Wednesday, January 15, 2013: Sucre
Boris Wilson Arias Lopez, Law Clerk, Constitutional Court
Crowley Delegation Presentation of Report Findings,
Illustrious Bar Association of Chuquisaca
Thursday, January 16, 2013: Sucre and La Paz
Crowley Delegation radio interview, Radio Loyola Fides
Sucre
Fundaci6n Construir, Roundtable Discussion with NGOs
Ana Baza, Fundacidn La Paz
jnnifer Guachalla Esedbar, Specialist in Human
Rights, Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights in Bolivia
Ana Ibafiez, Pastoral Penitenciaria
Eddyjimenez, Fundaci6n La Paz
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Yana Rojas, Defensa de Nifios y Nifias
Internacional Seccidn Bolivia [Defense for
Children International, Bolivia Section]
Friday, January 17, 2013: La Paz
Aargot Pirez Mlontafio, Examining Judge and observation
of pretrial hearing
Qalaurna Detention Facility, Viacha
Colonel Deap Hugo Vila Aramayo, Director
jose Colque, Agronomy Educator
Ruben Dario Lobat6n Ortiz, Chief of Police Security
Roberto Simnoncelli, Representative, Progetto Mondo
Mial
